In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE MOST COMPASSIONATE, THE MOST MERCIFUL.

A LOT HAS BEEN TOLD ABOUT PALESTINE,AND THE PALESTINIANS. THE STORY OF THE OPPRESSION IMPOSED ON THIS NATION IS AN OLD AND DISTRESSING ONE. PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, USURPED LANDS, DAYR-YASSEEN, KFR-GHASSEM, SABRA AND SHATEELA MASSACRES, PALESTINIANS IMPRISONED IN ZIONIST CAMPS, AND ALL THE OPPRESSIONS BORNE ON THIS HEROIC AND RESISTANT NATION, ARE ALL COUNTLESS CRIMES COMMITTED BY ZIONISTS AND THEIR IMPERIALIST SUPPORTERS.

OUR MUSLIM NATION IS AWARE OF PALESTINE'S PROBLEMS, HAVING DECLARED ITS SUPPORT FOR THIS HOMELESS NATION,BEFORE AND AFTER THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. OUR NATION HAS FIRMLY DECIDED TO TAKE REVENGE ON ZIONIST ENEMIES IN THE OCCUPIED LANDS. THIS NATION'S MOST FUNDAMENTAL AND STRATEGIC GOAL IS TO LIBERATE QUDS. ITS' SONS HAVE BECOME MARTYRED IN THE WAR-FRONTS, HAVING DESIRED THE FREEDOM OF AL-AQSA MOSQUE, AND THE IMAM HAS MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS:

"MACHINE-GUNS DEPENDENT ON ISLAMIC FAITH AND POWER ARE TO BE USED IF THE LIBERATION OF QUDS IS DESIRED, AND ALL POLITICAL GAMES PLAYED TO SATISFY SUPERPOWERS, MUST BE DISCARDED."

BY RESPONDING TO THE CALL OF THE IMAM, OUR YOUTHS HOPE TO DEFEAT SADDAM'S ARMY AND THEREAFTER, HEAD FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE QUDS OCCUPIERS AND LEAD THEIR PRAYERS THERE UNDER THE PRAYER-LEADERSHIP OF IMAM KHOMEINI.

BUT HEREBY WE INVITE YOU TO HEAR THE AMERICAN-STYLE STORY OF THE PALESTINE. THESE DOCUMENTS INCLUDE INFORMATIONS, ANALYSES AND CONVERSATION MEMOS OF AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND THEIR HIRELINGS ON PALESTINE. THEY DEMONSTRATE THE ALL-PERVASIVE SUPPORT OF ISRAEL BY AMERICANS WHICH NEEDS NO FURTHER EXPLANATION. BOOKS NUMBERED 11,19, AND 36 ARE EXCELLENT RESEARCH BACK-GROUNDS IN THIS FIELD,THAT HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED BY "MUSLIM STUDENTS FOLLOWING THE LINE OF THE IMAM".

AMERICAN CRIMINALS WHO HAVE FILLED THE WORLD WITH THEIR SO-CALLED HUMAN-RIGHTS CAMPAIGNS, HAVE ACCORDING TO THESE DOCUMENTS, SUPPORTED THE OCCUPATION OF PALESTINIAN LANDS, BY PUBLICLY APPROVING OF THE TYRANTS, AND CALLING ON THE OPPRESSED TO SUBMIT TO INJUSTICE. CARTER, THE EX-AMERICAN PRESIDENT WHO WAS A STAUNCH SUPPORTER OF "HUMAN-RIGHTS POLICY ", MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IN ONE DOCUMENT:

WE HAD "NEVER FAVORED AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE" AND HAVE "NO INTENTION OF DEVIATING FROM THAT POSITION."

THE POSITION OF A REPUBLICAN CRIMINAL CAN NOT BE OTHERWISE.

IN ANOTHER DOCUMENT, AMERICANS DECLARE THEIR POSITION IN THE FOLLOWING WORDS:"

"THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO DECLINE TO DEAL WITH THE PLO AS LONG AS THE PLO DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND AS LONG AS THE PLO DOES NOT ACCEPT U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338.

U.N. RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 ARE BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION AT THE END OF THIS INTRODUCTION. RESOLUTION 242 WAS ISSUED ON NOVEMBER 22, 1967, OR AT THE END OF ZIONIST AGGRESSION TO ARAB TERRITORIES AND THE OCCUPATION OF MORE LANDS, BUT RESOLUTION 338 WAS ISSUED AT THE END OF RAMADHAN WAR IN 1973 WHEN THE ZIONIST ARMY WAS DEFEATED, YET THIS RESOLUTION CONTAINS NOTHING NEW AND MAINLY CALLS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242.

NEVERTHELESS, WE SHALL TAKE A LOOK AT THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION 242 TO FIND OUT WHY THE U.S. HAS BEEN INSISTING THAT PLO ACCEPT IT.

THE FIRST GOAL OF THIS RESOLUTION IS STATED AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY FOR ALL REGIONAL STATES THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT BEING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN THE AREA. OUR ARGUMENT IS THAT REGIONAL ARAB GOVERNMENTS USED TO LIVE IN PEACE ANYWAY, BUT A SPECIAL ELEMENT CAUSED THE DISRUPTION OF THIS PEACE. ISN'T THE ZIONIST CANCER THIS DISRUPTIVE ELEMENT? WAY IS IT THAT THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL IS TRYING TO ESTABLISH SECURITY BEFORE DENOUNCING THE ELEMENT OF INSECURITY? WHY DOES IT NOT CONDEMN THE JUNE 67 SAVAGE AGGRESSION AND ONLY TERMS IT "UNACCEPTABLE TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION THROUGH WAR."WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT MORE WHEN THE SECURITY CONCIL DECISION MAKERS AND THE ARMS SUPPLIERS OF THE ZIONIST CANCER ARE ONE AND THE SAME.TERRITORIES ARE CONFISCATED WITH THE AID OF ARMS AND MUSLIMS ARE KILLED,BUT RESOLUTIONS HIDE THESE CRIMES AND PROVIDE THE AGRESSOR WITH SECURITY.

IN THE LATTER LINES, SECTION 1-B, THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS FOR THE RECOGNITION OF ALL REGIONAL STATES' SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, AND STILL ONE PARTY IS NOT ATTENDED TO. THEN THE RESOLUTION DESIGNERS EXPAND THEIR IMPUDENCE AND AFTER MAINTAINING THE POLITICAL DEPENDENCE OF THE AGRESSOR, DECLARE THEIR INTENTION OF BRINGING PEACE FOR IT WITHIN RECOGNIZED AND SECURE BORDERS.

THE OTHER DIMENSION RELATES TO THE RESOLUTION'S APPROACH TO THE PALESTINIAN NATION. IN SECTION 2-B THE RESOLUTION ONLY STATES THE NECESSITY OF "FINDING A JUST SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM," AND NEGLECTS WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE PALESTINE AND THE PALESTINIANS, AND NOT EVEN A SLIGHT MENTION IS MADE OF THEIR RIGHTS, AND EVEN A WORD IS NOT SAID IN CONDEMNATION OF THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTEI ALL THESE CRIMES. THEY ONLY MADE A MENTION OF THIS POOR NATION AS "REFUGEES", AND HERE IT IS THAT WE MUST REPEAT THE QURANIC AYAH " WE ARE ALL FROM ALLAH, AND WE SHALL ALL GO UNTO HIM ".

THE QUESTION IS; ARE THE RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 NOT ATTEMPTING TO MATERIALIZE THE RECOGNITION OF THE ZIONISTS' EXISTENCE?

AREN'T THEY IGNORING THE UNQUESTIONABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS? AREN'T THEY COMPELLING THE OPPRESSED TO SUBMIT TO TYRANNY AND FORGET HIS OWN NATURAL RIGHTS? HOW CAN ONE COMPROMISE WITH A LAND USURPER? HOW CAN PALESTINIAN MOTHERS RECONCILE WITH THOSE WHO HAVE KILLED THEIR SONS? HOW DOES AMERICA DARE TO CALL ON PALESTINIANS TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE ZIONIST REGIME? AND WHO ARE THOSE WHO HAVE ALLOWED THE U.S. TO APPROACH THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION IN THIS MANNER? ELEMENTS OF COMPROMISE ARE TO BE SEARCHED FOR AND IDENTIFIED. BY READING THESE DOCUMENTS WE WILL FIND OUT WHY AMERICA IS PULLING THIS REVOLUTION INTO THE COMPROMISE.

PRESENTLY, ALL MUSLIMS AND ALL PALESTINIANS ACROSS THE WORLD HAVE FOUND OUT THAT QUDS WILL NOT BE LIBERATED WITHOUT AN ALL-OUT ARMED STRUGGLE AND ISLAMIC FAITH.

THOSE CONSPIRATORS THAT ARE APPARENTLY LEADING THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION AND ACCORDING TO OUR BELOVED IMAM THEY ARE FOR COMPROMISE AND ARE TRYING TO KEEP SUPERPOWERS SATISFIED ARE THE ONLY SOURCES OF DEVIATION WHO HAVE SHOWN THE GREEN LIGHT TO AMERICA. FROM AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW SUCCESS MEANS THE FOLLOWING:

" A PRINCIPAL INGREDIENT TO SUCCESS WOULD BE A CESSATION OF TERRORIST AND RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES CARRIED ON BY FATAH WITHIN ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK."

AND LATER:
" IN ANY EVENT, WE WILL WANT TO DO OUR BEST TO PROMOTE PALESTINIAN COOPERATION WITH A LASTING CEASEFIRE THROUGH INDIRECT EFFORTS WITH THIRD PARTIES."

INSTEAD OF TAKING DECISIVE POSITIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION, THE SO-CALLED LEADERS MAKE REDICULOUS AND COWARDLY GESTURES. THEY PLACE THEMSELVES FULLY AT THE DISPOSAL OF USURPERS AND ATTEMPT TO PROVE THEIR RIGHTS DURING NEGOTIATIONS:
" HE THOUGHT THAT ARAFAT WOULD RELY HEAVILY ON THE SAUDIS TO APPLY PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS TO ENSURE THAT PLO INTERESTS WERE NOT OVERLOOKED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS."

AREN'T THE SAUDIS THE THIRD PARTIES THROUGH WHOM AMERICA IS TRYING TO ENCOURAGE PALESTINIANS TO CO-OPERATION? AREN'T PALESTINIANS CAUGHT IN AN AMERICAN TRAP?

FOR THESE REASONS THEY HAVE SUBMITTED TO THE MOST SHAMEFULL PACTS, AND THE PLO EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MAKES THE FOLLOWING COMMENT:
" PLO WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STOP IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT THAT CONFORMED TO THE AMERICA/EGYPTIAN VIEW OF AUTONOMY AND SELF-DETERMINATION."

THAT IS WHEN AMERICANS BEGIN TO LIKE ARAFAT'S POLICIES AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS:
ARAFAT APPEARS TO BE BEGINNING TO REALIZE THAT THE USE OF TERRORISM MAY NOW BE AN IMPEDIMENT TO GAINING FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL DIPLOMATIC BACKING IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE US.

DURING 36 YEARS OF STAUNCH RESISTANCE, THE PALESTINIAN NATION HAS PROVED THAT IT CAN BE A MUSLIM REVOLUTIONARY NATION TO LIBERATE QUDS; AND AS AMERICA AND OTHERS ADMIT, SO FAR THEY HAVE ACCUMULATED EXTRAORDINARY EXPERINCES.

BY READING THE"INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM" SECTION IN THIS BOOK, YOU WILL EXPERIENCE AMERICA'S FEARS OF PLESTINIANS' REVOLUTIONARY CAPABILITIES. WHENEVER IMPERIALIST AND ZIONIST INTERESTS ARE DECIDED TO BE THREATENED, THE EXISTENCE OF ZIONISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS COME UNDER THREAT, AND THEY ARE PERPLEXED AND PARALIZED BEFORE THESE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES.
BY THE WAY, WHAT IS IT THAT CAN BRING ABOUT ALL THESE CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE RANKS OF A NATION AND MAKE THEM STRIKE THE FINAL BLOW ON THE ENEMIES OF PALESTINE? CAN ANY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTED BY A REACTIONARY GOVERNMENT PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THIS FIELD?

IN THESE DOCUMENTS YOU WILL SEE HOW VARIOUS STATES ARE ACTING WITH RELATION TO THIS PROBLEM. IRAQ WHOSE BULLETS ARE FIRED ONLY TO THE BENEFIT OF ZIONISM AND TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN NATION; AND OTHER REACTIONARY ARAB STATES WHOSE FINANCIAL AIDS TO THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION HAS BROUGHT NOTHING BUT CATASTROPHE, ARE ALL IMPEDIMENTS BEFORE THE MOVEMENT OF PALESTINIANS.

THE PALESTINIAN NATION CAN LIBERATE QUDS ONLY UNDER THE BANNER OF ISLAM. THAT IS HOW THE SOUTHERN LEBANESE SHI'ITES THREW THE OCCUPIERS OUT AND COMPELLED AMERICANS TO TAKE REFUGE IN THEIR WAR-SHIPS. THESE MUSLIMS HAVE CHOSEN THE ONLY DIRECT PATH TO FREEDOM. NATIONALISM AND OTHER SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT WILL NOT SOLVE PROBLEMS OF PALESTINE.

THE HEROIC SONS OF THIS NATION ARE MAKING AN ISLAMIC RESISTANCE AND THAT IS THE ONLY THING WHICH HORRIFIES ZIONISTS AND THEIR BACKERS, IN ONE DOCUMENT A ZIONIST MILITARY COMMANDER SAYS THE FOLLOWING:

THE HEAD OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN COMMAND, MAJOR GENERAL AVIGDOR BENGAL, AUGUST 9 SAID THE ARABS OF GALILEE ARE A CANCER IN ISRAEL'S BODY. WE ALSO AGREE WITH HIM. THIS CANCER WILL FINALLY DESTROY ZIONISTS AND OBLITERATE THEIR FILTHY NATURE. THE PALESTINIAN NATION WILL HOPEFULLY BE ABLE TO LIBERATE QUDS, AND THE MUSLIM IRANIAN NATION WILL KEEP BEING ON THEIR SIDE.

MAY ISLAM BECOME VICTORIOUS AND MAY IMAM MAHDI (A.S) COME TO RULE THIS WORLD.

MUSLIM STUDENTS FOLLOWING THE LINE OF THE IMAM.

Department of State

NIV

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

R 160200Z DEC 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

11635

CN 11635
DEC 16, 1971
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 225989

INFORM CONSULS

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO JORDANIANS AND PALESTIANIANS

REF: CA-3836 OF AUGUST 18, 1971

1. DEPT HAS JUST LEARNED OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO LONDON, ZAID RIFAI. INCIDENT OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY 1000Z DEC 15 NEAR JORDANIAN EMBASSY. ACCOREING OUR INFORMATION RIFAI RECEIVED ONLY MINOR WOUND BUT HIS AUTOMOBILE CAME UNDER HEAVY GUNFIRE. THIS LATEST INCIDENT, FOLLOWING IN WAKE OF PRIME MINISTER TELL ASSASSINATION IN CAIRO, DEMONSTRATES FEDAYEEN DETERMIPATION TO CARRY ON THEIR CAMPAIGN OF ASSASSIWATION AGAINST KEY GOJ FIGURES. ACCORDING TO PREVIOUS REPORTS, EXTREMIST WING OF FATAH IS BEHIND THIS CAMPAIGN.

2. ACCORDINGLY, WE TAKING HARD LOOK AT VISA POLICYNNITH REGARD TO INDIVIDUALS HAVING PAST AND PRESENT AFFILIATION WITH PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS. WE EXPECT ISSUE SHORTLY UPDATED AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS MATTER. MEANWHILE, POSTS SHOULD REQUEST EMBASSY AMMAN CLEARANCE BEFORE ISSUING VISAS TO JORDANIAN NATIONALS (EXCEPT GOJ OFFICIALS) OR PALESTINIANS. POSTS SHOULD ALSO BE ALERT TO FACT THAT FEDAYEEN IN PAST HAVE GENERALLY TRAVELLED ON SYRIAN AND ALGERIAN PASSPORTS. GP-3. ROGERS

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AmEmbassy TEHRAN

ACTION: **INCOMING TELEGRAM** CONTROL NO. 160

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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS
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VISAS INFORM CONSULS

ACTION COP

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CVIS: (JIRYIS, SABRI AND SARTAWI, ISSAM)

SUBJECT: APPLICATIONS BY PLO MEMBERS

1. RECENTLY TWO MEMBERS OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) OBTAINED VISAS. SABRI JIRYIS, BORN IN GALILEE, PALESTINE ON DECEMBER 4, 1938, OBTAINED A VISA FROM NICOSIA ON OCTOBER 8. JIRYIS, WHO HAS NOW BEEN ADDED TO THE VLOS, PRESENTED A PRESUMABLY GENUINE SUDANESE PASSPORT IN THE NAME OF SABRY ELYAS GIRAS SHOWING DPOB AS DECEMBER 12, 1938, KHARTOUM, SUDAN. HE REPRESENTED HIMSELF AS A LAWYER AND LEGAL ADVISOR TO A RESEARCH CENTER IN BEIRUT, LEBANON. HE WAS GRANTED A B-1/2 VISA FOR A ONE-MONTH VISIT TO NEW YORK AND FOR RESEARCH AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

2. ISSAM SARTAWI, BORN IN 1931 IN NABLUS, JORDAN, WAS TRAVELING WITH JIRYIS. HE IS LISTED IN THE VLOS AND THE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT KNOW WHEN OR WHERE HE OBTAINED HIS VISA. ALL POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO SEARCH THEIR VISA FILES FOR ANY RECORD OF AN APPLICATION IN THE NAME OF SARTAWI OR ANY VARIANT SPELLING SUCH AS SERTAWI, ARTAOUI OR SITAWI. FOR THOSE POSTS FILING CHRONOLOGICALLY, THE DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE ANY CHECK YOU CAN MAKE. THE ONLY TIME FRAME KNOWN TO US IS THAT JIRYIS' VISA WAS ISSUED ON OCTOBER 8 AND HE ENTERED THE COUNTRY, PRESUMABLY WITH SARTAWI, ON OCTOBER 19. SARTAWI MAY ALSO HAVE PRESENTED A SUDANESE PASSPORT.

3. THE EFFORTS OF JIRYIS AND SARTAWI TO OPEN A PLO INFORMATION OFFICE IN WASHINGTON ATTRACTED PRESS ATTENTION AND RAISED QUESTIONS AS TO HOW THEY HAD BEEN PERMITTED TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES. JIRYIS' VISA HAS BEEN REVOKED AND SARTAWI IS BELIEVED TO HAVE DEPARTED THE COUNTRY. ALL POSTS SHOULD BE ON THE ALERT FOR ANY NEW APPLICATIONS BY SARTAWI OR JIRYIS UNDER THEIR OWN NAMES OR VARIANTS THEREOF. JIRYIS COULD ALSO BE SPELLED GERIUS OR JIRJIS. ANY POST RECEIVING AN APPLICATION FROM AN INDIVIDUAL WHO COULD BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH EITHER JIRYIS OR SARTAWI SHOULD SUSPEND ACTION AND INFORM THE DEPARTMENT. ROBINSON
BT

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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS
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CAP INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, PLO

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE RE U.S. OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO

REF: GENEVA 3814 (NOTAL)

1. SEVERAL RECENT CASES HAVE COME TO DEPT'S ATTENTION OF APPROACHES TO U.S. OFFICIALS ABROAD BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). IN VIEW OF THIS, WE BELIEVE IT USEFUL TO REMIND ADDRESSEE POSTS OF LONG STANDING U.S. POLICY REGARDING CONTACTS BETWEEN U.S. OFFICIALS AND PERSONS REPRESENTING THE PLO.

2. AS DEPT SPOKESMEN HAVE STATED ON MANY OCCASIONS OVER PAST SEVERAL YEARS, OUR STANDING POLICY IS FOR U.S. OFFICIALS TO UNDERTAKE NO RPT NO DIRECT, SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PLO. THIS POLICY APPLIES EQUALLY TO DIRECT, SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS WITH MEMBERS OF THE PLO'S CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS, NOTABLY SUCH FEDAYEEN GROUPINGS AS FATAH, THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PDFLP), THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), ET AL.

3. OUR OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PLO HAS NOT RPT NOT CHANGED. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO DECLINE TO DEAL WITH THE PLO AS LONG AS THE PLO DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND AS LONG AS THE PLO DOES NOT ACCEPT U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. ACCORDINGLY, U.S. OFFICIALS ABROAD SHOULD AVOID ANY ACTION THAT MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS A DEPARTURE FROM OR RELAXATION OF THIS GENERAL POLICY.

4. CLEARLY, SITUATIONS ARE LIKELY TO ARISE FROM TIME TO TIME IN WHICH NON-SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS BETWEEN U.S. OFFICIALS AND PLO REPRESENTATIVES ARE NECESSARY AND, INDEED, UNAVOIDABLE. (EXAMPLES OF SUCH CONTACTS ARE THOSE WHICH HAVE OCCURRED AT THE UN ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECURITY MATTERS AFFECTING THE PLO OBSERVER DELEGATION IN

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, AS WELL AS THOSE WHICH TOOK PLACE IN BEIRUT IN 1976 IN CONNECTION WITH OUR EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE SUCCESSFUL EVACUATION OF U.S. AND OTHER FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM OR THROUGH PLO-CONTROLLED TERRITORY IN LEBANON.) IN THE EVENT THAT ADDRESSEE POSTS FIND THEMSELVES CONFRONTED WITH SITUATIONS OF THIS KIND, THEY SHOULD APPRISE DEPT OF THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED AND REQUEST GUIDANCE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM.

5. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT US. OFFICIALS ABROAD CANNOT ENTIRELY AVOID SOCIAL CONTACT ON AN OCCASIONAL, UNPLANNED BASIS WITH PERSONS WHO TURN OUT TO HAVE SOME OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH THE PLO. IN INADVERTENT SITUATIONS OF THIS KIND, IN WHICH THEIR EFFORTS TO AVOID CASUAL CONTACTS WITH SUCH PERSONS WOULD RUN COUNTER TO UNIVERSALLY OBSERVED SOCIAL AMENITIES, U.S. OFFICIALS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT OVER-REACT. THEY SHOULD CONDUCT THEMSELVES AS COMMON SENSE AND COURTESY DICTATE, BEING CAREFUL TO ESCHE PROLONGED AND/OR SUBSTANTIVE DISCOURSE WITH PLO REPRESENTATIVES. CHRISTOPHER
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INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS

SUBJECT: PLO THREATS TO US INTERESTS

REF: STATE 236773

1. REFTEL ADVISED US FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS TO MAINTAIN ALERT POSTURE AND TAKE APPROPRIATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS AGAINST ANTICIPATED THREAT TO US INTERESTS FROM SELECTED PALESTINIAN AND ARAB QUARTERS, IN WAKE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT AGREEMENT.

2. POSTS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THREATS AGAINST US INTERESTS HAVE BEEN ISSUED BY PALESTINIAN LEADERS, INCLUDING FATAH LEADER, YASSER ARAFAT, AND POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) LEADER, GEORGE HABBASH. ARAFAT SPEAKING IN DAMOUR, SEPTEMBER 19, SAID "CARTER'S SIGNATURE WILL COST HIM HIS INTERESTS IN THE ARAB REGION." HABBASH IN DAMASCUS ON SEPTEMBER 21 AT THE ARAB SUMMIT, "FRONT FOR STEADFASTNESS AND CONFRONTATION," REPORTEDLY SAID THE PFLP CONSIDERED "ALL AMERICAN INTERESTS (TO INCLUDE OIL) IN THE ARAB AREA AS LEGITIMATE TARGETS FOR ARAB AND PALESTINIAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS."

3. THOUGH OMINOUS IN TONE, THREATS ARE GENERAL IN NATURE. TO DATE, WE HAVE NO INTELLIGENCE ON SPECIFIC THREAT TO ANY GIVEN POST OR OTHER US OFFICIAL OR PRIVATE INTERESTS, OR AMCITS. NONETHELESS, DEPARTMENT WISHES UNDERLINE WARNING IN REFTEL AND URGES ALL POSTS TAKE SUITABLE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST POSSIBLE ACTS OF VIOLENCE. CHRISTOPHER
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INFORM CONSULS

E.O.11265 N/A

TAGS: ASEC

CIRCULATE

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SUBJECT: POSSIBLE RETALIATION BY MID-EAST TERRORIST GROUPS

1. ON JANUARY 22, 1979, ALI HASAN SALEMEH (ABU HASSAN) WAS MURDERED IN BEIRUT, LEBANON, BY A REMOTE-CONTROL BOMB. SALEMEH, A MEMBER OF FATAH WHO WAS ASSOCIATED WITH BLACK SEPTEMBER AND BELIEVED TO HAVE PLANNED THE 1972 OLYMPICS ATTACK, WAS YASIR ARAFAT'S CHIEF OF SECURITY AND WAS VERY CLOSE TO ARAFAT. THE PLO HAS BLAMED ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE FOR THE ASSASSINATION.

2. THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS OF RETALIATORY ACTS BY THE PLO, FATAH, AND/OR BLACK SEPTEMBER TO AVENGE SALEMEH'S DEATH. ALTHOUGH BLACK SEPTEMBER HAS BEEN MORIBUND FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND FATAH HAS, SINCE 1974, AVOIDED ACTS OF TERRORISM OUTSIDE ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED LANDS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS PATTERN MAY BE BROKEN.

3. AT THIS TIME, THE DEPARTMENT HAS NO INDICATION THAT AMERICAN PERSONNEL OR INSTALLATIONS WILL BE TARGETED SPECIFICALLY, NOR IS THERE INTELLIGENCE INDICATING OTHER POSSIBLE TARGETS. THIS ADVISORY IS PASSED TO ALL POSTS

FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES OR ACTION OF INCREASED VIGILANCE AS MAY BE DEEMED APPROPRIATE. SINCE POTENTIAL RETALIATORY MOVE MAY REQUIRE EXTENSIVE PLANNING (IN AN EFFORT BY TERRORISTS TO PRODUCE A SPECTACULAR OPERATION), POSTS SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, ASSUME THAT OPERATION WILL OCCUR IMMEDIATELY. VANCE
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UEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 1185
UQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 6621
UEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 4263
UEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1960
UQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2713
UQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1622
UDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1430
UEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0860
UDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0371
UQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0708
UEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3864
UDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0566
UEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1255
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 02940

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 5/3/99 (NEWTON, DAVID G.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PLO
SUBJECT: (U) PLO EXCOM MEMBER SAYS PLO SHOULD LET
U.S./EGYPTIAN STYLE AUTONOMY SUCCEED

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SECRETARY NASHASHIBI SAID THAT IF U.S./EGYPTIAN IDEA OF WEST BANK AUTONOMY PREVAILS OVER BEGIN VIEW, HE WILL ARGUE THAT PLO SHOULD TAKE A HANDS-OFF ATTITUDE, LET ITS SUPPORTERS PARTICIPATE IN WEST BANK ELECTIONS AND THEN, PERHAPS TWO OR THREE YEARS DOWN THE PIKE, PARTICIPATE IN A GENEVA-TYPE EXPANSION OF THE FRAMEWORK ESTABLISHED WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE PLO. HE FELT ARAFAT MIGHT REJECT SUCH A PASSIVE POLICY AND EITHER MAKE CONCESSIONS TO TAKE A DIRECT PART IN NEGOTIATIONS OR SEEK TO SABOTAGE THE U.S./EGYPTIAN EFFORT. THIS WOULD BE A MISTAKE, ACCORDING TO NASHASHIBI, BECAUSE THE PLO WOULD LOSE IF IT TRIED TO STAND IN THE WAY OF TRUE AUTONOMY AND SELF-DETERMINATION ON THE U.S./EGYPTIAN MODEL. HE SAID CURRENT PLO TERRORISM IN ISRAEL WAS A DISASTER AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. PLO SHOULD INSTEAD BE ATTACKING ISRAEL'S WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS AND FOCUSING WORLD ATTENTION ON WHAT BEGIN IS DOING. END SUMMARY.

5. ON MAY 1, AUSTRALIANS HAD LONG DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE NASHASHIBI ON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

- (A) THE PEACE PROCESS:

- NASHASHIBI EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER THE PLO COULD OR SHOULD SEEK TO RETAIN A DIRECT ROLE IN THE WEST BANK/GAZA STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS. HE SAID EVERYTHING DEPENDED ON WHETHER THE BEGIN OR THE UNITED STATES/EGYPT VIEW OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS IS APPLIED. IF BEGIN'S VIEW WERE TO PREVAIL, THE NEXT STAGE OF THE PROCESS WOULD BE STILLBORN. IF, HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS AND THE EGYPTIANS ARE ABLE TO CONVINCE ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THEIR VIEW, NASHASHIBI THOUGHT THAT THE PLO WOULD BE UNABLE TO PREVENT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

- NASHASHIBI PERSONALLY FELT, AND WAS ARGUING IN THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, THAT, SHOULD THE UNITED STATES/EGYPT APPROACH PREVAIL AND SHOULD REAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE PROSPECT OF AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BE OFFERED TO THE PALESTINIANS, THE INTERESTS OF PLO UNITY WOULD BE BEST SERVED IF THE PLO WERE TO STAND ON THE SIDELINES FOR TWO OR THREE YEARS AND ALLOW ITS SUPPORTERS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCESS. THIS PARTICIPATION WOULD BE ALONG THE LINES OF THE 1976 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. NASHASHIBI SAID THAT THE PLO MUST NOT BE DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH THIS PROCESS BUT THAT IT SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO MAINTAIN ITS OVERALL RESPONSIBILITIES AS THE SPOKESMAN AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. IF THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE SHOWN TO WORK, THE PLO COULD THEN SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEM AT A RECONVENED GENEVA CONFERENCE OR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. NASHASHIBI WAS NOT CONCERNED THAT THE PLO MIGHT LOSE ITS PREEMINENT POSITION TO AN EMERGENT LEADERSHIP ON THE WEST BANK OR GAZA. HE SAID THAT SUPPORT FOR THE PLO WAS STRONG AND INCREASING AND THAT AS LONG AS IT MAINTAINED A HIGH INTERNATIONAL PROFILE AND CONTINUED TO ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF ARAB COUNTRIES, NO WEST BANKER WOULD CONSIDER ATTEMPTING TO USURP THE PLO'S ROLE. IN THIS CONTEXT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT JORDAN SHOULD BE KEPT OUT OF THE PROCESS. HE NOTED THAT THE SYRIAN ATTITUDE WOULD BE CRITICAL TO THIS APPROACH AND HE HAD NO FEEL FOR WHAT POSITION THE SYRIANS MIGHT TAKE.

- NASHASHIBI SAID HE WAS AFRAID ARAFAT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE A HANDS-OFF APPROACH TOWARD THE NEXT ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT ARAFAT DEPENDS ON HIS IMAGE AS AN ACTIVIST TO HOLD THE PLO TOGETHER AND ENSURE HIS LEADERSHIP. HE CANNOT AFFORD CRITICISM TO EFFECT THAT HE IS DOING NOTHING. THUS, NASHASHIBI SAID THAT ARAFAT WOULD DO ALL IN HIS POWER TO ENSURE THAT THE PLO IS NOT

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3058
INFO RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0555
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4762
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 1186
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 6622
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 4264
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1961
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2714
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1623
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1431
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0861
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0372
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0709
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3865
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0567
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1256
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 DAMASCUS 02940

BYPASSED IN THE COMING STAGES. HE THOUGHT THAT ARAFAT WOULD RELY HEAVILY ON THE SAUDIS TO APPLY PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS TO ENSURE THAT PLO INTERESTS WERE NOT OVERLOOKED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. NASHASHIBI FEARED THAT THIS SELF-IMPOSED PRESSURE FOR AN ACTIVE PLO ROLE MIGHT LEAD ARAFAT EITHER TO MAKE "IRRESPONSIBLE" CONCESSIONS LIKE RECOGNIZING RESOLUTION 242 OR TO AN ATTEMPT AT SABOTAGING REAL GAINS MADE BY THE EGYPTIANS AND AMERICANS. HE REITERATED HIS BELIEF THAT THIS LATTER OPTION WAS UNREALISTIC SINCE THE PLO WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STOP IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT THAT CONFORMED TO THE AMERICAN/EGYPTIAN VIEW OF AUTONOMY AND SELF-DETERMINATION.

- (B) PLO'S NEXT STEPS AND TERRORISM:
- NASHASHIBI SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE PLO CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS ON MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AGAINST BEGIN'S CONCEPTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. CENTRAL TO THIS WOULD BE A MILITARY CAMPAIGN DIRECTED AT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK. BEGIN'S ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE DEMOGRAPHIC NATURE OF THE WEST BANK IN ORDER TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE 'CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT MUST BE STOPPED. NASHASHIBI CRITICIZED THE CURRENT TERRORISM DIRECTED AT ISRAEL AS BEING COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE INTERNATIONALLY AND DIRECTING THE WORLD'S FOCUS AWAY FROM ISRAEL'S "CRIMES" ON THE WEST BANK.

WHILE PLO ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL ARE WIDELY CONDEMNED, HE SAID THERE CAN BE LITTLE INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST SETTLEMENTS WHICH ARE RECOGNIZED AS ILLEGAL AND AS OBSTACLES TO PEACE. THE PROBLEM IS THAT ISRAELI SECURITY FOR WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS MAKES THEM DIFFICULT AND PERHAPS IMPOSSIBLE TARGETS FOR PLO ATTACKS.

- (C) ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND NAM:
- NASHASHIBI FELT THE MOVE TO EXPEL EGYPT FROM THE NAM WAS A NON-STARTER AND EVEN THE EFFORT TO DO THE SAME IN THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE WAS IN SERIOUS DOUBT.
- (D) IRAN:
- NASHASHIBI MET KHOMEINI ON A RECENT TRIP TO IRAN AND WAS IMPRESSED. BUT HE SAID HE HAD THE FEELING KHOMEINI WAS A MAN WHO DID NOT WANT TO RULE IRAN AND DID NOT WANT ANYONE ELSE TO DO SO EITHER. HE SAID THE IRANIANS WERE OVERENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE PLO AND HAD ALREADY OFFERED TO SEND TROOPS TO FIGHT FOR "PALESTINE." THE PLO DELEGATION NOTED THAT THIS WAS PREMATURE. THEY DID NOT EXPECT MUCH MORE THAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM IRAN. NASHASHIBI WAS AFRAID THE PLO WOULD OVERSTAY ITS WELCOME IN IRAN. HE SAID ARAFAT WAS TRYING TO USE THE PLO'S RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN TO STRENGTHEN HIS CONSERVATIVE FORCES (FATAH) AND UNDERMINE THE "PROGRESSIVES" (HABBASH, ET AL).

- (D) CENTRAL COUNCIL MEETING:
- NASHASHIBI COMMENTED IN PASSING THAT THE LAST CENTRAL COUNCIL MEETING, HELD IN EARLY APRIL, ACHIEVED LITTLE. IT HAS BEEN EXPECTED THAT THE POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT WOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PLO AT THAT MEETING. HOWEVER, A DECISION ON THIS QUESTION WAS SHELVED. NEWTON
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BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 146262

E.O. 12065 GDS 6/7/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN-ARAB RELATIONS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE HAVE HEARD THE REPORT THAT PGOI HAS EXPELLED PLO REPRESENTATIVE FROM AHWAZ. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER HE HAS LEFT. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOU HAVE ON THIS AS WELL AS A SUMMARY OF ANY CHANGE IN ATTITUDE WITHIN THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP TOWARDS THE PLO AND ARAB STATES.

VANCE

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7 JUN 79 17 ?Z

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FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC TYPT
INFO RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 54
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 526
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

POL
CHG
ECON
RF
CHRON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MUSCAT 1002

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, PLO, XF, IR, MU, BE
SUBJECT: IANIAN EMBASSY CIRCULATES NOTE ON TERRORIST INCIDENT AT BRUSSELS AIRPORT

EMBASSY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN HAS CIRCULATED TO OTHER DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN MUSCAT THE DIPLOMATIC NOTE QUOTED BELOW. WE TRANSMIT IT AS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST TO ADDRESSEES. THE NOTE IS DATED JUNE 3. THIS IS THE ORIGINAL ENGLISH TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT. THE EMBASSY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN THE SULTANATE OF OMAN AND HAS THE HONOUR TO BRING TO THEIR ATTENTION THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:-

IN HIS EXALTED NAME
STATEMENT MADE BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN ON THE
COUNTERFEIT IRANIAN PASSPORTS USED BY
TWO OF THE ASSAILANTS TO THE
BRUSSELS AIRPORT

FOLLOWING THE ATTACK MADE AGAINST THE BRUSSELS AIRPORT ON APRIL 16TH 1979, BY EXTREMIST AND UNCOMMITTED GROUPS WHO CALLED THEMSELVES PALESTINIANS, A REPORT WAS BROADCAST BY REUTER AND FRENCH NEWS AGENCIES THAT TWO OF THE ASSAILANTS BORE IRANIAN PASSPORTS. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE EMBASSY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN IN BRUSSELS GOT IN TOUCH WITH BELGIAN AUTHORITIES AND A THOROUGH EXAMINATION WAS MADE OF THE PASSPORTS WHICH, ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS, PROVED TO BE ENTIRELY FORGED.

WITH A VIEW TO ENLIGHTENING PUBLIC OPINION, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, WHILE CONDEMNING TERRORISTIC AND MISANTHROPIC ACTIVITIES OF THIS NATURE, CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO DECLARE PUBLICLY THAT THE SO-CALLED IRANIAN PASSPORTS USED BY TWO OF THE ASSAILANTS WERE FORGED AND ILLICIT.

IT IS TO BE RECALLED THAT THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANISATION ALSO, HAS ALREADY DISOWNED THE ATTACKERS AND DENOUNCED THEIR ACTION.

THE EMBASSY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN WISHES TO AVAIL ITSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENW TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN THE SULTANATE OF OMAN THE ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. END TEXT.

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PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #5730 1781609
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS PRIORITY
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S E C R E T STATE 165730

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VISAS - INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 12065 RDS-2 (MEYSENBURG, MARY ANN) (NOFORN)

TAGS: CVIS, ASEC, PINS

SUBJECT: USE OF IRANIAN AND OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN PASSPORTS BY PALESTINIAN GROUPS

REF: (A) STATE 125878; (B) STATE 106756

1. SECRET (ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT PALESTINIAN OPERATIVES APPARENTLY MAY HAVE ACQUIRED ACCESS TO IRANIAN PASSPORTS. WE ALSO REMIND CONSOFF AGAIN THAT LYBIAN, TUNISIAN, KUWAITI, SYRIAN, JORDANIAN, ALGERIAN, SUDANESE, LEBANESE, IRAQI AND ISRAELI PASSPORTS HAVE BEEN USED BY ;MEMBERS OF MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORIST GROUPS.

3. POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO BEARERS OF IRANIAN PASSPORTS WHO APPEAR SUSPICIOUS EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY BE POSING AS RESPECTABLEPROFESSIONAL PEOPLE OR BUSINESSMEN.

4. WE DO NOT HAVE INFORMATION TO IDENTIFY SPECIFIC PASSPORTS, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE PASSPORTS TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED EITHER IN TEHRAN OR AT AN IRANIAN POST ABROAD. BEARERS COULD BE EITHER MALE OR FEMALE.

5. WE REMIND CONSOFFS THAT PASSPORTS SHOULD BE CHECKED FOR DATE AND PLACE OF ISSUANCE, TRAVEL TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND ENTRY STAMPS INTO COUNTRY WHERE VISA APPLICATION IS BEING MADE. IN CASE OF SUSPICIOUS IRANIAN APPLICANTS, TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER IDENTIFICATION (SUCH AS THE "SHENAS NAMEH - IRANIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY CARD) SHOULD BE EXAMINED WITH GREATER CARE AND QUESTIONS POSED ABOUT THEM TO DISCOVER WHETHER THE APPLICANT'S RESPONSES ARE CREDIBLE AND CONSISTENT.

6. SINCE A FINDING OF INELIGIBILITY WOULD INVOLVE SECTION 212(A)(27) OF THE INA, ANY SUSPICIOUS CASE MUST BE REFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT. PLEASE INFORM THE DEPARTMENT BY A DONKEY CABLE, ADDRESSED ALSO TO THE FBI, AND SLUGGED FOR ATTENTION: VO,SY, M/CT. TELEGRAM SHOULD INCLUDE PASSPORT NUMBER AS WELL AS NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF-BIRTH AND OCCUPATION. CONSOFF MUST SUSPEND PROCESSING CASE UNTIL REPLY IS RECEIVED FROM DEPARTMENT. CHRISTOPHER
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WNRNTV ESB049BRA812
PP RUQMHR
DE RUFHDB #3390 1931823
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121757Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2721
INFO RUEHDB/EC COLLECTIVE
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0234
RUEHGR/USINT BAGHDAD 0208
RUQMFR/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0344
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0069
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0039
RUQMJA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0052
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0056
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0103
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0359
RUEHUN/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0450
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0551
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C O N F I D E N T I A L DUBLIN 03390

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/12/86 (BUSHING, CHARLES E.) OR-M
TAGS: PDOC, UNGA, EI, EEC, FX, OVIP (MAYNES, CHARLES W.)
SUBJECT: (U) MAYNES' CONSULTATIONS WITH GOI ON 34TH UNGA: MIDDLE EAST

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING THE JULY 11 MEETING WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY (IO) C. W. MAYNES, IRISH DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEPUTY (PERMANENT) SECRETARY NOEL DORR WONDERED HOW THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE WOULD DEVELOP AT THE UN. EVEN THE MODERATE ARABS SEEM SOLIDLY ARRAYED AGAINST THE EGYPT-ISRAEL TREATY AND ISRAEL'S CURRENT "IRRESPONSIBLE" BEHAVIOR SUGGESTS THAT AS REGARDS EGYPT AS "NEUTRALIZED" BY THE TREATY. THE USG APPARENTLY SEES THE CONTINUING NEED FOR A UN FORCE IN SINAI BUT SOME COUNTRIES BELIEVE THIS CAN NOW BE WITHDRAWN.

3. MAYNES SAID SOME MODERATE ARAB LEADERS OPPOSE THE TREATY PUBLICLY, BUT TELL US PRIVATELY THAT THEY HOPE WE CAN MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS TO THE PEACE PROCESS THOUGH THEY ARE DOUBTFUL. SADAT HAS EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DIRECT USG COMMITMENT TO INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROCESS AND, INDEED, THE MIDDLE

[redacted] AND SALT ARE OUR TWO TOP FOREIGN POLICY
PRIORITIES. MOREOVER, SADAT'S POLICIES ARE CAUSING
[redacted] FUNDAMENTAL RETHINKING WITHIN ISRAEL. SOME
OPPOSITION PARTY FIGURES ARE
BREAKING PUBLICLY ABOUT PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY BUT SAYING
PRIVATELY THAT THEY RECKON WITH AN EVENTUAL IRREDENTIST
PALESTINIAN STATE. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE WORLD
WILL ALLOW ENOUGH TIME FOR THE PEACE PROCESS TO WORK.

4. MAYNES SAID THE US SEES A NEED FOR A CONTINUING UN
PRESENCE (AS OPPOSED TO "FORCE") IN THE SINAI. IT
COULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED IN SIZE AND ONLY LIGHTLY
ARMED, WITH AN ALTERED ROLE--THAT OF SORTING OUT DIS-
AGREEMENTS AND MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY.
THIS PRESENCE IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE ARABS THAN THE
ISRAELIS. IT MAINTAINS THE VITAL LINK WITH UNSC
RESOLUTION 242. IF THAT LINK IS REMOVED, THE ISRAELIS
COULD CONCEIVABLY ARGUE THAT THEY NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT
242 SINCE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NO LONGER DOES SO.
MAYNES STRESSED THAT THE US WILLPRESS FOR A VOTE ON
[redacted] UN MEMBERS MUST BE PREPARED TO DECLARE
PUBLICLY WHERE THEY STAND ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

5. DORR ASKED IF THE USG WOULD BUILD UP CONTACTS WITH
THE PLO. MAYNES REPLIED THAT THE PLO IS NOT A COHESIVE
ORGANIZATION. IT REPEATEDLY SAYS PRIVATELY TO CERTAIN
ARAB GOVERNMENTS THAT IT WILL TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS, THEN
DOES NOT DO SO.

6. MAYNES DID NOT SEE THIS MESSAGE PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.
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PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #8885/01 2230716
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 110231 8Z AUG 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2619
RUEKJDS/DOD/ISA WASHDC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 208865/01

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E.O. 12065 GDS 8/10/85 (MONTVILLE, JOSEPH V.)

POL

TAGS: EG, IS, PINR

CHG

SUBJECT: INTSUM 872 - AUGUST 10, 1979

RF

LONDON FOR GLASPIE
PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY
DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

CHRON

(PARAGRAPHS 1-4 SECRET)

1. LEBANON: ENCROACHMENT OF UNIFIL'S ZONE: WHILE THE STALEMATE AT BEIT YAHUN CONTINUES, A SMALLER CONFRONTATION HAS BEGUN TO FESTER IN RESHAF (33-09N 035-11E). THE SITUATION PARALLELS THE BEGINNINGS OF BEIT YAHUN. SINCE THE END OF JULY, THE UNIFIL CONTINGENT AT THE EMPTY VILLAGE OF RESHAF HAS OPPOSED A TAKEOVER BY THE CHRISTIAN MILITIA. THE STALEMATE CONTINUED WITH A FEW MINOR INCIDENTS, INCLUDING MINING OF THE RESHAF ROAD AND SNIPING BY THE CHRISTIANS.

2. ON AUGUST 7, HOWEVER, PALESTINIANS RAIDED THE CHRISTIAN POSITION AT RASHEF. IT WAS SURPRISINGLY SIMILAR TO THE RAID THE PALESTINIANS CONDUCTED ON THE CHRISTIAN POSITION AT BEIT YAHUN ON JULY 26. REPORTEDLY, THE CHRISTIANS FIRED ON UNIFIL POSITIONS, BELIEVING THE UN FORCE TO BE THE ATTACKERS.

3. IN WHAT IS BELIEVED TO BE A RELATED ACTIVITY, THE CHRISTIAN MILITIA SET UP A POSITION INSIDE A UNIFIL ZONE AT JEBEL BASSIL, A HILLTOP. HADDAD'S MILITIA HAS HELD THIS POSITION BEFORE.

4. IF A LINE WERE DRAWN FROM BEIT YAHUN TO JEBEL BASSIL THROUGH RESHAF, IT WOULD SHOW A 1.; TO 2.; KM NORTHWARD ENCROACHMENT INTO THE UNIFIL'S AREA OF OPERATION. IT WOULD ALSO DEMONSTRATE A PATTERN OF EXPANSION FROM EAST TO WEST THAT UNIFIL HAS BEEN UNABLE TO STOP. IT APPEARS THIS PATTERN IS DESIGNED TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF CHRISTIAN ENCLAVES; GIVE HADDAD'S FORCES A BETTER TACTICAL POSITION ON THE HIGH GROUND OF BEIT YAHUN AND JEBEL BASSIL; AND, MOST IMPORTANT, GAIN AN IMPROVED ROAD NETWORK WITH A SHORTER LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MARJUN TO THE EAST AND NAQOURA ON THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE NEXT VILLAGES TO BE PRESSURED BY THE CHRISTIANS SHOULD BE YATAR (33-09N 035-20E), HARIS, AND BRACHIITE.

5. (U) EGYPT-ISRAEL-OIL: A CAIRO MENA STORY AUGUST 9 SAID EGYPT'S AGREEMENT TO SELL OIL TO ISRAEL INCLUDES SELLING AT THE I;TERNATIONAL PRICE WHICH EGYPT HAS BEEN GETTING (THE STORY CLAIMS THIS IS MORE THAN DOLS 30 PER BARREL) WITHOUT COMMITTING EGYPT TO SELL A SPECIFIC AMOUNT OR FROM ANY SP;CIFIC WELL. EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE HELD TALKS ON OIL SALES OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS AND DESPITE THE MENA STORY, THE ISRAELIS HAVE D:FINITE IDEAS ON PRICE, QUANTITY AND SOURCE FROM UHICH THE OIL IS TAK:N.

6. (U) ISRAEL-PRESS: THE ISRAELI PRESS AUGUST 9 GAVE FRONT PAGE COVERAGE TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S "UNUSUAL" LUNCHEON WITH AMBASSADOR EVRON. SOME REPORTS SPEAK OF "PROMISES" MADE BY THE PRESIDENT TO EVRON. THE THRUST OF MOST STORIES IS THAT WHILE THE ATMOSPHERE WAS IMPROVED, THE DIFFERENCES REMAIN. MAARIV IN AN EDITORIAL SAID THE PHRASE THAT "NOTHING HAS CHANGED IN US COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL" IS ONLY A PLOY BECAUSE "THEY (THE US ADMINISTRATION) WISH TO AVOID AT PRESENT AN OPEN CLASH WITH ISRAEL AND ARE

AFRAID OF A POSSIBLE REACTION FROM US JEWS AND ISRAEL'S FRIENDS IN CONGRESS.;

7. (U) ISRAEL-ISRAELI ARABS: THE HEAD OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN COMMAND, MAJOR GENERAL AVIGDOR BEN GAL, AUGUST 9 SAID THE ARABS OF GALILEE ARE A CANCER IN ISRAEL'S BODY, IN THE WORDS OF A JERUSALEM RADIO REPORT. TH: REPORT SAID: 'ACCORDING TO HIM (BEN GAL) HALF A MILLION ARABS IN THE GALILEE ARE WAITING FOR TH: MOMENT TO SCREW US, AS HE PUT IT.' BEN GAL ALSO REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THE ISRAELI ARABS IDENTIFY MORE WITH THE ARAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND THAT THEY ARE BEING BACKED BY THE PLO AND ARAB COUNTRIES.

8. (C) RABIN-PERES: EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTS THAT FORMER PRIME MINISTER RABIN'S FORTHCOMING MEMOIRS, IN WHICH HE ATTACKS FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER AND CURRENT LABOR PARTY LEADER SHIMON PERES, THREATENS TO RAISE A STORM IN THE LABOR PARTY SIMILAR TO THE PROBLEMS THAT THE LIKUD IS UNDERGOING. ISRAELI TELEVISION REPORTED AUGUST 9 THAT RABIN HAS WRITTEN THAT PERES "NOT ONLY TRIED TO UNDERMINE ME BUT THE ENTIRE GOV:RNMENT, TRUSTING IN THE OLD BOLSHEVIK MAXIM THAT 'THE WORSE THE SITUATION, THE BETTER FOR PERES'." RABIN CRITICIZED OTHER LABOR PARTY LEADERS AS WELL, INCLUDING FORMER ATTORNEY-GENERAL AHARON BARAK. THE EMBASSY REPORTS THAT PERES' INITIAL REACTION IS TO PLAY DOWN THE CHARGES IN THE BOOK BUT THAT THE PUBLICATION ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL DAMAGE THE LABOR PARTY'S IMAGE AS A VIABLE, ATTRACTIVE
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PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #8885/02 2230718
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INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2620
RUEKJDS/DOD/ISA WASHDC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 208885/02

ALTERNATIVE TO THE FRACTIOUS LIKUD.

9. (U) ISRAEL-JORDAN-US TANKS: JERUSALEM RADIO REPORTED AUGUST 9 THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT PLANNED TO "LAUNCH A PUBLIC CAMPAIGN" IN THE US AGAINST THE SALE OF US M-60 TANKS TO JORDAN. THE GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED THE SALE WILL ENCOURAGE "AGGRESSIVE TENDENCIES" ON THE EASTERN FRONT, THE REPORT SAID.

10. (C) IRAQ-SADDAM SPEECH: IN ADDRESSING A MASS RALLY AUGUST 8, IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAYN MOVED QUICKLY TO ELIMINATE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HIS LEADERSHIP IN THE WAKE OF THE EXECUTION OR IMPRISONMENT OF MORE THAN 50 GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HE ANNOUNCED GOVERNMENT SALARY INCREASES, AN AMNESTY WHICH IS TO INCLUDE KURDS IN PARTICULAR AND A POSSIBLE REDUCTION IN THE JAIL SENTENCES OF THE PLOTTERS AGAINST THE REGIME. SADDAM MADE A POINT

OF PRAISING THE ARMY, THE GROUP TO WHICH HIS TIES ARE SOMEWHAT FRAYED. HE DID NOT MENTION SYRIA DIRECTLY BUT HIS PASSING REFERENCE TO FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD IN THE PLOT FITS THE PERIOD OF SYRIAN-IRAQI HOSTILITY. USINT BAGHDAD REPORTS THAT THE ONE PLOTTER SENTENCED TO DEATH BUT NOT EXECUTED MAY HAVE ESCAPED TO SYRIA, ANOTHER POSSIBLE IRRITANT IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

11. (C) SOUTH YEMEN-CABINET CHANGES: THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY AUGUST 9 REPORTED THAT FOUR OF SOUTH YEMEN'S MINISTERS, INCLUDING FOREIGN MINISTER MUTI, HAVE BEEN RELIEVED OF THEIR POSTS. IF ACCURATE, THE REPORT INDICATES A CONTINUATION OF THE RIFTS IN THE GOVERNMENT WHICH APPEAR TO PIT OFFICIALS OF SOUTH YEMENI ORIGIN AGAINST THOSE FROM NORTH YEMEN.

12. (U) SAUDI ARABIA-OIL-PEACE PROCESS: AP REPORTED AUGUST 9 THAT THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER LINKED OIL POLICY TO PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. PRINCE SAUD AL-FAISAL REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD NO HOPE FOR A "JUST AND EQUITABLE PEACE" IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE AUTONOMY FOR THE PALESTINIANS. HE SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA, SE A GREAT LINK BETWEEN POLITICS AND ITS OIL RESERVES WOULD NOT HESITATE TO USE ITS RESOURCES TO "GET IN RETURN WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR OUR PROGRESS," THE REPORT SAID. HE FURTHER SAID THAT ISRAEL'S POLICY IN LEBANON COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO WAR IN THE REGION.

13. (U) PLO-UNSC RESOLUTION 242: THE PRESIDENT OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (THE PLO'S PARLIAMENT) KHALID FAHUM REITERATED THE PLO'S REJECTION OF UNSC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY FAIL TO DEAL WITH THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AS ONE OF NATIONAL RIGHTS. SPEAKING TO THE SAUDI NEWSPAPER AL-RIYADH, FAHUM SAID THE PLO CANNOT GIVE A FINAL VIEW ON ANY NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION UNTIL IT WAS PASSED AND CONSIDERED BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL.

14. (C) PLO-UN: THE CHARGE OF SWEDEN'S UN MISSION TOLD OUR US MISSION IN NEW YORK THAT THE PLO'S REPRESENTATIVE TERZI STATED THAT IN THE CASE OF A US VETO OR ABSTENTION ON A NEW UNSC RESOLUTION ENDORSING PALESTINIAN RIGHTS,

THE PLO WOULD PROBABLY RAISE THE ISSUE OF A SPECIAL UNGA SESSION ON PALESTINE AT THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HAVANA. WE HAVE HEARD THIS SAME REPORT FROM OTHER ARAB DIPLOMATIC SOURCES.

15. (U) FRG-PLO: ACCORDING TO REUTER, AFTER TWO ROUNDS OF TALKS WITH YASSIR ARAFAT, A WEST GERMAN PARLIAMENTARIAN JUERGEN MOELLEMANN, WHO IS A FOREIGN POLICY EXPERT OF THE FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, CALLED FOR MORE CONTACT WITH THE PLO. HE SAID HIS COUNTRY HAD SO FAR NEGLECTED THE PALESTINIANS. MOELLEMANN, SPEAKING AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN BEIRUT, SAID HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ARAFAT HAD BEEN BASED ON AN EIGHT POINT MIDDLE EAST PLAN DRAWN UP FOR THE FDP.

HE CLAIMED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PRESENTED THE PLAN IF IT HAD NOT HAD THE BLESSING OF FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, LEADER OF THE FDP. REUTER CLAIMED THAT THE PLAN, AMONG OTHER THINGS, CALLED FOR ALL STATES INCLUDING ISRAEL TO RECOGNIZE THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

HIS VISIT IS LIKELY TO STRAIN FURTHER FRG-ISRAELI RELATIONS AND GIVE IMPETUS TO PLO EFFORTS TO GAIN FURTHER RECOGNITION FOR THEIR MOVEMENT FROM WEST EUROPEAN STATES, FOLLOWING ARAFAT'S MEETING WITH KREISKY AND POLITICAL DEPARTMENT CHIEF QADDUMI'S MEETING WITH THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER.

16. (LOU) PLO-CENTRAL COUNCIL: ACCORDING TO REUTER, THE 55-MEMBER PALESTINE CENTRAL COUNCIL (THE PLO'S ,MINI-PARLIAMENT;) WILL MEET AUGUST 10 IN DAMASCUS. THE COUNCIL, WE BELIEVE, WILL DEBATE ARAFAT'S RECENT UNILATERAL DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES, INCLUDING HIS MEETINGS WITH KREISKY AND BRANDT, AND ATTEMPTS TO SUPPLEMENT UNSC RESOLUTION 242. COOPER

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E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: US, XF, PEPR

SUBJECT:PRESS GUIDANCE REGARDING YOUNG/TERZI CHANCE MEETING

1. FOLLOWING IS APPROVED PRESS GUIDANCE BEING USED BY DEPARTMENT ABOUT AN ALLEGED "SECRET" MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADOR YOUNG AND PLO REPRESENTATIVE TERZI IN NEW YORK:

Q. IS IT TRUE THAT UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE UN HAS HAD A SECRET MEETING WITH MR. TERZI, THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE THERE?

A. AMBASSADOR YOUNG HAS HAD NO SECRET MEETING WITH MR. TERZI, OR ANY OTHER REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PLO. UNITED STATES POLICY AGAINST SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS WITH THE PLO REMAINS UNCHANGED.

WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE IS THE FOLLOWING:

.- KUWAITI AMBASSADOR BISHARA ON JULY 23 SUGGESTED THAT AMBASSADOR YOUNG DROP BY SOMETIME THAT EVENING AT AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S CONVENIENCE FOR A TALK ABOUT SECURITY COUNCIL ISSUES. AMBASSADOR YOUNG WENT FOR A WALK THAT EVENING WITH HIS SON, AND DECIDED TO DROP IN ON AMBASSADOR BISHARA.

-- DURING THEIR TALK, MR. TERZI ARRIVED UNEXPECTEDLY AT THE BISHARA HOME. AMBASSADOR YOUNG DID NOT KNOW HE WAS COMING. THE AMBASSADOR, IN ACCORD WITH OUR POLICY ON INADVERTENT SOCIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO, OBSERVED THE SOCIAL AMENITIES AND DEPARTED AS SOON AS CONVENIENT APPROX MATELY FIFTEEN MINUTES LATER.

-- I WANT TO STRESS THAT THIS WAS AN ACCIDENTAL MEETING. AMBASSADOR YOUNG DID NOT HAVE A NEGOTIATING OR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WITH TERZI, AND THE AMBASSADOR BEHAVED EXACTLY IN ACCORD WITH STANDING POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

Q. WHY DID YOUNG TAKE HIS SON TO THE BISHARA'S?

A. THE BISHARAS HAVE A SON THE SAME AGE AS AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S SON, AND THEY HAD NEVER MET. THE AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY.

Q. DID TERZI IN ANY WAY JOIN THE YOUNG-BISHARA DISCUSSION ON SECURITY COUNCIL ISSUES?

A. NO.

Q. HAS THE AMBASSADOR EVER MET TERZI BEFORE?

A. THE AMBASSADOR AND U.S. OFFICIALS AT THE U.N. HAVE ENCOUNTERED MR. TERZI INADVERTENTLY AT SOCIAL OCCASIONS.

-- IN ACCORD WITH OUR POLICY, THEY HAVE DONE THE SAME THING AS AMBASSADOR YOUNG DID ON THIS OCCASION.

-- I REPEAT - U.S. POLICY IS NOT TO HAVE SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS WITH THE PLO.

Q. WHAT "SECURITY COUNCIL ISSUES" DID YOUNG AND BISHARA DISCUSS?

A. WE DO NOT GO INTO THE CONTENTS OF OUR DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS. I WANT TO STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT MR. TERZI DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE DISCUSSION AMBASSADOR YOUNG WAS HAVING WITH AMBASSADOR BISHARA. COOPER
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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977—225 323

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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/14/85 (MONTVILLE, JOSEPH V.)

TAGS: EG, IS, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 874 - AUGUST 14, ,9,9

LONDON FOR GLASPIE
PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY
DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

(PARAGRAPHS 1-9 CONFIDENTIAL)

1. FRG-ISRAEL: A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WHILE NO BASIC SHIFT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN WEST GERMAN APPROACHES TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM, THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES OF NUANCE AND STYLE IN RECENT MONTHS. THESE HAVE RELATED TO ARRANGEMENTS TO INCLUDE THE PALESTINIANS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THEY HAVE BEEN SIGNALED BY:

(A) THE ACTIVE WEST GERMAN ROLE IN THE FORMULATION OF THE EC STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST LAST JUNE;

(B) FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S CURRENT ROUND OF VISITS TO THE MIDDLE EAST; AND

(C) STATEMENTS BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT.

THE MOVEMENT HAS BEEN DRAMATIZED BY ARTICLES IN THE WEST
THE MOVEMENT HAS BEEN DRAMATIZED BY ARTICLES IN THE WEST
GERMAN PRESS THAT HAVE ADDED TO ISRAELI CONCERNS.

2. BONN'S BASIC POSITION REMAINS BALANCED BETWEEN ITS CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN A SUPPORTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL IN ATONEMENT FOR THE NAZI ERA AND TO ASSURE LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE ARAB OIL PRODUCERS AND MAINTAIN STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE FRG IS FURTHER CONSTRAINED BY ITS INTEREST IN NOT GETTING OUT TOO FAR AHEAD OF WASHINGTON ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES.

3. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, BONN WANTS TO SEE THE MOMENTUM OF

CAMP DAVID INCREASE. BUT SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER BELIEVE THAT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE BY THE PALESTINIANS IS CRUCIAL TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ALSO WANT TO FACILITATE A US MOVE TOWARD DIALOGUE WITH THE PLO.

6. SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER'S CAUTION IN PUTTING DIRECT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO ALTER ITS POLICIES AND THEIR DESIRE FOR FIRM TIES TO THE ARABS ARE STRONGLY APPROVED BY MOST FRG OPINION. EXCEPT IN SOME CONSERVATIVE CIRCLES, BONN'S CONCERN ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS IS NOT VIEWED AS A CONTRADICTION OF THESE PRINCIPLES. MOST WEST GERMAN CRITICS BELIEVE BONN IS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT ISRAELI POLICIES INDISCRIMINATELY.

7. SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER'S EFFORTS TO APPEAR EVENHANDED ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN COMPLICATED BY THE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN WEST GERMANY. THE ARAFAT MEETING WITH KREISKY AND BRANDT IN VIENNA SUGGESTED THAT BONN WAS PUSHING FASTER TO BRING THE PLO INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS THAN IS THE CASE. BRANDT'S PARTICIPATION IN THE MEETING AS CHIEF OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL WAS NOT SUBJECT TO SCHMIDT'S VETO. BRANDT PLAYED A LOW-PROFILE ROLE AT VIENNA, BUT BECAUSE HE REPRESENTS GROUPS ESSENTIALLY FRIENDLY TO ISRAEL, HIS VERY PRESENCE SIGNALS TO ISRAEL THAT EVEN ITS CLOSEST FRIENDS SEE THE NEED FOR CHANGE.

8. GENSCHER'S TOUR OF THE ARAB WORLD WAS BROADENED TO INCLUDE ARAB REGIMES OF ALL POLITICAL COLORATIONS AFTER CRITICISM IN THE WEST GERMAN PRESS. HE WILL BALANCE OFF CONTACTS WITH THE ARABS BY SEEING MOSHE DAYAN IN BONN IN SEPTEMBER. BUT THUS FAR SCHMIDT IS REFUSING TO RESPOND TO A THREE-YEAR-OLD INVITATION TO VISIT ISRAEL. THIS DELAY IS INTERPRETED IN THE FRG AS PRESSURE ON TEL AVIV TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN GIVING UP OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE FRG CHANCELLOR IS ALSO ANXIOUS NOT TO "GET IN THE WAY."

7. SCHMIDT AND CERTAINLY GENSCHER ARE ALSO EMBARRASSED BY THE VISIT OF FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY "EXPERT" MOELLEMANN WITH ARAFAT AT THE START OF AUGUST. MOELLEMANN IS CLOSE TO GENSCHER AND IS ONE OF THE FEW FREE DEMOCRATS WITH EXPERIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT HE MAY HAVE EXCEEDED HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM GENSCHER. IT IS NOT LIKELY, IN ANY EVENT, THAT GENSCHER EXPECTED HIS COLLEAGUES TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A GRANDSTAND PLAY WITH A UNIQUE PEACE PROPOSAL OF HIS OWN -- THOUGH ONE NOT MUCH DIFFERENT FROM OTHERS ALREADY MAKING THE ROUNDS.

8. GENSCHER'S DECLARATION DURING HIS MEETING HERE ON AUGUST 9 THAT HE HAS NO INTENTION OF BUILDING UP ARAFAT'S ROLE THUS IS CREDIBLE. AFTER THE EXCITEMENT GENERATED BY THE BRANDT AND MOELLEMANN MEETINGS WITH THE PLO LEADER, GENSCHER IS LIKELY TO DUCK SUCH A SESSION HIMSELF WHEN HE BRIEFLY STOPS BY LEBANON LATER THIS MONTH.

9. NONETHELESS, IT WILL NOT BE EASY FOR BONN TO REASSURE TEL AVIV THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF WEST GERMAN POLICY HAS NOT CHANGED. WHILE IT IS TOO MUCH TO ASSERT THAT ISRAEL HAS

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NOW LOST THE FRG AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO FRANCE IN EC CIRCLES, THE CHANGE TO STYLE AND NUANCE IS TOO GREAT FOR THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT WITHOUT CONCERN. AND TEL AVIV WILL NOT BE MOLLIFIED BY GESTURES OF PRUDENCE BY GENSCHER IN AVOIDING DIRECT CONTACT WITH ARAFAT.

10. (U) RABIN-PERES-LABOR PARTY: A LABOR PARTY SPOKESMAN SAID AUGUST 13 THAT FORMER PRIME MINISTER RABIN HAD BEEN REBUKED BY THE PARTY FOR STRONGLY CRITICIZING SHIMON PERES IN A NEW BOOK. RABIN HAS ACCUSED PERES OF LYING, SUBVERTING THE GOVERNMENT AND LEAKING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

11. (U) ISRAEL-STRIKES: NEWS REPORTS SAID THAT ABOUT ONE MILLION WORKERS IN ISRAEL (NEARLY A THIRD OF THE POPULATION IF THE REPORTS ARE ACCURATE) STAGED A TWO-HOUR STRIKE AUGUST 13 TO PROTEST RISING PRICES.

12. (U) ISRAEL-US-LEBANON POLICY: ACCORDING TO JERUSALEM RADIO IN AN INTERVIEW AUGUST 13, FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN STATED THAT ISRAEL'S POLICY TOWARD LEBANON IS "TOTALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES." HE DESCRIBED ISRAEL AS HAVING THE "OBLIGATION" AND THE "RIGHT" TO "HIT TERRORIST BASES ON OUR OWN INITIATIVE AND NOT WAIT FOR RETALIATORY ACTIONS AND THE LIKE." HE SAID THE US ONLY HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE HITTING OF CIVILIANS DURING SUCH RAIDS, "MAINLY WHEN THIS IS DONE WITH US EQUIPMENT."

13. (U) ISRAEL PRESS: THE JERUSALEM POST REPORTED THAT BEGIN TOLD THE CABINET AUGUST 12 THAT ISRAEL'S FIRM STAND "AGAINST EROSION IN WASHINGTON'S POLICY HAD PAID OFF" BECAUSE THE US APPEARS TO INDICATE IT WILL KEEP ITS COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL. BEGIN REPORTEDLY PREDICTED THE US WOULD DO WHAT IS NEEDED TO PREVENT CHANGE IN 242. A HA'ARETZ CORRESPONDENT SAID DAYAN TOLD THE CABINET THAT US JEWRY AND ISRAEL'S FRIENDS IN THE US CAN BE MOBILIZED TO SUPPORT ISRAEL ON THIS ISSUE. HA'ARETZ ALSO REPORTED THAT MINISTER BURG COMPLAINED THAT ISRAELI AMBASSADOR EVRON HAD TOLD A US OFFICIAL THAT HE (EVRON) WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH ISRAEL'S POSITION IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS.

14. (U) DUTCH GOVERNMENT-ARAB BOYCOTT: REUTER REPORTED AUGUST 13, THAT THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT SAID IT WOULD NOT PREVENT DUTCH COMPELS FROM COMPLYING WITH THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL.

15. (C) IRAQ-PALESTINIANS: THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON NARROWLY ESCAPED ASSASSINATION WHEN THE CAR IN WHICH HE WAS RIDING WAS HIT BY AN RPG AND MACHINE GUN BULLETS AUGUST 13. THE ATTACK CAME ONE DAY AFTER A PROMINENT FATAH LEFTIST OFFICIAL IN A PUBLIC SPEECH BITTERLY ACCUSED IRAQ OF RECENTLY KILLING A PALESTINIAN JOURNALIST IN LEBANON, AND DENOUNCED THE MASS EXECUTIONS WHICH OCCURRED IN BAGHDAD. THESE ACCUSATIONS SURFACED A SIMMERING FEUD BETWEEN IRAQ AND FATAH. HOWEVER, PLO POLITICAL DIRECTOR FARUQ QADDUMI VISITED THE IRAQI DIPLOMAT IN THE HOSPITAL AND THE PLO CONDEMNED THE ATTACK.

IRAQ HAS ALSO BEEN FEUDING WITH PALESTINIAN AND LEBANESE LEFTIST GROUPS OVER ITS BREAK WITH SOUTH YEMEN, AND ARAB COMMUNISTS ARE BITTER OVER IRAQ'S CRACKDOWN ON ITS COMMUNIST PARTY. THUS, A PLETHORA OF GROUPS EXIST WHICH MIGHT HAVE PERPETRATED THE ATTACK. THIS ATTACK, HOWEVER, COULD LEAD TO AN OUTBREAK OF ANOTHER ROUND OF ASSASSINATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND ITS ARAB OPPONENTS SUCH AS OCCURRED IN SPRING-SUMMER OF 1978 BETWEEN IRAQ AND FATAH.

16. (U) SYRIA-US: ACCORDING TO REUTER, SYRIAN PRESIDENT AL-ASSAD ACCUSED THE US AND EGYPT OF DESTROYING EFFORTS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AL-ASSAD WAS ADDRESSING A BANQUET IN HONOR OF VISITING ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEAUCESCU.

17. (C) ARABS-US-SUPPLEMENTING 242: THE KUWAITI OIL MINISTER SHAYKH ALI KHALIFA AL-SABAH, DURING AN EXTENDED CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR WEST AT SHAYKH YAMANI'S HOME, WARNED THAT HE WAS AFRAID A MAJOR CRISIS WAS COMING THIS MONTH IN US-ARAB RELATIONS OVER THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. SHAYKH ALI SAID THAT THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT A KUWAITI RESOLUTION BUT HAD THE BACKING OF ALL ARAB COUNTRIES. THE OIL MINISTER PREDICTED THAT THE US WOULD VETO THE RESOLUTION. THIS, HE SAID, WOULD CAUSE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE US TO SUFFER IRREPARABLE DAMAGE, NOT ONLY WITH THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS BUT ALSO WITH THE AVERAGE ARAB, SINCE SUCH A VETO WILL BE SEEN AS A COMPLETE ABANDONMENT OF THE HIGH MORAL POSITION WHICH THE US HAS GENERALLY TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. VANCE
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EXDIS ALL NATO CAPITALS TAKE AS IMMEDIATE INFO

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FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 16839 ACTION STATE USUN NEW YORK INFO TOKYO AUG 18.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A
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(16)

FROM STRAUSS

DEPT REPEAT TO ALL NEA AND NATO POSTS FOR INFORMATION

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/18/85 (SAUNDERS, HAROLD) OR-O
TAGS: PEPR, IS, EG, US
SUBJECT: (C) UN RESOLUTION ON PALESTINIAN QUESTION

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOR USUN: PLEASE CALL BISHARA AND CHOUFI AND MAKE THE POINTS BELOW.

3. FOR DEPARTMENT/DRAPER: PLEASE CALL JOHN ROBINSON OF THE UK EMBASSY WITH THE FOLLOWING. USUN MAY BRIEF BRITISH COLLEAGUES ALONG THE SAME LINES.

4. ACTION POSTS SHOULD USE THE FOLLOWING POINTS. INFO ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON THEM AS THEY CONSIDER APPROPRIATE:

-- AMBASSADOR STRAUSS IN ISRAEL ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 17, SAID PUBLICLY THE FOLLOWING: "WE HAVE RAISED WITH (THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT) THE POSSIBILITY THAT OUR NATION MIGHT GO FORWARD WITH A RESOLUTION OF ITS OWN IN THE UN (ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION), ONE HOPEFULLY THAT WOULD MEET THE APPROVAL OF OUR FRIENDS IN ISRAEL."

-- THE U.S. HAS MADE CLEAR THAT ANY RESOLUTION IT PUTS FORWARD WOULD REAFFIRM AND BUILD ON RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND WOULD BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. THE U.S. WILL OPPOSE ANY RESOLUTION WHICH SEEKS TO AMEND OR SUPPLANT RESOLUTION 242, WHICH REMAINS THE AGREED BASIS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

-- IT HAS BEEN OUR HOPE THAT IF WE PUT FORWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, WE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORT.

-- AMBASSADOR STRAUSS WANTS YOU TO BE PERSONALLY AWARE OF U.S. THINKING AT THIS POINT. HE IS STILL IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONSULTING WITH INTERESTED PARTIES AND WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU WHEN THERE ARE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

5. DEPARTMENT SHOULD CALL SELECTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WITH THE ABOVE. ATHERTON UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER
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INFORM CONSULS: FOR RSOS AND PSOS

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/29/85 (TELFORD, SID T.)

TAGS: ASEC

SUBJECT: (U) SECURITY ADVISORY

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. POSTS SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT AN ARAB NATIONAL WANTED IN ISRAEL FOR HIS ROLE IN A MAY 1979 TERRORIST ATTACK IS CURRENTLY IN FEDERAL CUSTODY IN CHICAGO AWAITING POSSIBLE EXTRADITION TO ISRAEL. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT PORTIONS OF THE ARAB COMMUNITY IN THE U.S. INTEND TO PROPAGANDIZE IN THE MEDIA AGAINST THE EXTRADITION OF THE ARAB, WHO IS IDENTIFIED AS ZAID MOHAMED AHMED TARIF(I) OR A VARIATION THEREOF. AS A PRECAUTION, DEPARTMENT REQUESTS ALL POSTS NOTE THIS SITUATION AS PRESENTING POSSIBLE RATIONALE FOR A PALESTINIAN RETALIATORY ATTACK. THIS IS AN ADVISORY ONLY AND DOES NOT REFLECT INTELLIGENCE REPORTING. VANCE
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RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 6113
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4498
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 2348
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6661
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 1106
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 8753
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 8279
RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE 0246
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4192
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SUVA IMMEDIATE 1686
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2859
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 3689
RUDKSNO/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2968
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9279
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7691
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8678
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1454
RUDKGPS/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8579
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 8994
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1317
RUDKPNS/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3156
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2141
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 5909
INFO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4350
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 4959
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 5513
RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA IMMEDIATE 5559
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5079
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3667
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1555
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 2364
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8433
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 2644
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 9684
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 229511/01

EXDIS

E.O. 12065 RDS-1-3 8/29/88 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: UNSC PORG XF IS LE MARR MOPS

SUBJECT: SOUTHERN LEBANON SITUATION

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BY SEPTEL FROM USUN YOU WILL BE SEEING TEXT OF STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR YOUNG AT SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING OF AUGUST 29 ON THE LEBANON SITUATION. THIS IS A MAJOR STATEMENT OF U.S. POSITION IN TWO IMPORTANT RESPECTS:

FIRST, IT MAKES CLEAR OUR POSITION OF DISAPPROVAL OF THE PLO TERRORISM, OF THE ISRAELI PREEMPTIVE STRIKE STRATEGY IN LEBANON, AND OF THE MILITARY ACTIONS AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENTS CARRIED OUT BY THE LEBANESE MILITIAS ALLIED WITH ISRAEL AND BY ISRAEL ITSELF. SECOND, THE STATEMENT CALLS FOR A LASTING CESSATION OF VIOLENCE IN THIS AREA. HERE WE ARE TALKING ABOUT SOMETHING MORE THAN A CEASEFIRE. WE MEAN A LASTING PERMANENT END TO VIOLENCE IN THIS AREA. THE KEY THRUST INCLUDES PLO IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS PLEDGE OF JUNE 5 TO WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH OF THE LITANI RIVER.

3. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE MAINSTREAM PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP IN FATAH MAY BE READIER THAN PREVIOUSLY TO GO ALONG WITH A MORE MEANINGFUL AND LONGER LASTING CEASEFIRE

AND CEASE INFILTRATION AND TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE HADDAD FORCES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AS WELL AS ON ISRAEL. IN PARTICULAR, THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS COULD
FORESHADOW
POSITIVE TRENDS IN REDUCING VIOLENCE.
IN ANY EVENT, WE WILL WANT TO DO OUR BEST TO PROMOTE PALESTINIAN COOPERATION WITH A LASTING CEASEFIRE THROUGH INDIRECT EFFORTS WITH THIRD PARTIES.

4. FOR BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, AMMAN AND KUWAIT: YOU SHOULD THEREFORE GET IN TOUCH WITH HIGHEST APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL AT EARLIEST MOMENT TO DESCRIBE OUR MAJOR POLICY STATEMENT ON THE LEBANON SITUATION AND TO ENLIST SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A LASTING CEASEFIRE AND END OF VIOLENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR POINTS:

-- THE U.S. WILL BE MAKING STRONG EFFORTS WITH ISRAEL TO BRING ABOUT A CESSATION OF ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS AND THOSE OF HADDAD, OF THE KINDS WE HAVE SEEN THE PAST FEW MONTHS. A FULL AND LASTING CEASEFIRE, HOWEVER, WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE UNLESS THE PALESTINIANS CO-OPERATE AND REFRAIN FROM INITIATING ATTACKS ON THE HADDAD AND ISRAELI FORCES.

-- WE URGE THAT HOST GOVERNMENTS USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH ARAFAT AND THE PLO/FATAH LEADERSHIP, AS WELL AS WITH ANY OF THE MILITANT GROUPS, TO URGE A COMPLETE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE CARRYING OUT OF THEIR JUNE 5 PLEDGE TO WITHDRAW FIGHTING MEN FROM SOUTH LEBANON. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT PALESTINIANS ALSO BE WITHDRAWN FROM UNIFIL'S AREA OF OPERATION.

-- HOST GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ALSO URGE ARAFAT AND THE FATAH
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 9891
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9136
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 6114
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4499
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 2349
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6662
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 1107
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 8754
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 8280
RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE 0247
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4193
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SUVA IMMEDIATE 1687
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2860
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 3690
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 8969
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9080
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7692
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8679
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1455
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8560
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 8995
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1318
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3157
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2142
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 5910
INFO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4351
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 4960
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 5514
RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA IMMEDIATE 5560
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5080
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3668
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1556
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0365
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8434
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0645
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 9685
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 229511/02

EXDIS

LEADERSHIP TO DO THEIR UTMOST TO ENSURE THAT THE VARIOUS MILITANT PALESTINIAN AND LEFTIST GROUPS WHICH DO NOT ALWAYS OBEY PLO ORDERS ARE ALSO BROUGHT INTO LINE AND OBSERVE A LASTING CEASEFIRE. FATAH HAS AN ENFORCEMENT APPARATUS WHICH MIGHT BE APPLIED.

-- A PRINCIPAL INGREDIENT TO SUCCESS WOULD BE A CESSATION OF TERRORIST AND RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES CARRIED ON BY FATAH WITHIN ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK. WE URGE THAT HOST GOVERNMENTS ALSO URGE THIS STEP UPON FATAH. IT COULD CHANGE THE SITUATION IN A MAJOR WAY.

-- HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS ALONE WOULD WARRANT A MAJOR

EFFORT BY HOST GOVERNMENTS. IN ADDITION, THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT AN ACCELERATED SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE WOULD INVOLVE THE ISRAELIS AND HADDAD FORCES IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON, WHICH COULD SET OFF WIDER CONFLICT, WITH MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AREA.

-- THERE IS STILL ANOTHER ASPECT WORTH CONSIDERING IN ANY HOST GOVERNMENT EXCHANGE WITH THE PALESTINIANS. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT MONTHS WHICH COULD AFFECT THE FUTURE OF THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE CONCEPT OF NON-VIOLENCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL AIMS HAS STRONG SUPPORT IN MANY AREAS OF THE WORLD.

5. FOR USUN: YOU SHOULD MAKE SIMILAR APPROACHES TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS NOTED ABOVE AND URGE REPRESENTATIVES OF UNIFIL TROOP CONTRIBUTORS AND EC-9 MEMBERS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN QUARTERS WHICH THEY HAVE INFLUENCE.

6. FOR AMMAN: GIVEN HUSSEIN'S RECENT EXCHANGES WITH ARAFAT, WE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR HUSSEIN PERSONALLY TO MAKE AN EFFORT WITH PALESTINIANS OF THE KIND WE ARE PROPOSING.

7. FOR EC-9 CAPITALS AND UNIFIL CONTRIBUTOR CAPITALS: YOU MAY DRAW FULLY ON THE FOREGOING TO EXPLAIN WHAT THE U.S. WILL BE DOING IN TERMS THAT ENCOURAGES THEM TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS, AND MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO HELP BRING ABOUT A LASTING CEASEFIRE.

8. FOR HAVANA: MANY OF THE ARAB POLICY MAKERS WHO WILL BE CONCERNED WITH THIS ISSUE ARE PRESENTLY IN HAVANA ATTENDING THE NAM SUMMIT. WE APPRECIATE THAT YOU WILL NOT HAVE READY ACCESS TO THEM BUT WE ASK THAT YOU MAKE A PARTICULAR EFFORT TO CONTACT KUWAITI AMBASSADOR BISHARA, BRIEF HIM FULLY DRAWING ON POINTS IN PARA. 4, AND PROVIDE HIM WITH-TEXT OF AMBASSADOR YOUNG.S STATEMENT. YOU MIGHT EMPHASIZE TO BISHARA THAT HE IS IN ABETTER POSITION THA MOST TO APPRECIATE, AND TO EMPHASIZE TO HIS COLLEAGUES, THE POSITIVE EFFECT WHICH PALESTINIAN MODERATION CAN HAVE ON U.S. AND WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION.

9. FOR TEL AVIV: PLEASE DESCRIBE FULLY TO ISRAELI OFFICIALS THE MAJOR EFFORTS WE ARE UNDERTAKING TO BRING ABOUT PALESTINIAN COOPERATION WITH A LASTING CEASEFIRE. WHILE WE CANNOT PREDICT SUCCESS, MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR EFFORTS WILL BE SUSTAINED. VANCE
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VV ESA9&8BRA183
00 RUQMHR
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3892
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9137
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 6115
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4530
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 2350
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6663
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RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 8755
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 8281
RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE 0245
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4194
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SUVA IMMEDIATE 1688
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2261
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 3691
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2970
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9081
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7693
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8680
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1456
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8581
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 8996
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1319
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3159
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2143
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 5911
INFO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4352
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 4961
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 5515
RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA IMMEDIATE 5561
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5081
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3669
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1557
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0366
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8435
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 3646
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 9686
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 03 STATE 229511/03

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INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1?3?
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN ?342
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT ?381
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO ?466
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1511
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1931
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1?52
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 1401
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN ?957
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0499
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM ?042
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 DOHA 1016

POL
CHG
CHRON
ECON
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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/29/86 (VILLGORE, ANDREW I.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, QA
SUBJECT: QATAR, THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES

REF: A) DOHA ?050

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE LARGE AND EXTREMELY WELL SITUATED PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY OF QATAR IS DEEPLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT AMERICAN EFFORTS TO SETTLE THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE. THEY SEE THESE EFFORTS AS FAILING AND ANOTHER ARAB-ISRAEL WAR AS INEVITABLE. IN SPITE OF A LATENT ANXIETY STEMMING FROM LOSING THEIR HOMELAND, PALESTINIANS HERE BELIEVE THEY HAVE THE GENUINE FRIENDSHIP AND SYMPATHY OF THE RULER OF QATAR, AMIR KHALIFA, WHO IN ANY CASE IS HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON PALESTINIAN SKILLS AND TIES TO THE WEST. THEY BELIEVE (CORRECTLY IN EMBASSY'S VIEW) THAT IN A SHOWDOWN KHALIFA WOULD STOP OIL EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES TO INDUCE CHANGES IN THE U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY. THIS IN SPITE OF THE AMIR'S BASIC HIGH REGARD FOR THE UNITED STATES. DESPITE FACT THAT PALESTINIANS REGARD U.S. POLICY AS GROSSLY PRO-ISRAEL, THE COMMUNITY IN QATAR IS GENERALLY WELL-DISPOSED TOWARDS AMERICANS AND THE UNITED STATES. MANY HOPE TO BECOME AMERICAN CITIZENS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE 20,000-STRONG PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY OF QATAR (HEREAFTER PALESTINIANS) IS THE MOST NUMEROUS EXPATRIATE ARAB GROUP (EGYPTIANS ARE 17,000), AND EASILY THE MOST IMPORTANT AND INFLUENTIAL FOREIGN ELEMENT. THE 75,000 PAKISTANIS AND 40,000/45,000 IRANIANS ARE MORE NUMEROUS, BUT THESE COMMUNITIES, ESPECIALLY THE FORMER, CONSIST MAINLY ORDINARY WORKERS. WHILE SOME IRANIANS ARE DOING WELL IN BUSINESS, THEY LACK STRONG LINKS TO THE QATAR GOVERNMENT, WHILE TIES TO NATIVE QATARIS SUFFER FROM RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES AND THE PERSONALITY/TEMPERAMENTAL ABYSS SEPARATING PERSIANS AND ARABS. PALESTINIANS, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE PERCEIVED BY QATARIS AS FELLOW ARABS OF SIMILAR RELIGIOUS PERSUASION WHO HAVE SUFFERED GREAT INJUSTICE AND WHO ARE ENTITLED TO SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT. WHILE SOME JEALOUSLY OF PALESTINIAN SUCCESS IS DISCERNIBLE, THIS IS MUTED BY THE NATURAL GOOD FAVORITISM SHOWN TO NATIVE SONS OF THE SHAIKHDOM.

4. THE PALESTINIANS, UNLIKE SOME OF THOSE STILL IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON AND SYRIA, ARE NOT A DESPERATE PEOPLE. THEY ARE, IN FACT, HIGHLY PLACED IN GOVERNMENT, THE PROFESSIONS AND BUSINESS. EXAMPLES: THE DE FACTO MINISTER OF FINANCE (SECRETARY OF FINANCE) IS A PALESTINIAN, AS ARE THE HEAD OF THE QATAR NATIONAL BANK AND NAIR KHALIFA'S CHIEF ADVISOR ON ENGINEERING AND CONTRACTING. OFFICE DIRECTOR OF THE KEY MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND PETROLEUM IS PALESTINIAN, AS ARE MANY PHYSICIANS, ACCOUNTANTS, PROFESSORS, TEACHERS, LAWYERS, JUDGES, CONTRACTORS, MERCHANTS AND TOP BUSINESS MANAGERS. (EGYPTIANS LEAD IN EDUCATION.) MANY WERE EDUCATED AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT OR AT UNIVERSITIES IN THE UNITED STATES. PALESTINIANS ARE PROFICIENT IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE FROM BRITISH-MANDATED PALESTINE DAYS AND PURSUE EDUCATION AND LEARNING OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES, ESPECIALLY ENGLISH, WITH SINGLE-MINDED DETERMINATION. MANY ALREADY HAVE BLOOD AND FRIENDSHIP TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES AND UNDERSTAND THE BROADLY TOLERANT SPIRIT OF AMERICA. A RELATIVELY GENTLE DOUBLE IRONY IS THAT QATARIS, ESPECIALLY THE OLDER ONES, REGARD THE PALESTINIANS MORE OR LESS AS WESTERNERS, AS INDEED THE PALESTINIANS REGARD THEMSELVES; WHILE THE QUINTESSENTIAL WESTERNERS, THE AMERICANS, ARE SEEN BY THE PALESTINIANS AS NEVER QUITE WILLING TO LET THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE CLUB. BEHIND THIS IS THE SOMBER PRESENCE OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE.
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4959
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1781
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2343
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0382
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2467
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1512
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1982
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1793
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 1302
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0958
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0500
RUEHJM/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 0249
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 DOHA 1016

5. PALESTINIANS HERE ADMIRE THE UNITED STATES, MANY EITHER HAVE BOUGHT, ARE BUYING OR INTEND TO BUY RESIDENCES IN AMERICA AND WANT THEIR CHILDREN TO BE EDUCATED THERE. THE PALESTINIANS ARE COMING OR INTEND TO COME BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THEY CAN MAKE A HOME AND BE ACCEPTED IN AMERICA. IN THAT SENSE, THEY ARE PRO-AMERICAN, ALTHOUGH THIS CO-EXISTS WITH A STRONG EDGE OF BITTERNESS AND DISILLUSION OVER AMERICAN FAVORITISM FOR ISRAEL. AT THE SAME TIME, THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS HERE IS BELIEVED TO IDENTIFY WITH THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) AND TO CONTRIBUTE A PERCENTAGE OF THEIR SALARIES TO THE PLO. THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN DOHA, YASEEN SHARIF, IS RESPECTED BY THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY. THE PALESTINIANS SEE AMERICAN MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS AS FAILING AND BELIEVE A FIFTH ARAB-ISRAEL WAR IS INEVITABLE. THEY THINK PRESIDENT CARTER CANNOT ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT DUE TO DOMESTIC AMERICAN POLITICS. IN CONTEXT OF A NEW WAR, THEY SEE QATAR AND OTHER OIL EXPORTERS ON THE PERSIAN GULF, INCLUDING IRAN, CUTTING OFF OIL SHIPMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES.

6. PALESTINIANS HERE GIVE NO CREDENCE TO RECENTLY PUBLICIZED NIGHTMARES THAT PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS WILL SINK TANKERS IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ TO BLOCK OIL SHIPMENTS. WHILE CONCEDING THAT DESPERADOS MIGHT MAKE SUCH AN ATTEMPT, THE PALESTINIANS WOULD CONSIDER SUCH ACTION MINDLESS. THEY SEE THEIR CAUSE GAINING IN JAPAN AND EUROPE, PARTICULARLY THE LATTER, AND WANT TO AVOID HARMING AMIR KHALIFA AND OTHER LEADERS OF GULF OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES, ALREADY REGARDED AS SYMPATHETIC.

7. QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THE PALESTINIANS CORRECTLY ASSESS WHAT AMIR KHALIFA'S ACTIONS WOULD BE, I.E., CUTTING OFF OIL TO THE UNITED STATES WHEN, AS THEY EXPECT, THE FIFTH ARAB-ISRAEL WAR BREAKS OUT. THE ANSWER, IN EMBASSY'S VIEW, IS THAT THE PALESTINIANS ARE CORRECT. THIS BRINGS US TO THE UNCHARTED AND PERHAPS BASICALLY UNKNOWABLE AREA OF PSYCHOLOGICAL/PERSONAILITY ANALYSIS OF THE RULER OF QATAR. AMIR KHALIFA WAS BORN IN 1930 AT THE VERY END OF A PERIOD OF RELATIVE PROSPERITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, STEMMING FROM THE PEARLING BUSINESS. BUT IN 1932 JAPANESE CULTURED PEARLS

WRECKED THE LOCAL PEARLING INDUSTRY AND LEFT QATAR FACING LONG YEARS OF POVERTY. AMIR KHALIFA GREW UP IN POVERTY AND KNOWS FROM FIRST HAND WHAT IT MEANS TO BE DOWN AND OUT. THE BRITISH WERE THE RULERS AND WHILE THEY ACTUALLY DID NOT INVENT RACISM AS HAS BEEN ALLEGED, QATARIS OF KHALIFA'S GENERATION REMEMBER WHAT IT WAS LIKE TO BE PUT DOWN BY BRITISH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATORS. AS AN ARAB HE WAS MADE TO FEEL INFERIOR.

ONLY IN 1949 DID OIL EXPORTS AND MONEY BEGIN TO FLOW. THAT SAME YEAR MANY PALESTINIANS BECAME HOMELESS, AND THE FIRST OF THEM CAME TO DOHA. ARAB VICTIMS OF BRITISH POLICY. ONE OF THESE, THE LATE DAOUD FANNOUS, ACTUALLY ORGANIZED THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN QATAR AND SERVED AS HEAD OF PERSONNEL FOR THE GOG UNTIL HIS DEATH. FANNOUS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN GREATLY LOVED BUT HE WAS PERSONALLY INCORRUPTIBLE. PREVIOUS RULERS OF QATAR ADMIRED HIM AS THEY HAVE OTHER TALENTED PALESTINIANS. THE PRESENT RULER, AMIR KHALIFA, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS HAS COME TO FEEL SYMPATHETIC TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. NOT SYMBIOSIS BUT SOMETHING IN THAT SPIRIT HAS OCCURRED. THE AMIR RELIES HEAVILY ON HIS TALENTED PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY, LINKED AS IT IS THROUGH THE ARABIC LANGUAGE AND HISTORY TO THE ARAB WORLD, AND TIED THROUGH THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND INCLINATION TO THE WESTERN WORLD. THEY IN TURN ARE LOYAL TO HIM NOT ONLY BECAUSE THEY MAKE GOOD LIVINGS HERE BUT BECAUSE THEY SENSE HIS BASIC SYMPATHY.

THE COMFORTING ILLUSION THAT AMIR KHALIFA AND PERHAPS OTHERS LIKE HIM SUPPORT ARAB NATIONALIST CAUSES ONLY OUT OF FEAR IS REALLY ONLY AN ILLUSION. THE AMIR OF QATAR HAS COME IN HIS LIFETIME FROM NEAR TOTAL DESTITUTION TO FABULOUS, INCREDIBLE WEALTH. JUST WHAT PSYCHOLOGICAL ODYSSEY HE HAS TRAVERSED IN REACHING HIS DEEP CONVICTION THAT THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE HAS TO BE SUPPORTED AT ALMOST WHATEVER COST, CAN ONLY BE SPECULATED UPON. BUT PERHAPS PART OF THE EXPLANATION IS THAT LIKE OTHER MEN WHO HAVE UNACCOUNTABLY ACHIEVED GREAT WEALTH AND SUCCESS, HE HAS BEEN IN QUEST OF SOME LARGER CAUSE TO JUSTIFY HIS FORTUNE, TO PAY BACK ALLAH FOR SHOWERING SUCH BLESSINGS ON A RATHER UGLY, BOW-LEGGED KID WITH NO PROSPECTS. OR IT MAY BE THAT A KIND OF MIDDLE EASTERN NOBLESSE OBLIGE IS MOVATING KHALIFA; SINCE HE HAS THE WHEREWITHAL TO HELP THE PALESTINIANS, IT IS SIMPLY THAT HE MUST DO IT.

10. NO ONE WHO HAS FACED THE FIERCE GLARE OF KHALIFA'S EYES AND HEARD HIM ASK INTENSELY, "WHAT ABOUT JERUSALEM? WHAT ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS?), CAN BELIEVE THAT IS IS SPEAKING OUT OF SOME CRAVEN FEAR OF RETRIBUTION IF HE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE PALESTINIANS. THESE OR SIMILAR QUESTIONS HAVE ACCOMPANIED ALL CONVERSATIONS WITH KHALIFA ABOUT THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS OR ABOUT THE EGYPT-ISRAEL TREATY. MOREOVER, IT CANNOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT KHALIFA CUT HIS $250-MILLION-A-YEAR SUBSIDY TO PRESIDENT SADAT WHEN HE BECAME CONVINCED THE EGYPTIAN WAS ABANDONING PALESTINIAN INTERESTS. KHALIFA REGARDED SADAT AS HIS BEST ARAB FRIEND WITH THE SURVIAL OF WHOM HE HAD LINKED HIS OWN POLITICAL SURVIVAL. AND THE RULER UNDOUBTEDLY SEES A STRONG AND PROSPEROUS UNITED STATES AS THE ONLY SURE BULWARK AGAINST COMMUNISM AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE ABANDONMENT OF SADAT BY KHALIFA (AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS) IS A MEASURE OF KHALIFA'S IDENTIFICATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS AND THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TURN ON THE UNITED STATES AS WELL IF WE FAIL TO FIND A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE.

KILLGORE

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P 051549Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO BUWATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2731
RUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC PRIORITY
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 232786/01

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/4/85 (MONTVILLE, JOSEPH V.)

TAGS: EG, IS, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 858 - SEPTEMBER 4, 1979

LONDON FOR GLASSIE
PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY
DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

1. ENTIRE TEXT: SECRET.

2. AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S MEETING WITH TERZI, FOLLOWING ARAFAT'S MEETING WITH KREISKY AND BRANDT HAS GIVEN THE PLO A SHOT IN THE ARM. THE WAY IN WHICH A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES PERCEIVED THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAY HAVE ACCELERATED THEIR MOVEMENT TO UPGRADE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE PLO OR TO INTENSIFY THEIR CONTACTS WITH ITS REPRESENTATIVES. ARAFAT, IN TURN, BELIEVES HE HAS GAINED INCREASED RESPECTABILITY. MOREOVER, HE APPEARS TO BE REASSESSING THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN ACHIEVING PLO/FATAH POLITICAL GOALS.

3. RECENTLY, THE PLO HAS GIVEN ITS DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN GAIN MOMENTUM.

--FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD A WELL-PUBLICIZED MEETING WITH PLO POLITICAL DEPARTMENT CHIEF FAROUQ QADDUMI. (ARAFAT HOPES TO VISIT FRANCE SOON. [illegible] FRANCE INDICATES THIS WILL NOT BE LIKELY).

--[illegible] IN CONNECTION WITH THE [illegible] OF THE

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EGYPTIAN EMBASSY TAKEOVER IN ANKARA, AGREED TO ALLOW THE PLO TO OPEN AN OFFICE THERE WITH FULL DIPLOMATIC STATUS -- THE FIRST SUCH MOVE FOR ANY NATO COUNTRY.

--ROMANIA'S CEAUSESCU HAS MET TWICE WITH ARAFAT IN A NINE-DAY PERIOD AND HAS CLEARLY TILTED TOWARD THE PLO, WHILE MUTING HIS SUPPORT FOR THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

--THE SWISS FEDERAL COUNCIL HAS PUBLICLY STATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO HAVE THE SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER RECEIVE QADDUMI DESPITE SOME DOMESTIC OPPOSITION.

--LIBERIAN PRESIDENT TOLBERT HAS AGREED TO RECEIVE A PLO ENVOY, EVEN THOUGH NO PLO OFFICE EXISTS IN MONROVIA.

4. THE STRATEGY OF THE PLO'S PRAGMATISTS APPEARS TO BE TWO FOLD:

--TO MOVE BEYOND THE PLO'S TERRORIST REPUTATION TO ONE OF DIPLOMATIC RESPECTABILITY IN THE WEST; AND

--TO BUILD ON THE NEW REPUTATION TO BREAK DOWN US RESISTANCE TO DIALOGUE.

5. IN PURSUIT OF THESE GOALS, ARAFAT WENT TO THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT. HE EXPECTS A RESOLUTION TO EMERGE STRONGLY CRITICIZING THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY AND CALLING FOR A SPECIAL UNGA SESSION ON PALESTINE. HE WOULD PROBABLY HOPE TO COME TO NEW YORK TO DISCUSS SUCH A SESSION.

6. FURTHERMORE, ARAFAT SEEMS MORE PREPARED THAN EVER BEFORE TO IGNORE THE HARDER-LINE GUERRILLA GROUPS WITHIN THE PLO, AS WELL AS THE WEAKENING SYRIAN GOVERNMENT (DAMASCUS FEARS THAT ARAFAT WILL BECOME TOO INDEPENDENT OF IT IN HIS DIPLOMATIC DEALINGS). HE HAS APPARENTLY

SUSPENDED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM BY FATAH AT THIS TIME. HE HAS ALSO EXERCISED RESTRAINT DURING THE ISRAELI/HADDAD OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH LEBANON. FATAH MILITARY ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAEL IS APPARENTLY LIMITED TO INCIDENTS BY WEST BANK PALESTINIANS AS OPPOSED TO SEABORNE RAIDS FROM LEBANON OR CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS FAVORED BY THE MORE RADICAL FACTIONS IN THE PLO.

7. THE INVITATION TO AMBASSADOR YOUNG AND OTHER BLACK LEADERS TO VISIT [illegible] ARAFAT'S NEW COI#2#

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STRATEGY TO GAIN A CONSTITUENCY IN THE US. ARAFAT HAS AGAIN DROPPED STRONG HINTS THAT HE WOULD RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE IF THE PLO AND PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION WERE RECOGNIZED BY THE US AND/OR ISRAEL.

8. ARAFAT APPEARS TO BE BEGINNING TO REALIZE THAT THE USE OF TERRORISM MAY NOW BE AN IMPEDIMENT TO GAINING FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL DIPLOMATIC BACKING IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE US. IT IS DOUBTFUL, HOWEVER, THAT HE PERCEIVES OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY PALESTINIANS UNDER OCCUPATION AS TERRORISM, EVEN THOUGH THEY CAUSE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

9. ULTIMATELY, ARAFAT SEEMS TO EXPECT THE US WILL COME

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INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2732
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 STATE 222785/02

TO ACCEPT THE NECESSITY OF TALKS WITH THE PLO, DESPITE THE DETERMINED OPPOSITION OF ISRAEL AND ITS SUPPORTERS. HIS OPTIMISM IS BASED ON:

--WHAT HE VIEWS AS GROWING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE US OVER MIDDLE EAST POLICY;

--HIS EXPECTATIONS THAT NO WEST BANK/GAZA AUTONOMY CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT PLO AGREEMENT; AND

--THE APPARENT WILLINGNESS OF THE ARAB OIL PRODUCERS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE AND ECONOMIC LEVERAGE ON BEHALF OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE.

10. ISRAEL'S US AID REQUEST: ACCORDING TO AN ARTICLE IN THE JERUSALEM POST, ISRAEL PLANS TO ASK THE US FOR $3 TO $3.5 BILLION IN FISCAL AID FOR THE COMING YEAR. THE AMOUNT, MORE THAN $1 BILLION IN EXCESS OF PREVIOUS REQUESTS, IS BASED ON THE INCREASING TRADE MALINDE DEFICIT WHICH COULD REACH $4.5 TO 5 BILLION, INCLUDING MILITARY IMPORTS. DESPITE TREASURY REASSURANCES, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CONSUMPTION GREW FAR BEYOND THE PLANNED AMOUNT IN THE PAST YEAR. GOVERNMENT SOURCES WARNED THAT IF THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE CUT IN THE STATE BUDGET THE ECONOMY

COULD ENTER A SEVERE UNCONTROLLED RECESSION. IN JANUARY, ISRAEL WILL SEEK A CONGRESSIONAL REVALUATION OF THE TERMS OF THE LOAN TO PAY FOR THE SINAI DEPLOYMENT IN WHICH ISRAEL WILL ARGUE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL WAS PLACED A HEAVY BURDEN ON THE COUNTRY, THE ARTICLE SAID.

11. AN ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY ECONOMIC ADVISOR HAS CONFIRMED TO EMBASSY TEL AVIV THAT HIGH LEVEL ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CONSULTATIONS ARE UNDERWAY ON THE SIZE OF ISRAEL'S FY '81 [illegible] REQUEST TO THE US. MID-SEPTEMBER IS THE TARGET DATE FOR SIMULTANEOUS PRESENTATIONS OF THE REQUEST IN WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV. A RECENT DAVAR

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ARTICLE SAID THE ISRAELI REQUEST WOULD BE $2.5 BILLION. THE DAVAR REPORT PREDICTED A DIFFICULT STRUGGLE WITH THE US ADMINISTRATION BECAUSE OF US ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES. IT SAID AN EXTENSIVE CAMPAIGN WILL BE NEEDED IN THE US TO WIN APPROVAL OF THE REQUEST AND THAT THIS EFFORT WILL BE MANAGED BY THE ISRAELI ECONOMIC MINISTER IN WASHINGTON, DAN HALPERIN.

12. EMBASSY TEL AVIV COMMENTS THAT THE $2.5 BILLION FIGURE IS WHAT THE ISRAELIS HOPE TO RECEIVE IN FY '81 AND, ASSUMING THAT THEIR REQUEST WILL BE CUT BACK, THEY WILL PROBABLY REQUEST $2.8 BILLION TO $3 BILLION. THE EMBASSY EXPECTS THIS REQUEST WILL BE DIVIDED INTO $1.7 BILLION IN FMS AND $1.1 BILLION TO $1.3 BILLION IN ECONOMIC AID.

13. WEIZMAN-US-F-18: THE JERUSALEM POST REPORTED ON SEPTEMBER 3 THAT AT A CABINET MEETING, ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER WEIZMAN OUTLINED PLANS FOR ISRAELI PARTICIPATION IN MANUFACTURING THE F-18 FIGHTER. WEIZMAN SAID HE INTENDS TO PRESENT THESE PLANS AT HIS MEETING IN THE US THIS MONTH. THE NEWSPAPER SAID THAT ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES WILL NOT GIVE AN OPINION ON THE PLANS UNTIL IT

FINISHES ANALYZING THE TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER ASPECTS, WHICH MAY TAKE FOUR OR FIVE MONTHS.

14. ISRAEL-NEW POLITICAL PARTY: JERUSALEM RADIO REPORTED AUGUST 31 THAT A NEW POLITICAL PARTY, TANU'AT HATHIYYA (THE REVIVAL MOVEMENT) HAS BEEN FORMED IN ISRAEL. ITS LEADERSHIP IS COMPOSED OF MEMBERS OF THE GREATER ISRAEL MOVEMENT, THE ALLIANCE OF ERETZ YISRA'EL LOYALISTS, THE GUSH EMUNIM AND THE TOO BE VERED. A FOUNDING CONVENTION IS TO TAKE PLACE DURING THE SECOND WEEK IN OCTOBER.

15. ISRAEL-ARAB STATES: THE PRESS CARRIED SEVERAL STORIES OVER THE LABOR DAY WEEKEND ABOUT POSSIBLE

ISRAELI CONTACT WITH ARAB STATES OR ARAB INVOLVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. REUTER CARRIED A MAARIV STORY THAT ISRAELI INTERIOR MINISTER BURG HAD SAID HE HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING JORDAN MIGHT ENTER THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS SHORTLY. "THERE ARE DEVELOPMENTS GOING ON WHICH APPEAR TO BE FAVORABLE TO US," BURG TOLD A EUROPEAN DELEGATION VISITING ISRAEL.

16. REUTER ALSO REPORTED THAT BEGIN'S AIDES SAID BEGIN HAS ISSUED SEVERAL INVITATIONS TO SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD TO DISCUSS PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA. NO

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DETAILS WERE PROVIDED ON HOW OR WHERE THE INVITATIONS WERE ISSUED. THE AIDES WERE EVIDENTLY RESPONDING TO REPORTS IN THE ISRAELI PRESS THAT A ROMANIAN ENVOY HAD RELAYED TO BEGIN PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU'S BELIEF THAT SYRIA WAS PREPARED TO ENTER TALKS WITH ISRAEL ABOUT A PEACE TREATY IF ISRAEL WITHDREW COMPLETELY FROM THE GOLAN AND GRANTED FULL SELF-DETERMINATION TO THE PALESTINIANS. A KUWAITI NEWSPAPER, ON SEPTEMBER 1, TOOK THIS ONE STEP FURTHER BY REPORTING THAT THE ROMANIAN HAD PROPOSED A SECRET MEETING BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN REPRESENTATIVES AND THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS MADE AT THE REQUEST OF THE US.

17. **PLO-US:** REUTER REPORTED THAT PLO SPOKESMAN ABD

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AL MUHSIN ABU MAYZAR SAID IN AN INTERVIEW WITH A SYRIAN NEWSPAPER THAT THE PLO REJECTS ANY QUALIFIED DIALOGUE WITH THE US. "FOR THE THOUSANDTH TIME WE SAY NO TO RESOLUTION 242 AND TO ANY DIALOGUE WITH AMERICA CONDITIONAL ON THE PLO'S ACCEPTANCE OF THAT RESOLUTION," ABU MAYZAR SAID.

18. DAYAN-PALESTINIANS: EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTS THAT DAYAN'S WELL-PUBLICIZED MEETING WITH THE LEADING PLO FIGURE IN THE GAZA STRIP, DR. HAYDAR ABDUL-SHAFI, COMBINED WITH WEIZMAN'S VISIT TO GAZA LAST WEEK, COULD INDICATE THAT HE AND WEIZMAN INTEND TO FOCUS ON THE PALESTINIAN FACTOR -- PARTICULARLY THE GAZA ASPECT -- IN THE DAYS AHEAD. DAYAN'S GAZA MEETING CAME ONE DAY AFTER HIS ATTENDANCE AT A MINISTERIAL MEETING ON THE AUTONOMY TALKS AND APPARENTLY SIGNALS HIS INTENTION TO PLAY A STRONGER ROLE THERE.

19. DAYAN MADE NO APOLOGIES FOR HIS MEETING WITH DR. HAYDAR ABDUL-SHAFI. INDEED, HE TOLD THE PRESS HE SPECIFICALLY WANTED TO MEET WITH SOMEONE WHO WAS BOTH PRO-PLO AND A POPULAR GAZA FIGURE. HE SAID HE INTENDS TO HAVE SIMILAR MEETINGS IN THE FUTURE. EMBASSY TEL AVIV COMMENTS THAT DAYAN MAY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT HE CAN HEAD OFF US EFFORTS TO DRAW THE PLO INTO THE PEACE PROCESS BY STARTING AN ISRAELI DIALOGUE WITH WEST BANK AND GAZA LEADERS.

20. ON DAYAN'S DEALINGS WITH THE PLO, THE JERUSALEM POST REPORTS THE FOREIGN MINISTER AS SAYING THAT IT MAY SEEM CONTRADICTORY BUT THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE FORTUNES AND PRESTIGE OF THE PLO ALSO MAKES IT "EASIER FOR ISRAEL TO PRESENT ITS POINT OF VIEW AND TO STRESS THAT THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS RULE OUT ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE..." A POST EDITORIAL SAID DAYAN APPARENTLY FEELS "BEGIN MUST BE MADE TO REALIZE" THAT TALKING TO THOSE CLOSE TO THE PLO "IS THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE AUTONOMY WORK.

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THE DAVAR EDITOR IN CHIEF SAYS NO ONE CAN EXPECT A NATION TO RECOGNIZE THOSE WHO REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE IT BUT IT WOULD BE FOLLY TO SAY ISRAEL WILL NOT TALK TO THE PLO EVEN IF IT GIVES UP TERRORISM OR CHANGES ITS COVENANT.

21. EGYPT-MOROCCO: SADAT PROMISED SUPPORT, INCLUDING MILITARY SUPPORT, FOR KING HASSAN AND MOROCCO IN SPITE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, CAIRO MENA REPORTED SEPTEMBER 1. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE WITH VISITING PRC FOREIGN MINISTER CHENGCHEN, SADAT ANNOUNCED THAT "DESPITE THE ATTITUDE KING HASSAN HAS ADOPTED AND DESPITE WHAT THE MOROCCAN POLITICIANS HAVE DONE TO MISLEAD THE MOROCCAN PEOPLE," EGYPT WILL SUPPORT MOROCCO WHEN IT ASKS "FOR ANY KIND OF AID." ACCORDING TO MENA, SADAT DODGED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT HE EXPECTED MOROCCO TO ASK FOR MILITARY AID FROM EGYPT.

22. SADAT-PALESTINIANS: IN A SPEECH AND A PRESS CONFERENCE, SADAT PREDICTED FULL PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY BY THE END OF THE YEAR AND SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND JERUSALEM WITH BEGIN IN HAIFA THIS WEEK. THE NBC BUREAU IN CAIRO TOLD OUR EMBASSY THAT AS THE PRESS CONFERENCE WAS BREAKING UP, SADAT SAID THAT THE MEETING BETWEEN PLO REPRESENTATIVE TERZI AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG WAS NOT THE FIRST USG-PLO CONTACT. HE SAID THAT TALKS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN MOROCCO WHEN HENRY KISSINGER WAS SECRETARY OF STATE.

23. IN OUTLINING HIS OBJECTIVES REGARDING THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, SADAT SAID THAT AT HAIFA HE WILL NOT SPEAK IN THE NAME OF THE PALESTINIANS SINCE ONLY THEY CAN SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. HE SAID THE HAIFA TALKS ARE DESIGNED TO "PAVE THE WAY FOR PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY." HIS STATED OBJECTIVES ARE:

--PALESTINIAN SELF-RULE IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS;

--RELEASE OF PALESTINIAN PRISONERS IN ISRAELI JAILS;

--ESTABLISHMENT OF A "PALESTINIAN ADMINISTRATION" AND A "PALESTINIAN POLICE FORCE;"

--ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO "SECURITY POINTS" IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA; AND

--TERMINATION OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY AND CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY UPON ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT.

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24. SADAT SAID THAT HIS SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH BEGIN THIS YEAR ENABLED HIM TO SAY THAT BY THE END OF THE YEAR THEY WOULD REACH A SOLUTION TO PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY AND THE "PROBLEM OF JERUSALEM."

25. SMALL SCALE CONFESSIONAL VIOLENCE IN SYRIA: AMERICAN EMBASSY DAMASCUS REPORTS THAT WHILE THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN SYRIA REMAINS RELATIVELY CALM DESPITE PLEDGES BY ANTI-REGIME DISSIDENTS TO RESUME ASSASSINATIONS OF ALAWITES FOLLOWING RAMADAN, ALEPPO, HAMA, AND LATTAKIA HAVE RECENTLY EXPERIENCED FLARE-UPS OF CONFESSIONAL VIOLENCE. THE CALM MAY BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE CRACKDOWN INSTITUTED BY SECURITY FORCES SINCE THE ALEPPO SLAYINGS
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 04 STATE 202736/04

BUT AT THE SAME TIME THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE REMAINS, IN PART, BECAUSE OF THE EXCESSES OF THE SYRIAN SECURITY FORCES.

26. SAUDI ARABIA-PALESTINIANS-LEBANON: AFTER HEARING US VIEWS ON SOUTHERN LEBANON FROM AN EMBASSY JIDDA OFFICER, A SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL SAID THE LEBANESE HAD ALREADY ASKED THE SAUDIS FOR ASSISTANCE IN GAINING PALESTINIAN COMPLIANCE WITH A CEASEFIRE AND AGREEMENT TO REFRAIN FROM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE SAUDI SAID THE MATTER WOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER WITH VISITING LEBANESE DEFENSE MINISTER JOSEPH SKAFF. VANCE
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INFO RUTERS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 4532
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 696
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2875
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 9871
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1334
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 326
RUQMBA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 926
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2092
RUTHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 1617
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7619
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 477
RUQMBR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 908
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2201
RUDKER/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 5230
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE RABAT 6420

POL
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ECON
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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, MO, IF
SUBJECT: PLO ENVOY TALKS TO KING HASSAN ABOUT LEBANON, MAGHREBI RECONCILIATION, AND ARAFAT'S COMING VISIT

1. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE HAVANA MEETING OF PLO CHIEF ARAFAT WITH MOROCCAN PRIME MINISTER BOUABID AND FOREIGN MINISTER BOUCETTA, PLO TEHRAN REPRESENTATIVE WANKI AL-HASSAN, STOPPING OFF HERE ON HIS RETURN TO TEHRAN, WAS RECEIVED BY KING HASSAN II AT IFRANE ON SEPTEMBER 12. THE AUDIENCE, WHICH REPORTEDLY LASTED TWO FOURS, WAS HELD IN THE PRESENCE OF HASSAN'S ARAB AFFAIRS SPECIALIST, ROYAL COUNSELOR AHMED BENSOUDA, AND OF HIS LONGTIME CONFIDANT, ROYAL COUNSELOR AHMED REDA GUEDIRA. AL-HANNA'S PRESS RELEASE SAID HE HAD TALKED WITH THE KING ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO CONDITIONS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, IN WHICH HE SAID THE KING HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST. AL-HANNA LAUDED THE STATE OF MOROCCAN-PLO RELATIONS AND THE KING'S SAGACITY.

2. (FOUR DAYS PREVIOUSLY, KING HASSAN HAD RECEIVED DR. ZAKI MEZRAOUI, A PERSONAL ENVOY OF LEBANESE PRESIDENT SARKIS. MEZ BOUDI REPORTEDLY DELIVERED A LETTER TO HIM FROM SARKIS AND PLEDGED TO

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CONVEY HASSAN'S VIEWS TO BEIRUT.)

3. IN AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW PRINTED IN THE SEPT 12 ISSUE OF "L'OPINION," THE FRENCH-LANGUAGE DAILY OF BOUCETTA'S ISTIQLAL PARTY, AL-HANNA ASSERTED THAT HIS AUDIENCE WITH THE KING HAD DEALT PRIMARILY WITH LEBANON. HE HAD DESCRIBED TO THE KING THE PLO STAN THAT UNION AMONG ALL THE LEBANESE WITH THE PLO BEHIND THE LEGITIM LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, WITH SYRIAN SUPPORT, IS PREREQUISITE TO CON FRONTING THE ZIONIST AGGRESSION IN SOUTH LEBANON, WHICH THE PLO PRESENCE THERE HAD NOT PROVOKED. AL-HANNA ATTRIBUTED TO "MR. SAUNDERS, A MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS," THE VIEW THAT ISRAEL WANTS TO CONTROL THE WATERS OF THE LITANI. AL-HANNA ASSERTED THAT AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S RESIGNATION SHOWED PRESIDENT CARTER INCAPABLE OF EFFECTING WHATEVER GOOD INTENTIONS HE MIGHT HARBOR TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS. AL-HANNA MENTIONED THAT A POSSIBLE PALESTINIAN GOV-ERNMENT-IN-EXILE HAD COME UP, OBSERVING THAT "THE MOMENT IS NOT YET OPPORTUNE" TO TAKE THAT STEP.

4. AL-HANNA STATED THAT "BROTHER ABU AMAR (ARAFAT) WILL COME TO MOROCCO SHORTLY, AFTER HIS TOUR OF EUROPE."

5. ALTHOUGH THE PALESTINIANS ARE AWARE THAT THE SAHARA IS THE MOST IMPORTANT MOROCCAN CONCERN, AL-HANNA CONTINUED, HE HAD TOLD THE KING THAT THE ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO BE USED BY PRESIDEN SADAT AS A WAY OUT OF HIS ISOLATION. THE KING, ACCORDING TO AL-HANNA, HAD ASSURED HIM OF HIS ATTACHMENT TO THE BAGHDAD RESOLU-TIONS AND HIS SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIANS.

6. AL-HANNA ASSERTED THAT ALL SHOULD ATTEMPT TO PUT AN END TO CONFLICT IN NORTH AFRICA, SINCE, HE OBSERVED, IT HAS A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AND PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SADAT TO MANEUVER IN THE REGION: "THAT IS WHY THE PLO HAS STUDIED THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOLUTION CAPABLE OF SATISFYING ALL THE PARTIES IN NORTH AFRICA."

7. AL-HANNA CLOSED WITH A LONG COMMENT ON IRAN, URGING THAT THE PLO BRING TOGETHER IRANIANS AND ARABS TO ESTABLISH MORE EQUITABLE RELATIONSHIPS AND UNITE RANKS AGAINST THE ZIONIST CHALLENGE.

8. COMMENT: JUDGING FROM AL-HANNA'S REMARKS, ARAFAT'S MISSION, WHEN HE VISITS MOROCCO, WILL HAVE TWO OBJECTIVES: DISCOURAGING MOROCCAN-EGYPTIAN COOPERATION AND ENCOURAGING MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN RECONCILIATION. IF RABAT'S DIPLOMATIC RUMOR-MONGERS ARE TO BE GIVEN CREDENCE, THESE WERE THE OBJECTIVES OF SAUDI PRINCE ABDALLAH ABDULAZIZ'S RECENT SOJOURN HERE (RABAT 5397).
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEFC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1[illegible]
INFO RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 4838
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 5[illegible]
RUCMDE/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2[illegible]
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 961
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1[illegible]
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 827
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 832
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2997
RUFHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 1825
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7242
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 471
RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 528
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2205
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 5258
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE RABAT F541

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, XF, MO, AG
SUBJECT: PLO CHIEF ARAFAT VISITS MOROCCO

1. PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT (ABU 'AMAR) ARRIVED IN RABAT FROM ALGIERS ABOUT 1:00 PM ON SEPTEMBER 15, ACCOMPANIED BY COMMITTEE MEMBER 'ABD AL-MUHSIN ABU MAYZAR AND PLO SPOKESMAN MUHAMMED AL-LABADI (FBIS LONDON 1612152 SEP 79 MOTAL).

2. ON HIS ARRIVAL, ARAFAT NOTED THAT HIS VISIT RESULTED FROM HIS MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BOUABID AT THE HAVANA NAM SUMMIT AND THAT IT TOOK PLACE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF REGULAR PLO CONSULTATIONS WITH ARAB STATES ON THE SITUATION IN THE ARAB WORLD. THE RABAT PLO OFFICE HAD ANNOUNCED SEPTEMBER 15 THAT ARAFAT'S SOJOURN HERE WAS CONNECTED WITH THE PLO MEDIATION EFFORT (FBIS LONDON 1612162 SEP 79 MOTAL), ECHOING THE COMMENT OF EARLIER PLO ENVOY HANNI AL-HASSAN (RABAT 5428).

3. ARAFAT WAS [illegible] BY KING HASSAN II AT HIS MOUNTAIN RETREAT AT IFRANE LATE SEPTEMBER 15. BOUABID AND THE KING'S ARAB AFFAIRS SPECIALIST, AHMED BENSOUDA, SAT

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IN. ARAFAT'S PRESS STATEMENT MENTIONED INTER ALIA THAT "THE WESTERN PART OF THE ARAB WORLD" HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. ARAFAT LEFT MOROCCO LATE SEPTEMBER 16.

4. IN THE ABSENCE OF HARD NEWS, THE LOCAL AFP CORRESPONDENT FILED A STORY NOTING THE DECADE-OLD MOROCCAN TAX ON TOBACCO AND MOVIE TICKETS, PROCEEDS OF WHICH ARE EARMARKED FOR THE PLO; PALESTINIAN CLAIMS THAT, BUT FOR THE INTERVENTION OF THE PLO, IRAN WOULD HAVE BROKEN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MOROCCAN BECAUSE OF THE EX-SHAH'S STAY IN MARRAKECH; AND PLO INTEREST IN THE AVOIDANCE OF A MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN CLASH, LEST LIBYAN ASSISTANCE T ALGERIA PROVOKE AN EGYPTIAN REACTION AGAINST LIBYA.
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—225-[illegible]

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VV EGA457[illegible]
PP RUQMHR
DE RUQMCT #1681 [illegible]
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P 191[illegible]Z SEP 7[illegible]
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE [illegible] IMMEDIATE 5[illegible]
INFO RUCNPI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1[illegible]
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0[illegible]
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA [illegible]
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 5[illegible]
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1[illegible]
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0[illegible]
RUQMNR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5[illegible]

E X D I S

CHARGE'

CHRN

S E C R E T MUSCAT 1681

XDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1-9/15/89 (WILEY, MARSHALL W.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, PLOS, MU, IR, XF
SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLO REQUEST FOR USE OF TUNBS AND ABU MUSA

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION OF OMAN STRAIT OF HORMUZ STUDY SEPT. 16 (SEPTEL), OMANI FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER SECRETARY YUSUF AL-ALAWI TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT OMAN HAD RECENT REPORT FROM RELIABLE PALESTINIAN SOURCE "HIGH UP PLO" (PLEASE PROTECT FULLY) THAT PLO REP IN TEHRAN, NANI HASSAN, HAS ASKED IRANIAN AUTHORITIES FOR PERMISSION TO STATION PLO UNITS ON TUNBS AND ABU MUSA ISLANDS. ALAWI DOES NOT KNOW WHAT REPLY, IF ANY, IRANIANS HAVE GIVEN TO PLO REQUEST, BUT SAID REQUEST ITSELF, IF TRUE, IS CAUSE FOR CONCERN. AMBASSADOR AGREED AND PROMISED TO PROVIDE ANY READ-OUT WE MAY HAVE ON SUBJECT.

3. ACTION REQUESTED: WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OR EMBASSY TEHRAN CAN PROVIDE ON REPORTED PLO REQUEST.

WILEY

1681

[illegible] E8S219RR#068
[illegible] RUCMER
[illegible] RUEHC #3259/01 2591516
[illegible] ZZH
[illegible] 0915207Z SEP 79
[illegible] SECSTATE WASHDC
[illegible] INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
[illegible]20 BUREATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY [illegible]
[illegible] JCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 253259/01

E.O. 12065 3D5 9/25/85 (MONTVILLE, JOSEPH W.)

TAGS: PO, IS, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 983 - SEPTEMBER 25, 1979

ACTION FOR BLASPIE
INFO FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY
DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM
DISTRIBUTE ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

WARNING - NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants

(ADDRESSEES 1-8 S/NF/NC)

1. [illegible] PLO-JORDANIAN RELATIONSHIP: ARAFAT'S PERSPECTIVE: [illegible] PRIMARY GOAL IN FORGING A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP [illegible] HUSSEIN HAS BEEN TO KEEP HUSSEIN FROM NEGOTIATING [illegible] ING ANY INITIATIVE WHICH MIGHT UNDERMINE ARAFAT'S [illegible] TIONS TO SEEK AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. [illegible] THROUGH A PLO-JORDANIAN LIAISON CONTINUE, DESPITE [illegible] 1978, IT DID NOT GAIN [illegible] A BREAKWAY UNTIL THE [illegible] PER CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. SINCE THAT TIME, [illegible] HAS MET WITH HUSSEIN ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND HAS

[illegible] THIS MONTH TO ARRIVE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN NINE [illegible] THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE TWO LEADERS HAVE [illegible] SUBSTANTIAL GROUND FOR COOPERATION.

[illegible] ENTERED THIS COMMON FRONT, WE DOUBT THAT ARAFAT HAS YET [illegible] SUBORDINATE HIMSELF TO KING HUSSEIN IN A CON- [illegible], ARAFAT AND HIS INNER CIRCLE HAVE AIMED SINCE [illegible] GOALS TO ESTABLISH A PALESTINIAN STATE. THEY [illegible] PREPARED NOW TO BECOME JUNIOR OF THE HASHEMITE

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3. ON THE OTHER HAND, ARAFAT IS A PRAGMATIST. HE RECOGNIZES THAT THE OVER ONE MILLION PALESTINIANS RESIDING IN JORDAN (EAST BANK) ARE AN INTEGRAL AND IMPORTANT PART OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. MOST PALESTINIANS BELIEVE THAT, EVEN IF THE PALESTINIANS ACHIEVE SELF-DETERMINATION AND AN INDEPENDENT STATE, SOME SORT OF RELATIONSHIP THAT GOES BEYOND NORMAL STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS HAS TO BE FORGED WITH JORDAN.

4. ARAFAT ALSO APPEARS TO BE COMING TO BELIEVE THAT ISRAELI AND US VIEWS WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO ACHIEVE STATEHOOD THAT DOES NOT IN SOME WAY ALLOW A ROLE FOR JORDAN. HE MAY WELL HAVE DISCUSSED WITH HUSSEIN THE LINKS THAT A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD HAVE WITH JORDAN, AS WELL AS DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES TO RECOVER THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. ARAFAT ALSO KNOWS THAT HUSSEIN WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS IF THEY ARE PERCEIVED AS INIMICAL TO FURTHER HASHEMITE RULE OF JORDAN.

5. HOWEVER, NOT ONLY WOULD MANY PALESTINIANS REACT NEGATIVELY TO ANY HINT THAT ARAFAT WAS COMPROMISING THE GOAL OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE, BUT MANY FACTIONS WITHIN THE PLO OPPOSE THE PRESENT DIALOGUE WITH JORDAN ALTOGETHER. THEY ARGUE THAT HUSSEIN HAS NOT PERMITTED THE FEDAYEEN TO REOPEN BASES IN JORDAN OR OPERATE POLITICALLY THERE.

6. THUS ON SEPTEMBER 21, THE VOICE OF PALESTINE DENIED REPORTS THAT A CONFEDERATION HAD BEEN AGREED TO. EARLIER, A KUWAITI NEWSPAPER QUOTED PALESTINIAN SOURCES AS ASSERTING THAT THE PLO HAD REFUSED TO ABANDON THE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE.

7. BOTH OF THESE REPORTS ARE PROBABLY TRUE. (AT THE SAME TIME, JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN LEADERS HAVE BEEN STRESSING THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION NOW EXISTING BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PLO.)

8. ARAFAT IS PROBABLY VERY SATISFIED WITH WHAT HE HAS ACHIEVED IN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HUSSEIN. THE KING HAS:

(A) ENDORSED THE PLO AND ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE;

(B) STAYED OUTSIDE THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK AND HAS SEEN TO IT THAT HIS PESSIMISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE AUTONOMY TALKS HAS BEEN MADE KNOWN TO WEST BANKERS; AND

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(C) RELEASED SOME PALESTINIAN PRISONERS AND UPGRADED THE PLO'S REPRESENTATION IN AMMAN.

9. (U) ISRAELI CONSUMER PRICE INDEX SPIRALS UPWARD: EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTS THAT THE ISRAELI CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS ANNOUNCED THAT THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX ROSE 8.4 PERCENT IN AUGUST, THE HIGHEST AUGUST INDEX INCREASE IN ISRAEL'S HISTORY AND ONE OF THE LARGEST INCREASES FOR ANY MONTH SINCE THE FOUNDING OF THE STATE. THE ANNOUNCEMENT BRINGS THE PRICE RISE FOR THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS TO 85 PERCENT. FOOD WAS THE LARGEST CONTRIBUTING FACTOR JUMPING OVER 18 PERCENT.

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UNCLASSIFIED ESB020RA072
PP RUQMBR
DE RUEHC #3959/02 2691518
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 2615072 SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 8889
RUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC PRIORITY
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 STATE 253959/02

10. (U) BITAN-PINTO AFFAIR: ACCORDING TO RADIO JERUSALEM, THERE WAS NO DEBATE ON THE PINTO AFFAIR IN THE SEPTEMBER 24 CABINET MEETING. CABINET SECRETARY ARIE NA'OR SAID THAT AS FAR AS THE GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED, THE ISSUE IS OVER IN THE WAKE OF THE DEFENSE MINISTER'S REMARKS SUPPORTING THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND RECENT REMARKS BY BITAN HIMSELF.

11. (U) SADAT ANSWERS QUESTIONS ABOUT OCTOBER INTERVIEW: ACCORDING TO RADIO CAIRO, SADAT SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT HE HAD REQUESTED MORE AID FROM THE US TO BE IN A POSITION THAT WOULD ENABLE HIM TO DEFEND EGYPT AND TO BE ABLE TO HELP HIS ARAB BROTHERS. HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO KING HASSAN AND SAID THAT WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN MOROCCO WAS NOT A STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE; THE POLISARIO NOW CONTAINS MORE CUBANS THAN MERCENARIES, WHO WERE ATTACKING HASSAN AND KILLING MOROCCANS. SADAT ADDED THAT HE WOULD NOT ASK HASSAN, HOWEVER, TO REESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT.

12. (U) OMANI PLAN FOR PROTECTION OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ: ACCORDING TO THE DOHA PRESS, AMBASSADOR HABIB, HEAD OF THE OMANI FOREIGN MINISTRY POLITICAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, ASSERTED THAT THE PROTECTION OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF OMAN AND THAT OMAN HAD PROPOSED A PLAN TO ALL THE FRATERNAL STATES OF THE GULF, THE US, JAPAN AND THE EUROPEAN STATES USING THE STRAIT.

13. (C) CASTRO TO THE MIDDLE EAST: ACCORDING TO THE US INTERESTS SECTION IN BAGHDAD, RADIO KUWAIT HAS SAID THAT CASTRO HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO VISIT SYRIA THIS AUTUMN AND NOTED THAT HE WOULD VISIT SEVERAL OTHER ARAB CAPITALS, AS WELL. OUR INTERESTS SECTION BELIEVES THAT CASTRO MAY DECIDE TO LAUNCH HIMSELF AS THE NEW LEADER OF THE NON-ALIGNED WITH A FLASHY EFFORT AT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ WHICH WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE NAM, AMONG OTHER GROUPINGS.

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14. (U) PALESTINIAN OFFICIAL DISCUSSES PLO-JORDAN RELATIONSHIP: ACCORDING TO RADIO DAMASCUS, PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL CHAIRMAN KHALID AL FAHUM DENIED THAT JORDAN HAS SUBMITTED A NEW PLAN FOR SOLVING THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE AND STRESSED THAT JORDAN IS COMMITTED TO THE BAGHDAD ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS. AL FAHUM POINTED OUT THAT THE POLITICAL COORDINATION BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PLO INCLUDES SYRIA FIRST OF ALL, WHICH IS THE CORNERSTONE IN RESISTING THE CAMP DAVID POLICY AND THE SELF-RULE "PLOT."

15. (U) KREISKY ON ISRAEL-PLO: ACCORDING TO THE VIENNA PRESS, AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR KREISKY HAS CHARGED THAT ISRAEL PLANS TO RUN A SLANDER CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARAFAT AND THINKS ISRAEL MAY BE AVOIDING RECOGNIZING THE PLO TO ALLOW THEMSELVES TO PURSUE A HARD-LINE POLICY.

16. (U) SHELLING IN NORTH LEBANON: ACCORDING TO REUTER, SEVERAL ARTILLERY SHELLS EXPLODED IN THE NORTHERN LEBANESE MOUNTAIN VILLAGE OF AMYOUN SEPTEMBER 24 AS A CEREMONY WAS BEGINNING BY THE SYRIAN NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY TO COMMEMORATE PARTY MEMBERS KILLED DURING THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR. THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IS UNCERTAIN; MAXIMUM NUMBER CLAIMED IS FOUR KILLED AND EIGHT WOUNDED.

17. (U) SOUTH LEBANON ROUND-UP: ACCORDING TO REUTER, LEBANON'S STATE-RUN BEIRUT RADIO SAID SEPTEMBER 24 THAT SEVERAL ISRAELI ARMORED VEHICLES HAD CROSSED THE BORDER, HEADING FOR THE SOUTHERN LEBANESE VILLAGE OF KFAR KILA, WHERE THERE WERE A NUMBER OF ISRAELI VEHICLES STATIONED. THE RADIO ALSO SAID THAT FORESTS NEAR THE BORDER VILLAGE OF KFAR HAMAM IN THE EASTERN SECTOR, CAME UNDER INTERMITTENT ISRAELI SHELLING SEPTEMBER 24 AND ADDED THAT THERE ISRAELI GUNBOATS WERE SEEN OFF THE COAST NEAR TYRE. IN TEL AVIV, A MILITARY SPOKESMAN DENIED THAT ISRAELI TROOPS HAD TAKEN ANY ACTION IN THE BORDER AREA.

18. (C) SYRIAN SPECIAL FORCES IN LEBANON: ACCORDING TO DEFENSE ATTACHE DAMASCUS NOT ALL, IF ANY, SYRIAN SPECIAL FORCE UNITS HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM LEBANON. DATT IS CERTAIN THAT ELEMENTS OF BOTH THE SYRIAN SPECIAL FORCES AND RIF'AT AL ASSAD'S DEFENSE FORCE UNITS REMAIN IN LEBANON WITHIN THE BEIRUT ENVIRONS AND THE LEBANESE MASSIF. THEY HYPOTHESIZE THAT A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE LINKING OF THE SYRIAN INTERNAL SITUATION AND REPORTS OF SF WITHDRAWAL AS POSTULATED IN PREVIOUS REPORTING, MAY SIMPLY BE IN NORMAL UNIT ROTATION.

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10. (LOU) REACTIONS TO SARKIS' SPEECH: ACCORDING TO EMBASSY BEIRUT, THE SEPTEMBER 22 SPEECH BY SARKIS MARKING THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF HIS PRESIDENCY HAS DRAWN A MIXED REACTION FROM LEBANESE POLITICIANS:

(A) PHALANGE LEADER, PIERRE GEMAYEL, WELCOMED THE SPEECH AS EXPRESSING "THE FEELINGS OF EVERY SINCERE AND SENSIBLE LEBANESE;"

(B) GEMAYEL'S SON AND RIGHTIST LEBANESE FRONT COMMAND LEADER, BASHIR GEMAYEL, CRITICIZED SARKIS FOR FAILING TO DO ANYTHING TO HELP LEBANON;

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NNNNVV ESB321BEA073
PP RUQMER
DE RUEEC #5859/23 2691520
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 2615072 SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2878
RUEKJCS/DOD/IBA WASHDC PRIORITY

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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 03 STATE 253059/03

(C) NLP CHIEF, CAMILLE CHAMOUN LAUNCHED THE MOST VIRULENT ATTACK AGAINST SARKIS FOR "FAILING TO SPECIFY THAT THE PALESTINIANS ARE OCCUPYING EVERY PART OF LEBANON;

(D) FORMER PM RASHID KARAMI WELCOMED THE SPEECH BUT SAID THAT SARKIS SHOULD HAVE PRESENTED HIS PLAN FOR NATIONAL ENTENTE "BEFORE THE COUNTRY COLLAPSES" AND ACCUSED SARKIS OF FAILING TO PIN-POINT "AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE CONSPIRACY AND

(E) THE PREDOMINENTLY MUSLIM AND LEFTIST NATIONAL MOVEMENT, ISSUED A STATEMENT ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT OF DOING NOTHING TO UNIFY THE COUNTRY ON A NON-CONFESSIONAL BASIS AND CALLED ON SARKIS TO PUT PRESSURE ON THOSE SUPPORTED BY ISRAEL (THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT HAS REPEATEDLY ACCUSED THE PHALANGE OF BEING ISRAELI-BACKED).

28. (U) ISRAEL-SYRIA-CLASH OVER LEBANON: ISRAELI F-15 FIGHTERS SHOT DOWN FOUR SYRIAN MIG-21S OVER LEBANON ON SEPTEMBER 24, ACCORDING TO AN ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT.
CHRISTOPHER
BT
#5859

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[illegible] ESA121MA912

PP RUQMHR
DE RUQMMI #1737 2690840
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260818Z SEP 79
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5971
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1451
BEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0267
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0448
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0673
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0883
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1325
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0612
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0906
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0552
BT

002228
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CHRG'
ECON
RF
CHRN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 1737

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 9/26/89 (BUCK, STEPHEN W.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, PLOS, MU, IR, XF
SUBJECT: OMANI OBSERVER COMMENTS ON IRANIAN/PLO RELATIONS

REF: MUSCAT 1681 (NOTAL)
1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. OMANI MFA POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR MULALAH HABIB IS AN EXPERIENCED OBSERVER OF IRANIAN/ARAB RELATIONS, HAVING SPENT THE PAST THREE YEARS AS OMAN'S AMBASSADOR TO IRAN (BEFORE THAT HE WAS AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO). A SHI'A, HE RECENTLY (C. SEPT. 19-21) RETURNED TO TEHRAN TO PRESENT AN OMANI PROPOSAL ON SECURITY IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT (SEPTEL). DURING A CALL BY DCM SEPT. 25 HE HAD THE FOLLOWING TO SAY ABOUT THE REPORTED PLO REQUEST FOR USE OF THE TUMBS AND ABU MUSA ISLANDS (REFTEL) / PLO/IRANIAN RELATIONS IN GENERAL.

3. EVEN IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE PLO HAS ASKED THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES FOR ACCESS TO OR USE OF THE TUMBS AND ABU MUSA, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD ACCEDE TO SUCH A REQUEST. IMMEDIATELY AFTER KHOMEINI CAME TO POWER THERE WAS A "HONEYMOON" BETWEEN KHOMEINI'S GROUP AND THE PLO BECAUSE OF PAST PLO SUPPORT. HOWEVER, THIS SOON ENDED. A PLO OFFER TO RECRUIT PALESTINIAN TECHNICIANS TO REPLACE WESTERN EXPERTS IN THE OIL FIELDS WAS NOT TAKEN UP. THE GOI TURNED DOWN A PLO REQUEST TO EXPAND PLO "CULTURAL AND INFORMATION CENTERS" TO A NUMBER OF CITIES BEYOND THE EXISTING ONES IN AHWAZ AND KHORAMMSHAR. THE GOI HAS FOUND THE PLO CONNECTION SOMEWHAT OF AN EMBARRASSMENT AND A NUISANCE, ESPECIALLY PLO ACTIVITY INSIDE IRAN. HENCE THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO MOUTH A PRO-PLO LINE IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, WHILE RESTRICTING ANY EFFECTIVE COOPERATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION. PERHAPS BECAUSE THIS IS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY, KHOMEINI'S GROUP DOES CHANNEL ASSISTANCE TO DESTITUTE SHI'A IN SOUTH LEBANON THROUGH THE PLO. IN SUM, PLO/IRANIAN TIES ARE NOT AS CLOSE AS PRESS REPORTS AND PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS WOULD MAKE THEM OUT TO BE.

4. COMMENT: WE LEAVE IT TO MORE EXPERIENCED IRAN WATCHERS TO JUDGE THE ACCURACY OF HABIB'S RENDERING OF IRANIAN/PLO RELATIONS. WE WOULD VENTURE THAT AS A SHI'A ARAB DIPLOMAT RESIDENT IN IRAZFAFTER KHOMEINI'S TAKE-OVER, HE WAS IN A GOOD POSITION TO FOLLOW THE SUBJECT.

WIELY

BT
#1737

DE RUQMHR #0513 274 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 0105242 OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4004
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0304
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0290
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0300
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0275
RUSBQB/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0340
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0341
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0347
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0307
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0417
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0272
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0189
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0375
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0027
BT

CLASS: CONFID
CHRGE: STAT 9
APPRV: CHARGE
DRFTD: POL:EA
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 C
ICA CH
RF 7/W

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10513

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/30/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PLOS, MU, IR
SUBJECT: PLO ACTIVITIES IN IRAN

REF: MUSCAT 1737

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. EMBASSY TEHRAN AGREES WITH DESCRIPTION BY OMANI MFA OFFICIAL REFTEL OF PLO/IRANIAN TIES. IRAN ENTHUSIASTICALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY SUPPORTS THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. IRAN WILL NOT, HOWEVER, PERMIT ANY PLO INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL IRANIAN POLITICS ESPECIALLY NOT IN KHUZESTAN.

3. WHILE PGOI OFFICIALS INCLUDING KHOMEINI CONTINUE TO DENOUNCE ISRAEL AND SUPPORT "PALESTINE", RELATIVELY LITTLE IS SAID ABOUT PLO ITSELF. EMBASSY HAS HEARD RUMORS, CHIEFLY FROM JEWISH COMMUNITY IN TEHRAN, OF UP TO 80 MILLION DOLLARS BEING TRANSFERRED THROUGH IRAN'S NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM TO THE PLO. THE RUMORS ARE SO PERSISTENT THAT WE ASSUME SOME MONEY HAS BEEN SENT.

4. ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC SOURCES TEHRAN (JAPANESE AND AUSTRALIAN) PLO OFFICES IN AHWAZ AND KHORRAMSHAHR ARE NOT STAFFED ON PERMANENT BASIS AND MAY INDEED BE CLOSED. IN ADDITION, PLO HAS JUST MOVED OUT OF THE EX-ISRAELI EMBASSY IN TEHRAN TO OTHER QUARTERS AND JAPANESE SPECULATE THAT THEY MAY HAVE BEEN FORCED TO MOVE. AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY SOURCE DID NOT THINK MONEY WAS BEING TRANSFERRED BY IRAN TO PLO.

5. EMBASSY HAS NOT HEARD FROM SOURCES HERE OF RUMORED PLO REQUEST TO USE TUMBS AND ABU MUSA NOR DO WE HAVE ANY INDICATION THAT IRAN WOULD AGREE TO SUCH A REQUEST IF IT WERE MADE.

6. WE THINK IT WOULD BE MOST UNLIKELY PGOI WOULD PERMIT PLO TO USE THESE ISLANDS. LAINGEN
BT
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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10513

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—222-222

MNANVV ESA874BPA997
PP RUCNMR
DE RUEHC #9917/01 2770847
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 040524Z OCT 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO INTSUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC PRIORITY
BT

002524 (DOC)

POL
CHRG
ECON
RF
CHRN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 STATE [illegible]

E.O. 12065 GDS 10/3/85 (MONTVILLE, JOSEPH V.)

TAGS: EC, IS, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 909 - OCTOBER 3, 1979

LONDON FOR GLASPIE
PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY
DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

(PARAGRAPHS 1-13 CONFIDENTIAL)

1. THE EC AND THE MIDDLE EAST: STABILITY AMID SOME T
DESPITE GROWING INTEREST WITHIN THE EC FOR CHANGE IN
THE COMMUNITY'S POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, IRISH
FOREIGN MINISTER O'KENNEDY, SPEAKING FOR THE EC AT TH
UNGA ON SEPTEMBER 25, DID NOT DEPART SIGNIFICANTLY FRO
ITS LONGSTANDING POSITION. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE EC
POSITION ARE: A SETTLEMENT BASED ON RESOLUTIONS 242 AND
338, AND ON THE FOUR PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE EC-9'S
STATEMENT OF JUNE 29, 1977.

2. O'KENNEDY DID ADD A MENTION OF THE PALESTINE
LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) BY NAME IN HIS ADDRESS,
BUT ONLY AS PART OF AN EXHORTATION TO ALL PARTIES TO
ACCEPT A BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT. HE ALSO

REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO JERUSALEM, STATING THAT
EC CONSIDERS GUARANTEED ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES
BASIC TO ANY AGREEMENT.

3. O'KENNEDY'S SPEECH DEMONSTRATES THE ESSENTIAL
CONTINUITY OF THE EC POSITION SINCE 1973. BUT RATHER
THAN REFLECTING A BASICALLY UNCHANGED VIEW, IT ATTRIBUTES
TO THE INABILITY OF THE COMMUNITY TO REACH A CONSENSUS
ON A BOLDER DEPARTURE. IT OBSCURES A GROWING INCLINATION
BY MANY OF THE NINE TO FAVOR RECOGNIZING THE PLO.

4. THERE HAVE BEEN PRESSURES ON THE [illegible] TO CHANGE THEIR POSITIONS FOR SOME YEARS. ARAB EFFORTS TO MOVE THE [illegible] WERE VISIBLE AT THE SESSIONS OF THE "EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE" IN BRUSSELS IN 1977 AND IN DAMASCUS IN 1978. ARAB INSISTENCE THAT THE EC RECOGNIZE THE PLO AS THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE CAUSED THE [illegible] ISSUED AT THE END OF BOTH THE 1977 AND 1978 [illegible] TO SOFTEN THE POSITIONS OF THE [illegible] INDIVIDUALLY.

5. BY EARLY 1979, THE OPPOSITION OF THE EC TO THE PLO APPEARED TO HAVE BEGUN TO ERODE. AT THAT TIME, IT WAS APPARENT IN THE WORKING GROUP OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE THAT ATTITUDES WERE SOFTENING. THE STAFF LEVEL EXPECTED THAT, WHILE THEIR SUPERIORS WOULD REFUSE TO CHANGE THE EC POSITION, THE REJECTION WOULD BE LESS FIRM THAN IN THE PAST AND THAT THERE WOULD BE A GRADUAL CHANGE OVER TIME IN FAVOR OF THE PLO.

6. PLO CHAIRMAN ARAFAT'S EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN THIS YEAR HAS INTENSIFIED AND CONFUSED THE ISSUE. HIS MEETING IN VIENNA WITH CHANCELLOR KREISKY AND WILLY BRANDT, HIS VISIT TO SPAIN, AND THE PLO'S ARRANGEMENT TO OPEN AN OFFICE IN ANKARA ALL REFLECT THE PLO'S INCREASING ACCEPTABILITY TO EUROPE. THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE EC MUST HAVE NOTED ARAFAT'S MADRID REMARKS LINKING A COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT TO OIL SUPPLY AS WELL AS THE BOYCOTT, BUT RELATED, COMMENTS OF SAUDI OIL MINISTER YAMANI IN COPENHAGEN.

7. AS PART OF THE CHANGES TAKING PLACE, THERE ARE INCREASING SIGNS OF DISCORD AMONG THE EC MEMBERS ON HOW TO HANDLE THE PLO QUESTION. THE MENTION OF THE PLO IN KENNEDY'S SPEECH, PRACTICALLY AN ASIDE, WAS THE OUTCOME OF LENGTHY AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION AMONG THE EC MEMBERS.

8. THE FRENCH ARE CONSIDERED THE DRIVING FORCE FOR PLO RECOGNITION. THE DUTCH, POSSIBLY THE STRONGEST ANTI-PLO FORCE AT ONE TIME, HAVE SHIFTED TO THE POINT WHERE THEY AND THE BRITISH ARE CONSIDERED AS HAVING A MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD POSITION. THE GERMANS AND THE BELGIANS ARE SAID TO OPPOSE OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PLO, WHILE LUXEMBOURG IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE EC'S DELAY IN RESPONDING TO THE ARAB DEMANDS.

9. THUS, THE SITUATION CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS UNDECIDED. THE EC STATES, CONFRONTED WITH ARAB PRESSURES AND THE OIL THREAT ON THE ONE HAND, AND MINDFUL OF DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS AND A DESIRE NOT TO GET TOO OUT OF STEP WITH THE US ON THE OTHER, ARE FACED WITH A REAL DILEMMA.

10. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE FRANCE IS THE LEADER IN WEST EUROPE AMONG THOSE FAVORING ACCOMMODATION WITH THE PLO, FRENCH OFFICIALS ARE CONCERNED THAT SUCH ACTION WILL HAVE REPERCUSSIONS, PARTICULARLY AMONG JEWISH GROUPS, IN THE NEXT FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THE [illegible] GOVERNMENT HAS MANAGED TO [illegible] BUT EXPECTS [illegible] PLO. IT [illegible] ST [illegible] 29417

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 10 STATE [illegible]

PRIME MINISTER COSSIGA TOLD THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT IN AUGUST THAT ITALY HAD FOR SOME TIME RECOGNIZED THE PLO AS AN "IMPORTANT POLITICAL FORCE" AND HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ITS REPRESENTATIVES SINCE 1974.

11. (U) WEST BANK PRESS: AL-QUDS NOTED ON OCTOBER 1 THAT ARAB DIPLOMATIC SOURCES HAVE LEARNED THAT SYRIA PLANS TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM LEBANON BEFORE END OF THE YEAR. THE SOURCES SAY THAT THE WITHDRAWAL IS CAUSED BY THE NEED FOR INCREASED MILITARY STRENGTH TO ENABLE SYRIA TO CONTROL INTERNAL POLITICAL DISSENT. [illegible] DAY. AL-FAJR ACCUSED HA'ARETZ OF ATTACKING THE MAYOR OF RAMALLAH AND HEBRON FOR THEIR MEETINGS WITH PLO OFFICIALS AND THEIR ANTI-ISRAELI STATEMENTS.

12. (U) PLO-TURKEY: THE TURKISH DOMESTIC RADIO SERVICE HAS ANNOUNCED THAT ARAFAT WILL MAKE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO TURKEY ON OCTOBER 5 AT THE PERSONAL INVITATION OF ECEVIT.

13. (U) EGYPTIAN PRESS: ALL EGYPTIAN NEWSPAPERS FOCUSED ON SADAT'S STATEMENT THAT RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES WHICH HAD BROKEN WITH EGYPT WOULD BE RESTORED FULLY OF EGYPT'S TERMS. SADAT DECLARED THAT HIS PEACE INITIATIVE HAD BEEN LAUNCHED TO SAVE THE ARAB CAUSE DIGNITY. BUT THAT DIFFERENCES AMONG THE ARABS [illegible] GREATER THAN ARAB DIFFERENCES WITH ISRAEL. IN OTHER REPORTS, THE EGYPTIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTED THE THREAT POSED TO IRAN TO THE STABILITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF STATES AND EGYPT'S OFFER TO ASSIST BAHRAIN IN THE FACE OF [illegible] PRESSURE.

14. (U) ISRAEL AND SINAI: RADIO JERUSALEM REPORTED OCTOBER 2 THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET REACHED NO DECISION ON THE PROPOSED SINAI SUPERVISION SCHEME AGREED UPON IN WASHINGTON BY DEFENSE MINISTER WEIZMAN AND FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN. ISRAELI GOVERNMENT SOURCES SAID THAT "BITTER CRITICISM" WAS DIRECTED AT THE PROPOSAL AND THAT SEVERAL MINISTERS DEMANDED THAT THE PLAN BE AMENDED.

15. (U) JORDAN-US: THE JORDANIAN NEWSPAPER AD DUSTOUR FOCUSED ON THE DETERIORATION OF US-JORDANIAN RELATIONS. IT LISTED THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

(A) GENERAL US MIDDLE EAST POLICY, ESPECIALLY THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT;

(B) THE PRO-ISRAELI POSITION OF THE US;

(C) THE US "VIOLATION" OF ITS MILITARY ARMS AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE SALE OF M-60 TANKS AND F-16 AIRCRAFT; AND

(D) INCREASED SUSPICION CAUSED BY US "PLOTTING" IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.

14. (C) JESSE JACKSON-SADAT-PLO: EMBASSY CAIRO AND OTHER SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THAT SADAT TOLD REV. JESSE JACKSON IN A SECOND MEETING OCTOBER 9 THAT HE WAS READY TO "EMBRACE ARAFAT LIKE A BROTHER" IF THE PLO CHARTER WOULD AGREE TO JOIN THE PEACE PROCESS. SADAT ALSO SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED THE PLO THE ONLY OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IN A LATER PRESS CONFERENCE, JACKSON SAID THAT SADAT ASKED HIM TO CARRY A MESSAGE TO ARAFAT CALLING UPON THE PLO LEADER TO CALL A HALT TO THE PLO'S MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL.

17. (C) PALESTINIANS/JORDAN/US: ABAL MAJI, THE NO. 2 MAN IN THE PFLP-GENERAL COMMAND, WAS CALLED UPON JORDAN TO BREAK ALL DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE US, ACCORDING TO THE QATARI NEWS AGENCY.

18. (C) PLO-UNGA: THE BANGLADESH UNGA DELEGATE INFORMED EMBASSY DACCA THAT THE PLO DELEGATE HAD TOLD HIM THE PLO BELIEVES THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF JESSE JACKSON AND OTHER BLACK LEADERS ARE CHANGING US ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PLO. FOR THIS REASON THE PLO INTENDS TO LET OCTOBER PASS QUIETLY WITHOUT INTRODUCING ANY NEW RESOLUTIONS, AND WATCH DEVELOPMENTS IN US ATTITUDES.

19. (C) LEBANON: FIVE PERSONS WERE KILLED IN THE NORTH DISTRICT ON OCTOBER 1 IN WHAT IS APPARENTLY A CONTINUATION OF THE FEUD BETWEEN THE PHALANGE AND SUPPORTERS OF FORMER PRESIDENT FRANJIYYAH. PHALANGE MILITIA WERE ALSO INVOLVED IN A GUNFIGHT ON OCTOBER 1 WITH MEMBERS OF A LOCAL GANG IN A BEIRUT SUBURB. TWO PERSONS WERE KILLED AND THREE WERE WOUNDED.

ANOTHER SHOOT-OUT TOOK PLACE IN BEIRUT ON OCTOBER 1 BETWEEN MEMBERS OF FATAH AND THE SHIA AMAL ORGANIZATION. A NUMBER OF PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES WERE KILLED.

20. (C) LIBYAN-SAUDI ARABIAN SUMMIT: IN THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE END OF KING KHALID'S TWO-DAY VISIT TO LIBYA, SAUDI ARABIA AND LIBYA REAFFIRMED THEIR REJECTION OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THEIR TO [illegible] SUPPORT FOR THE PLO. THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO CALLED FOR [illegible] AND KHALID ALSO REVIEWED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF [illegible] ADOPTED BY THE ARAB SUMMIT CALLING FOR [illegible]

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ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, AND DIPLOMATIC BOYCOTT OF EGYPT.

21. (C) IRAQI POSITIONS C IN A PRESS INTERVIEW OCTOBER
REUTER REPORTS, IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI STATED
THAT THE ARAB OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES WILL BE CONSIDERING
A SELECTIVE OIL EMBARGO AGAINST NATIONS OPPOSING THEIR
POLITICAL DEMANDS. IN THE SAME INTERVIEW, ACCORDING T
RADIO BAGHDAD, HAMMADI SAID THAT IRAQ WILL SUPPORT AN
INCREASE IN OIL PRICES AT THE NEXT OPEC CONFERENCE IF
INFLATION CONTINUES. RADIO BAGHDAD ALSO REPORTED THAT
HAMMADI REITERATED IRAQ'S CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF THE
CAMP DAVID PLAN FOR PERSIAN GULF SECURITY. CHRISTOPHER
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S E C R E T SECTION Ø1 OF Ø2 STATE 265316/Ø1

E.O. 12Ø65 GDS 1Ø/1Ø/85 (MO'TVILLE, JOSEPH V.)

TAGS: EG, IS, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 913 - OCTOBER 1Ø, 1979

LONDON FOR GLASPIE
PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY
DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

(PARAGRAPHS 1- 6 SECRET)

1. ARAFAT: BENDING WITH THE WIND: ARAFAT'S DECLARATION ON OCTOBER 5 THAT THE PLO WILL ADHERE TO A CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH LEBANON ESSENTIALLY MAKES PUBLIC A POLICY ON WHICH HE HAS ALREADY EMBARKED. ARAFAT SEEMS CLEARLY TO HAVE MADE A DECISION TO CONCENTRATE HIS EFFORIS MORE ON THE DIPLOMATIC THAN ON THE MILITARY FRONT, BUT TO MAINTAIN HIS AND FATAH'S REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS BY TAKING CREDIT FOR OPERATIONS LAUNCHED FROM THE WEST BANK.

2. NEVERTHELESS, THE DECLARATION IS NOT WITHOUT NEW SIGNIFICANCE. UNTIL RECENTLY, ARAFAT DID USE SOUTH LEBANON AS A STAGING AREA FOR ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAEL. THE BLOODY ATTACK ON AN ISRAELI BUS IN FEBRUARY 1978 WAS LAUNCHED FROM SOUTH LEBANON. FATAH HAS PARTICIPATED IN NUMEROUS ARTILLERY AND MORTAR DUELS WITH HADDAD'S MILITIA AND ISRAELI FORCES.

3. IT IS QUESTIONABLE, HOWEVER, WHETHER ARAFAT WILL TRY VERY HARD TO IMPOSE MODERATION ON MORE RADICAL GROUPS WITHIN THE MOVEMENT WHICH DISTRUST HIS DIPLOMATIC FORAYS AND WHICH WISH TO FOMENT REVOLUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD ALMOST AS MUCH AS THEY WISH TO "RECOVER" PALESTINE. MOREOVER, ARAFAT CLEARLY MADE HIS DECLARATION CONDITIONAL UPON ISRAEL'S CONTINUED OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE. ONE PALESTINIAN BOMB EXPLOSION WITHIN ISRAEL RESULTING IN CIVILIAN CASUALTIES COULD TRIGGER A NEW ROUND OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH.

4. PRESSURES ARE RAPIDLY BUILDING ON ARAFAT TO PERMIT THE LEBANESE ARMY TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL TROOPS SOUTHWARD. THE SARKIS GOVERNMENT WISHES TO AUGMENT THE PRESENT BATTALION SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE UNIFIL AREA WITH AT LEAST ANOTHER BATTALION WHICH WOULD MOVE TO TYRE AND, PERHAPS, NABATIYAH AND ARNUN. ALTHOUGH THE FEDAYEEN ARE SUSPICIOUS OF THE LEBANESE ARMY AND DO NOT WISH TO LOSE CONTROL OF THEIR LAST REMAINING AREA OF INDEPENDENT OPERATION, ARAFAT WILL PROBABLY ACQUIESCE IN SOME SUCH DEPLOYMENT. AMONG THE FACTORS ARGUING FOR ARAFAT TO BE ACCOMMODATING ARE:

(A) THE RECENT VISITS OF BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS;

(B) ARAFAT'S DESIRE TO USE THE TIME BEFORE THE US ELECTIONS TO EXPAND PLO RECOGNITION IN WESTERN EUROPE;

(C) FOREIGN MINISTER BUTRUS' CALL AT THE UNGA FOR RESTRAINT;

(D) ARAFAT'S OWN PLEDGE OF JUNE 5 THAT THE PLO'S FORCES WOULD PULL OUT OF MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS IN SOUTH LEBANON; AND

(E) THE CONCERN OF THE SHI'AS THAT THEY ARE PAYING THE PRICE OF PLO DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN ITS ABILITY TO STRIKE AT ISRAEL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY.

5. IN THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS ARAFAT HAS MET WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS, PRIME MINISTER AL HUSS, SPEAKER KAMAL ASSAD, AND OTHERS ABOUT EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON. ALTHOUGH NO OFFICIAL STATEMENTS HAVE EMERGED FROM THESE MEETINGS, EXPECTATIONS ARE BEING RAISED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY THAT SOME PROGRESS WILL BE MADE IN EXPANDING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY. THESE EXPECTATIONS ARE FURTHER HEIGHTENED BY THE RAMPANT SPECULATION OVER THE FORM THAT A US INITIATIVE FOR LEBANON WILL TAKE.

6. HOWEVER, EVEN IF LEBANESE ARMY TROOPS MOVE INTO TYRE'S BARRACKS AND MOST FEDAYEEN ARE WITHDRAWN FROM THE CITY, IN OUR VIEW, THE GUERRILLAS WILL CONTINUE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH. THEY CAN DO SO BECAUSE THEY ARE DEPLOYED IN AND AROUND THE REFUGEE CAMPS RINGING TYRE AND BECAUSE LEBANESE ARMY UNITS SENT SOUTH WILL NOT WANT TO RISK A TEST OF STRENGTH WITH THEM.

7. (U) NEW ISRAELI PARTY: REUTER REPORTS THE FORMATION ON OCTOBER 8 OF A NEW ULTRA-NATIONALISTIC ISRAELI POLITICAL PARTY WHICH COULD MAKE SIGNIFICANT INROADS INTO THE RULING LIKUD ALLIANCE AND ITS COALITION PARTNER, THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY. ABOUT 3,ØØØ PEOPLE ATTENDED THE FOUNDING MEETING OF THE NEW TEHIYA (REBIRTH) PARTY. KNESSET MEMBERS GEULA COHEN AND MOSHE SHAMIR, WHO HAVE ALREADY WITHDRAWN FROM THE LIKUD, WERE SPEAKERS. THE TEHIYA PARTY CALLS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF "JEWISH RIGHTS" IN ALL PARTS OF BIBLICAL PALESTINE INCLUDING THE WEST
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ANK AND THE GAZA STRIP. GUSH EMUNIM IS EXPECTED TO JOIN
HE NEW PARTY EN MASSE.

. (U) MISSING ISRAELI SOLDIER: AN ISRAELI ARMY
POKESMAN REPORTED OCTOBER 7 THAT THE BODY OF AN ISRAELI
OLDIER, REPORTED MISSING FOR NEARLY A YEAR, WAS FOUND
URIED IN A MOSLEM CEMETERY IN THE GAZA STRIP. A
ALESTINIAN COMMANDO GROUP ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD BEEN
OLDING HIM PRISONER "IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY" BEFORE HE
IED.

. (U) ISRAELI PRESS: THE PRESS ON OCTOBER 7 AND B
OCUSED ON THE CABINET'S "UNILATERAL" DECISION TO NOTIFY
HE US THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT CARRY OUT THE FINAL STAGE
ITS SINAI WITHDRAWAL IN THE ABSENCE OF A MULTINATIONAL
ORCE.

OLLOWING THE OCTOBER 7 MEETING OF THE CABINET, ISRAELI
SAID THAT ISRAEL WILL ASK THE US TO ACT AS A REFEREE
THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT OVER THE PRICE
EGYPTIAN OIL.

'ARETZ FEATURED AN ARTICLE IN WHICH A NUMBER OF SENIOR
OFFICIALS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT IT IS
FFICULT TO DEAL WITH MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS WITHOUT
ALING WITH THE PLO AND THAT THE US IS PLANNING TO
VOLVE THE PLO IN A NEW INITIATIVE CONCERNING SOUTH
BANON.

. (C) DAYAN ON SINAI: EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTS
AT DAYAN STATED IN AN OCTOBER 8 NEWS CONFERENCE
AT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAD ACCEPTED THE SINAI MONITOR-
G PLAN "IN TOTO" AND THAT NO CHANGE WHATSOEVER WAS BEING
QUESTED. HE ADDED THAT ISRAEL IS SEEKING FROM THE US
LY "CLARIFICATIONS" OF SEVERAL POINTS CONTAINED IN
E AGREEMENT.

11. (U) KUWAIT INCREASES OIL PRICE: AP AND REUTER REPORTED OCTOBER 9 THAT KUWAIT INCREASED THE PRICE OF ITS CRUDE OIL BY 1Ø PERCENT RETROACTIVE TO OCTOBER 1. THE NEW PRICE OF 21.43 DOLLARS PER BARREL IS STILL BELOW THE 23.5Ø DOLLARS PER BARREL PRICE ESTABLISHED AS A CEILING AT THE OPEC CONFERENCE IN GENEVA FOUR MONTHS AGO.

12. (U) CANADA-JERUSALEM: PRIME MINISTER JOE CLARK OCTOBER 9 PUBLICLY RECOGNIZED THE LEGITIMACY OF "PALESTINIAN GRIEVANCES" BUT SAID THAT CANADA WOULD DEAL WITH THE PLO ONLY IF IT RECOGNIZED ISRAEL. IN THE SAME INTERVIEW CLARK ADMITTED THAT HE HAD UNDERESTIMATED ARAB REACTION TO MOVING THE CANADIAN EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV TO JERUSALEM AND THE PROBLEMS THAT IT WOULD CREATE FOR CANADIAN BUSINESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

13. (U) WEST BANK-PLO: AP REPORTS THAT HEBRON MAYOR FAHD QAWASMEH SAID HE DOES NOT FEEL THAT THE PLO WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT REV. JESSE JACKSON'S ADVICE TO ADOPT A NON-V OLENT APPROACH TO THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. QAWASMEH PREDICTED CONTINUED "TERRORISM" AGAINST ISRAEL UNTIL PALESTINIAN AIMS ARE ACHIEVED.

14. (U) ISRAEL-WEST BANK ELECTIONS: AP REPORTS THAT HA'ARETZ SAID OCTOBER 9 THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL CANCEL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 198Ø. ACCORDING TO HA'ARETZ, PLO-BACKED CANDIDATES HAVE ALREADY BEGUN ORGANIZING FOR THE ELECTIONS IN APRIL HOPING TO CAPTURE ADDITIONAL OFFICES. ISRAELI AUTHORITIES APPARENTLY FEEL THAT ADDITIONAL ELECTION VICTORIES BY PRO-PLO CANDIDATES (WHO WON MOST OF THE RACES IN 1976) WOULD MAKE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND MODERATE WEST BANK ARAB LEADERS WHO COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE HA'ARETZ STORY, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE WEST BANK MILITARY GOVERNMENT INFORMED AP THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE ON CANCELLING THESE ELECTIONS.

15. (U) EXPLOSION NEAR HEBRON: A BOMB EXPLODED OCTOBER 9 IN HEBRON INJURING THE TWO ARAB YOUTHS WHO WERE ATTEMPTING TO PLANT IT NEAR THE TOMB OF THE PATRIARCHS.

16. (U) PHALANGIST KIDNAPPING: NEWS SERVICES REPORT THAT CHRISTIAR PHALANGIST MILITIAMEN KIDNAPPED 5Ø CIVILIA IN NORTHEAST LEBANON ON OCTOBER 8. ACCORDING TO AP, 15 HAVE BEEN RELEASED BUT 3Ø, MOST OF WHOM ARE SUPPORTERS OF FORMER PRESIDENT SHULEIMAN FRANJIEH, ARE STILL BEING

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10924

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RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0125
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0019
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0370
RUSPLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0366
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0330
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0438
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0031
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0075
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10924

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT 10/14/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
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E.O. 12065: GDS 10/14/79 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PLOS, MU, IR
SUBJECT: PLO IN IRAN

REF: TEHRAN 10513 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FON MINISTER YAZDI IN A PRESS CONFERENCE OCTOBER 13 FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGED PGOI'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT PLO TO OPERATE AN OFFICE IN AHWAZ, KHUZESTAN.

3. YAZDI SAID "WE FELT THE PLO OFFICE IN AHWAZ WOULD NOT BE IN OUR INTEREST OR IN THE INTEREST OF THE PLO, BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY. WE DISCUSSED IT TOGETHER AND THEY DECIDED TO CLOSE THEIR OFFICE THERE."

4. THE ARRIVAL OF A PLO DELEGATION IN TEHRAN OCT 12 HAS RECEIVED SOME ATTENTION IN THE PRESS AND MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED A SERIES OF STATEMENTS ON THE PLO. THE FOUR-MAN DELEGATION, LED BY KHALIL A. VASIR ("NICKNAMED ABU JEHAD"), CAME, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, TO TALK ABOUT BRINGING A CLOSER AND MORE FRUITFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE PLO. THE DELEGATION WAS MET BY FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI AT THE AIRPORT AND IS REPORTEDLY TO SEE KHOMEINI, YAZDI AND DEFENSE MINISTER CHAMRAN WHILE THEYARE HERE.

5. ON THE SAME DAY, REVOLUTIONARY GUARD COMMANDER ABOU SHARIF WHO WAS TRAINED IN PALESTINE WITH AMAL EXPRESSED HIS DISSATISFACTION TO THE PRESS OVER IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PLO. SHARIF REPORTEDLY SAID THAT "AS FAR AS THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION WAS CONCERNED THE FOREIGN POLICY OF IRAN HAD NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE AND REVOLUTIONARY FOR REASONS BEST KNOWN TO THOSE WHO WERE PURSUING THIS POLICY." THERE ARE CERTAIN POINTS WHICH CANNOT BE REVEALED FOR "TACTICAL REASONS," HE SAID.

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10924

6. IN A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ALSO ON OCTOBER 13, THE MOJAHEDEEN SUPPORTED THE PLO AND CALLED ON KHOMEINI TO SUPPORT THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE FINANCIALLY.

7. COMMENT: EMBASSY DOES NOT FEEL THAT THIS RECENT PLO VISIT WILL CHANGE BASIC IRANIAN POLICY OUTLINED REFTEL BUT WE WILL FOLLOW SITUATION CLOSELY. LAINGEN
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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10924

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11002

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RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0020
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0450
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0379
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0373
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0337
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0032
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0076
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 11002

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT 10/16/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
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CLEAR: SY:AGOLACINSKI
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DEPT FOR NEA/IRN AND A/SY/CC/TAGS

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/16/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PLOS, MU, IR
SUBJECT: PLO IN IRAN

REF: TEHRAN 10924

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. ENGLISH LANGUAGE WEEKLY RUMOR SHEET CALLED "EXCLUSIVE" ON OCTOBER 14 CARRIES STORY THAT PART OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TABATABAI'S TRIP TO LEBANON RESULTED IN AGREEMENT WITH PALESTINIAN LEADERS TO HELP IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS ACQUIRE MORE TRAINING FROM PALESTINIANS IN GUERILLA WARFARE CONCERNING MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS. STORY SAYS TABATABAI EXTENDED INVITATION TO PALESTINIAN MILITARY ADVISORS TO VISIT IRAN AND SPECULATES CURRENT VISIT OF "PLO OPERATIONS COMMANDER ABU JAHAD" (REFTEL) MAY BE CONNECTED WITH TABATABAI'S INVITATION.

3. EXCLUSIVE ALSO SPECULATES TABATABAI IN SYRIA GOT ASSURANCES THAT RADICAL PALESTINIAN GROUP "SAEGHE" (SAIQA) WAS NOT INVOLVED IN KHUZESTAN TROUBLES AND THAT SYRIA PROMISED TO HOLD NEGOTIATIONS WITH GEORGE HABASH'S GROUP TO PREVENT THEM FROM INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION.

4. EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE ANY LIGHT ADDRESSEES COULD SHED ON ANY OF ABOVE. LAINGEN

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11002

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RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 7355
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 7220
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 2872
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 6235
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 1757
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 5071
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY 2854
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 274942/01

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/19/99 (SAUNDERS, HAROLD H.)

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, LE, US

SUBJECT: SAUNDERS MEETING WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR: LEBANON AND IRAN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. BRITISH AMBASSADOR HENDERSON MET WITH NEA ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS OCTOBER 15 FOR UPDATE ON LEBANON INITIATIVE. HE ALSO DISCUSSED IRAN AND ARABIAN PENINSULA.

3. HENDERSON BEGAN BY ASKING IF LEBANON EFFORT WAS AIMED AT GETTING SYRIANS OUT OF LEBANON, OR OF ENGAGING PALESTINIANS IN INDIRECT DIALOGUE. SAUNDERS REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH LATTER SPIN-OFFS, POSSIBLE OVER TIME, OUR PRIMARY GOAL WAS TO BRING PEACE TO LEBANON FOR ITS OWN SAKE. LEVEL OF VIOLENCE THERE IN RECENT MONTHS HAD BECOME INTOLERABLE, WITH ATTENDANT RISKS OF BROADER CONFLICT.

4. ASKED ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION, SAUNDERS SAID THAT WE ARE JUST NOW MOVING AHEAD ON DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. WE EXPECT DECISION ON HOW TO PROCEED WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. AMBASSADOR DEAN WOULD ALSO HAVE IDEAS ON IMPLEMENTATION NOW THAT HE IS BACK IN BEIRUT AND CAN ASSESS SITUATION. IMPORTANT THING IS TO KEEP GOL AND UN IN LEAD,

WITH U.S. ACTING AS "MOTOR" IN PROCESS. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON GUIDANCE OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. AS FOR TIMING, AMBASSADOR DEAN WILL SEE PRESIDENT SARKIS AROUND THE END OF THIS WEEK TO EXPLORE INITIAL POINTS. AMBASSADOR HABIB WILL BE TRAVELLING TO AREA (BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, PERHAPS RIYADH), PERHAPS NEXT WEEK, WITH PARTICULAR AIM OF TALKING WITH LEBANESE AND ASSAD. SAUNDERS ASKED THAT HABIB TRIP BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL.

5. HENDERSON ASKED AT WHAT POINT, AND HOW, DO WE INTEND TO FEEL OUT PALESTINIAN THINKING. SAUNDERS SAID THAT WE ARE ALREADY IN CONTACT WITH MODERATE ARABS WHO HAVE TIES TO PALESTINIANS. WE KNOW THAT PLO IS THINKING ABOUT HOW TO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE ITS POLITICAL OPTIONS. SAUNDERS NOTED THAT JUDGING FROM INITIAL REACTIONS, MOST ARAB GOVERNMENTS FEEL THAT IT IS TIME TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT LEBANON. NONE HAS OBJECTED TO OUR INITIATIVE.

6. HENDERSON PROBED FOR SPECIFICS. SAUNDERS SAID THAT WE PLAN TO DISCUSS SPECIFICS WITH GOL, UN AND OTHER FRIENDLY PARTIES. SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT MIGHT BE ONE EXAMPLE. OUR PRESENT THINKING IS TO WORK TOWARD REACHING FIVE "CLUSTERS" OF AGREEMENTS: (A) MUTUAL AGREEMENT AMONG PARTIES IN SOUTH, INCLUDING ISRAELIS, NOT TO ATTACK EACH OTHER. ISRAELIS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO RESTRAIN HADDAD. CENTERPIECE OF THIS APPROACH WILL BE AGREEMENT THAT UNIFIL WILL HAVE PRIMARY ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY AND WILL BE FIRST PARTY TO BE ADDRESSED SHOULD CONFLICT BREAK OUT. (B) EVACUATION OF TYRE BY PLO, AND RETURN OF DISPLACED CIVILIANS TO THEIR HOMES IN SOUTH. (C) DEPARTURE OF NON-UNIFIL ELEMENTS--HADDAD, PLO, LEBANESE LEFTISTS--FROM UNIFIL ZONE. (D) LIMITED WITHDRAWALS OF SYRIAN TROOPS, PARTICULARLY IN BEIRUT AREA. THIS WOULD ENHANCE AUTHORITY OF SARKIS GOVERNMENT AND WILL HELP US WHEN WE GO TO ISRAELIS. (E) REDUCTION OF LIKELIHOOD OF FURTHER ISRAELI-SYRIAN CLASHES. WE HOPE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO CHANGE NATURE OF ISRAELI AIR RECONNAISSANCE. THIS WOULD INVOLVE DE FACTO ARRANGEMENTS RATHER THAN FORMAL AGREEMENT.

7. TURNING TO IRAN, HENDERSON OFFERED HMG'S VIEW THAT WHILE SITUATION THERE IS CLEARLY UNSTABLE, THERE ARE NO CLEAR SIGNS THAT ANYONE IS ABLE TO UNSEAT KHOMEINI. SAUNDERS AGREED THAT SITUATION WAS UNSTABLE, BUT THAT WE HAD LITTLE INFLUENCE ON IT. IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY MENTALITY REGARDS US AS SCARCELY ACCEPTABLE INTERLOCUTOR, BECAUSE OF TWENTY YEARS' SUPPORT OF SHAH. IRANIANS ARE CLEANING UP THE PAST, WHILE WE MUST BUILD BASE FOR THE FUTURE. SEVERAL MORE ACTS MUST BE PLAYED OUT, HOWEVER, BEFORE COMMUNISTS JOIN FRAY IN ANY EFFECTIVE WAY. IN RESPONSE TO HENDERSON'S QUESTION WHETHER WE THOUGHT THAT ARMY MORALE WAS HIGHER FOLLOWING SUPPRESSION OF KURDS, SAUNDERS REPLIED THAT THIS IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE BECAUSE OF GENERAL DISARRAY.

Have they been reading our stuff? Whee

8. HENDERSON ASKED IF SAUNDERS THOUGHT THAT U.S. PUBLIC OPINION WOULD PERCEPTIBLY TURN IN FAVOR OF ARABS OR ISRAELIS IN NEAR FUTURE. SAUNDERS SAID THAT U.S. PUBLIC TENDS PRIMARILY TO BLAME OIL COMPANIES AND USG FOR HIGH PRICES, RATHER THAN ARABS. HE ADDED THAT BLACK-JEWISH RIFT IS NOW PRODUCING DESIRE TO MEND FENCES. PLO HAS APPARENTLY GOTTEN MESSAGE THAT DIPLOMATIC RATHER THAN

BT
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NNNNUST
P 201601Z OCT 79 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9837
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1674
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 9721
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 7356
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 7221
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 2873
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 6236
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 1758
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 5072
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY 2855
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 274942/02

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MILITANT PATH IS MOST PRODUCTIVE WAY OF GETTING ITS MESSAGE ACROSS, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT IT WILL DO.

9. HENDERSON ASKED ABOUT OUR "QUICK REACTION" FORCE MENTIONED IN PRESS REPORTS. HE SAID THAT HE ASSUMES THAT "OVER THE HORIZON" PRESENCE IS INTENDED, RATHER THAN STRIKE FORCE CAPABLE OF "GRAND INTERVENTION," SINCE GROUND INTERVENTION WOULD REQUIRE DIFFICULT COLLABORATION WITH STATES IN AREA, INCLUDING BASES. SAUNDERS SAID THAT FOLLOWING VIGOROUS STUDY LAST SUMMER, WE CAME OUT ON SIDE OF OVER-THE-HORIZON APPROACH. THIS WOULD REQUIRE INCREASE IN NUMBER OF SHIPS, AS WELL AS OUR "SURGE CAPABILITY." DISPATCH OF F-15'S TO SAUDI ARABIA DURING YEMEN FIGHTING WAS PRECURSOR OF THIS IDEA. RESPONDING TO HENDERSON'S FURTHER QUESTION, SAUNDERS SAID THAT THIS WOULD PROBABLY REQUIRE INCREASE IN OUR LONG-RANGE TRANSPORT CAPABILITY. HE ADDED THAT WE ARE IMPROVING OUR RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY BUT NO "SURGE" UNIT WITH PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR MIDDLE EAST HAD BEEN FORMED. RECENT REPORT CONCOCTED BY ISRAELI PRESS THAT U.S. HAD POSITIONED UNITS IN ISRAEL FOR DEPLOYMENT IN GULF WAS OBVIOUSLY FALSE. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#4942

9 other ME cables

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 11217

DE RUQMHR #1217 296 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231238Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4415
INFO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0040
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0083
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 11217

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT 10/23/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:HPRECHT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
ECON CONS CHRON
RF 8/WEB

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/23/85 (LAINGEN, L. BRUCE) OR-P
TAGS: IR, LE, PINT
SUBJECT: YAZDI ON LEBANON AND PALESTINIANS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING CALL OF CHARGE AND VISITING DEPTOFF ON FON MIN YAZDI, WE REFERRED BRIEFLY TO US EFFORTS TO STABILIZE SITUATION IN LEBANON. YAZDI SAID CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN LEBANON WERE BECOMING INTOLERABLE FOR SHIAS WHO WERE CONSIDERING JOINING FORCES WITH PALESTINIANS AGAINST ISRAELIS AND CHRISTIANS. US MUST USE PRESSURE TO STOP ISRAELI ATTACKS. OP

3. WE REPLIED THAT US WAS ATTEMPTING TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL BUT PALESTINIAN TERRORIST ATTACKS MUST ALSO BE ENDED IF ISRAEL WAS TO CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE. IT SEEMED TO US THAT IRANIAN REVOLUTION, WHICH MOBILIZED ENTIRE PEOPLE IN PEACEFUL DISPLAY OF POLITICAL WILL, WAS A BETTER MODEL FOR THE PALESTINIANS. YAZDI SAID IRANIANS HAD BEEN WORKING ON PLO TO THAT END. IRANIANS WANTED PLO TO INJECT GREATER USE OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY IN ITS APPEAL. IF PLO CONTINUED SECULAR APPROACH, VICTORY WAS NOT ASSURED. IF PLO DID CREATE A PALESTINIAN STATE ON PURELY SECULAR LINES, THE MARXISTS AND RADICAL PALESTINIANS WOULD MOVE QUICKLY TO TAKE OVER. YAZDI SEEMED TO THINK THAT IRANIANS HAD MADE SOME IMPRESSION ON PALESTINIANS. HE ALSO MADE QUITE CLEAR IRAN'S COMMITMENT TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE: "WE HAVE HELPED THEM AND WE WILL HELP THEM IN THE FUTURE." LAINGEN
BT
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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 11217

1

RRUZMDV

LL ESA0810DA285 DC333H
AR RUCMHR
DE RUCMOD #1252 3081122
Z ZY SSSSS ZZH
R 271200Z OCT 79 POL
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUERC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5884 CHARGE
INFO RUCMDI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1814 ECON
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0353 DP
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0511 CHRON
RUCMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0387
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0476
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0346
RUCMJA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1536
RUCMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2006
RUCMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1055
RUCMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 1323
RUCMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0965
BT
S E C R E T DOHA 1252

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/27/85 (KILLGORE, ANDREW I.) OA-1
TAGS: PEPR, ZP, QA
SUBJECT: GULF FOREIGN MINISTERS UNEASY ABOUT PLO TIES WITH IRANIAN GOVERNMENT

REF: A) MANAMA 2118, B) DOHA 1213

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WEST GERMAN AMBASSADOR HELLNER HAS RELATED TO ME A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH QATARI MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SHAIKH AHMAD BIN SAIF AL-THANI, IN WHICH LATTER REFERRED TO A CONVERSATION ABOUT THE PLO [illegible]

LIBERATION ORGANIZATION WHICH HAD OCCURRED AT THE
OCTOBER 16 MEETING IN TAIF OF GULF FOREIGN MINISTERS.
MINISTERS WERE CONCERNED THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN T
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE PLO MIGHT BECOME SO C
THAT TRADITIONAL ARAB REGIMES IN ARABIAN PENINSU
WOULD LOSE PART OF THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE OVER TH
PLO. HEAVY FINANCIAL DEPENDENCE OF THE PLO ON THE ARAB
OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES HAS HELPED TO KEEP THE PLO
MORE MODERATE THAN IT OTHERWISE WOULD BE. BUT THE NEW
ISLAMIC REGIME IN TEHRAN HAS VERY LARGE FINANCIAL
RESOURCES PLUS A HEIGHTENED FERVOR ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF JERUSALEM FOR ISLAM. THIS GIVES TEHRAN AT LEAST
THE POTENTIAL TO GAIN INCREASING INFLUENCE OVER THE
PALESTINIANS WHO, AS WEST GERMAN AMBASSADOR KNOW, HOLD
MANY SENSITIVE POSITIONS IN SEVERAL OF THE GULF COUNTRIES.
HELLNER TOLD ME THAT THIS PORTION OF HIS CONVERSATION
WITH SHAIKH AHMAD BIN SAIF TOOK PLACE IN CONTEXT OF
PLEA FOR THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY COUNTRIES T
GRANT DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO THE PLO. THE RATIONALE
GIVEN BY SHAIKH AHMAD FOR EEC RECOGNITION
WAS THAT IT WOULD ENCOURAGE THE PLO AWAY FROM VIOLENCE
AND TOWARDS DIPLOMACY IN SEEKING A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION
TO THE PALESTINE PROBLEM.

3. COMMENT: AS INDICATED IN EARLIER REPORTING,
200,000 STRONG PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY IN QATAR IS EXTREMELY
WELL OFFF AND STRATEGICALLY LOCATED. THE PALESTINIANS
HERE ARE THE UPPER MIDDLE CLASS/INTELLECTUAL ELITE
OF THIS PECULIAR SOCIETY. THE BULK OF THEM ARE
REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH BOTH THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
SUPPORT TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT
OF QATAR. SO IT IS AN UNUSUAL INDEX TO FIND
QATAR AND PERHAPS THE OTHER GULF STATES CONSIDERING THE
ISLAMIC IRAN MAY BE ABLE TO OFFER THE PALESTINIANS MORE THAN
THEIR FELLOW ARABS.

KILLGORE

BT
#1230

NNNNTV ESB088RA818

PP RUQMBR
DE RUEEC #2118 3061035
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 2706012 OCT 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 3047
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 9267
RUEEAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1794
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 4909
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 2389
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 9824
RUFROL/AMEMBASSY BONN 3407
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0069
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 6350
RUDFNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 3618
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 7473
RUQMDB/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 4215
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0697
RUEHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 62[illegible]
RUQMJA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 187[illegible]
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 8815
RUEHC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0171
RUEHLG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 1699
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0635
RUFNDS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1548
RUQMTA/USLO RIYADH 2725
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 3838
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5169
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 7382
RUDKCPO/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 9168
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9244
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0032
RUFRNA/USMISSION USNATO 8421
PT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 282118

E.O. 12065: GDS - 10/26/85 (TWINAM, JOSEPE)

TAGS: ECIN, ENRG, EEC, OAPEC, PLO, ZP

SUBJECT: UTAYBA LINKS EEC-GULF DIALOGUE TO PLO ISSUE
REF: STATE 280699

REQUEST YOU SEEK EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY WITH UTAYBA HIS REPORTED MEDS INTERVIEW STATEMENT REGARDING ILLEGALITY OF RIGHT OF PALESTINIANS TO HAVE A STATE ON [illegible] WEST BANK AND GAZA AND GULF STATES DISCUSSION OF OIL [illegible] EEC. IN LAYING OUT US POSITION TO HIM, YOU SHOULD

GUIDED BY STATE REFTEL, MAKING CLEAR US OPPOSITION
INCLUSION OF ANY POLITICAL ISSUES IN ENERGY DIAL GUES
ISTOPHER

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003305

NNNNVV ESA609BRA580
RR RUQMHR
DE RUEHAD #2280 3031040
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 300633Z OCT 79
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9007
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2039
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1869
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1997
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1758
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1711
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2282
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 309
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 382
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 291
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 2280

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/30/85 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, XF, IZ
SUBJECT: (U) ARAFAT VISITS IRAQ

REF: (A) FBIS JN282108 OCT 79 (B) FBIS JN290755 OCT 79
(C) BAGHDAD 2093

1. (U) PLO CHAIRMAN YASSIR AR FAT VISITED BAGHDAD OCTOBER 27 - 29 ACCOMPANIED B. ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (AL SECGEN ABD AR-RAHIM UMAR AND FATAH FOREIGN RELATIONS CHIEF MUHAMMAD ABU MAYZAR. DEPUTY PM AND NATIONAL COMMAND DIRECTOR OF PALESTINE AND ARMED STRUGGLE OFFICE NA'IM HADDAD WAS ARAFAT'S OFFICIAL HOST AND ONLY IRAQI T SIT IN ON FOUR AND ONE-HALF HOUR MEETING WITH SAD

2. (C) ARAFAT WAS IN IRAQ IN NOVEMBER 1978 FOR BA SUMMIT, AND AGAIN IN MARCH FOR SUMMIT'S FOLLOW-ON MINISTERIAL MEETING. HOWEVER, THIS IS HIS FIRST VISIT ON BILATERAL BUSINESS IN SOME YEARS. IN COMPARING THIS WITH PREVIOUS VISITS, WE NOTE THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME ALF REP IS HERE AS PART OF PLO DELEGATION, RATHER THAN AS IRAQI'S "TAME" PALESTINIAN. IN ASSIGNING HOST RESPONSIBILITIES TO HADDAD, GOI APPEARS TO HAVE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO RECEIVE ARAFAT AS CHIEF OF STATE, A SLIGHT HTAT WILL NOT BE LOST ON HIM.

3. (C) ALTHOUGH LITTLE INFORMATION HAS YET TRICKLED OUT OF SADDAM/ARAFAT MEETING, ITS UNUSUAL LENGTH IS ATTRACTING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION. PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS HAVE STRESSED "COORDINATION" IN PREPARATION FOR ARAB SUMMIT AS THEME OF VISIT, JUST AS IT WAS ONE OF T[illegible] OF LAST WEEK'S VISIT BY KING HUSSEIN. AN OBVIOUS REQUIRING SOME KIND OF PREARRANGED UNDERSTANDING IS SYRIA-IRAQ DISPUTE, HIGHLIGHTED IN INTER-ARAB CONTEXT BY IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAQ(AND EVEN JORDAN) OF THEIR EXCLUSION FROM OCTOBER 16 TAIF MEETING.

4. (C) COMPARISON OF VOICE OF PALESTINE AND INA VERSIONS OF ARAFAT'S TV INTERVIEW IS BEST CLUE WE HAVE THAT LEBANON WAS AMONG MAJOR TOPICS OF CONVERSATION. IRAQ IS OBVIOUSLY STILL PUSHING ITS RESTRICTED AGENDA POSITION FOR ARAB SUMMIT (REF C), BUT JUDGING FROM VOP, ARAFAT IS STANDING FAST IN HIS OPPOSITION TO IRAQ ON THIS ONE.

5. (C) ANOTHER AREA OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN TO IRAQ IS WHAT IT NO DOUBT PERCEIVES AS ARAFAT'S SLOW AND UNACCEPTABLE SLIDE TOWARDS MODERATION IMPLICIT IN HIS EUROPEAN INITIATIVES. MANY OF OUR DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES THEREFORE ASSUME THAT ARAFAT WAS SUBJECTED TO A LECTURE ON ADHERENCE TO THE "BAGHDAD PRINCIPLES", SHORHAND FOR MAINTAINING UNITED FRONT AGAINST PARTICIPATION IN ME NEGOTIATIONS. (BY SAME TOKEN, WE SASSUME ARAFAT BROUGHT ALONG ALF REP TO BORE UP HIS RADICAL CREDENTIALS. INDEED, A RUMOR IS NOW CIRCULATING THAT BOTH ARAFAT'S AND KING HUSSEIN'S MEETINGS WITH SADDAM PRODUCED A PLEDGE THAT NEXT SUMMIT WOULD RECONFIRM BAGHDAD RESOLUTIONS AND THEN "BUILD" ON THEM IN TERMS OF ARAB SOLIDARITY AGAINST CDA AND TREATY.

6. (C) COMMENT: THERE IS CONSIDERABLE BUT TOTALLY INCONCLUSIVE SPECULATION OVER WHAT POSITION ARAFAT AND HUSSEIN MAY HAVE TAKEN ON THE GOAL OF THEIR DIALOGUE VIS A VIS THE AUTOMONY TALKS. MOST ASSUME DIALOGUE WILL EVENTUALLY RESULT IN SOME KIND OF JOINT NEGOTIATING FORMULA, BUT ACKNOWLEDGE NOT ONLY THAT IRAQ WOULD BE VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED, BUT THAT CURRENT STATUS OF AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS MAKES TIMING OF THIS KIND OF JORDANIAN/PLO INITIATIVE INAPPROPRIATE.

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#2280



There Has To Be a Palestinian State

Henry S. Sizer
American Embassy, Muscat

Being a peripheral observer of the Arab-Israeli controversy, I hesitate to insert my two bits into the discussion. Certainly more is going on than is disclosed in the cables we see at my present post. Yet I am dismayed at the unending deadlock on the crucial Palestinian question and at the tendency of official U.S. statements to go off in vaguely contradictory directions on this issue. Our statements sometimes seem designed to avoid a head-on scrutiny of the problem and sometimes seem to take a position, only to flip-flop away from it. The comments below are aimed at this confusion, hopefully with constructive effect.

Washington's Dilemma

If I judge correctly from U.S. statements over the last year or so of intensive negotiations, our policy on the Palestinian issue contains the following Delphic elements:

-- We believe there can be no lasting peace without "a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects," and the settlement must "recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." So far, so good, but this language says very little. In effect, we are stating only that we consider the Palestinian problem to be a key part of the controversy. The use of the term "legitimate rights," which we studiously avoided until the Carter administration, and the reference to a Palestinian "people" are not without significance, but no definition of a policy is revealed.

-- We believe the Palestinians should "participate in the determination of their own future," whatever that means. This was President Carter's Aswan wording, which the White House carefully repeated at the end of Sadat's visit. It is thus a current and authoritative version of our vague policy. Reportedly, this guarded language stems from our desire to find a common denominator for negotiations; if so, it shows how painfully bland we have become in the search for agreement.

-- We favor a Palestinian "homeland." This utterance, dating from March 1977, looks like a real position, but it can mean several things. The term conjures up the 1917 Balfour Declaration that led inexorably over three turbulent decades to the sovereign State of Israel. We say we'll accept whatever Palestinian "entity" the

parties agree upon, although we prefer one "tied" to Jordan and less than independent. As I write this, President Carter has just reinforced that preference by being quoted as saying we had "never favored an independent Palestinian state" and has "no intention of deviating from that position." A subsequent official "clarification" of the President's remark explained that he had said nothing new, but the impression was left of a bluntness previously absent in our dislike of a sovereign Palestine. That at least begins to be a recognizable policy. However, the nature of the non-independent "homeland" envisaged for the Palestinians remains a mystery.

-- We stress that somebody must speak for the Palestinians - negotiations "with appropriate representation of the Palestinian people" was the way we put it when Presidents Carter and Ceausescu issued their joint declaration on April 13. Yet we refuse to commit ourselves to the most obvious candidate for this role, the PLO. We won't talk officially to the PLO. However, we qualify this snub by saying we will talk to them as soon as they publicly recognize U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, thereby recognizing Israel's right to exist. This general line originated before Carter's Presidency and has repeatedly been confirmed by him and other Administration leaders. It has been the object of vigorous criticism by Israeli Premier Begin, particularly following its rather flexible definition in mid-1977. Carter said last August that the U.S. will talk to the PLO even if the latter feels it must add to its endorsement of 242 and 338 and that these resolutions do not go far enough, due to their reference solely to "refugees." And in an earlier effort to be accommodating, Vice President Mondale said last June merely that there must be a "demonstrated willingness" on the PLO's part to live in peace with Israel. Still the PLO does not - perhaps for internal reasons cannot - meet the U.S. condition. The result is that everything hangs in limbo, and all sides are displeased.

This thrashing about is disheartening, but one can appreciate the Carter administration's problem. The President has set an ambitious goal which is laudable in conception but which realities make hard to sustain. Scuttling the hyper-caution that characterized Kissinger's step-by-step approach, Carter went all out for a comprehensive Near Eastern peace. As in other policy areas, his hallmark has been to remove the strictures of the past and let in fresh thinking. Given the mounting danger to world peace inherent in the Arab-Israeli confrontation, combined with what may well be "the most propitious time for a genuine settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict", one can hardly fault the Administration for this decision. However, as in other policy areas, the Administration seems not to have seen that there were compelling reasons for the strictures of the past. Washington's helplessness in leading Israel and the Palestinians to acknowledge each other and, even more to the point, our own inability to be favorably disposed toward the Palestinians are large impediments to any drive toward a settlement. As I see it, previous Presidents have shied away from such a drive precisely because they saw these obstacles. Having foresworn his predecessors' caution, President Carter has come face to face with the harsh realities.

One has to concede that the most active Palestinian leaders are unlovely people who don't deserve to be acknowledged cordially. If there was ever any doubt about this, the attack on civilians north of Tel Aviv last March should drive home the reality of Palestinian tactics. The perpetrator of that deed was Fatah, the

largest of the PLO commando groups. Israel is quite justified in labeling the PLO a "terrorist" organization and in dealing with it as a security threat on that basis. Israelis are indignant about the Palestinians, and the historic U.S. commitment to Israel makes Americans indignant too. Hence we see Washington's long-standing refusal to talk to the PLO until it changes its entire outlook. This refusal is of course reinforced by the especially brutal antics of the Palestinian rejectionists, from whom "moderates" like Arafat have trouble distancing themselves for various reasons. One cause of Arafat's skittishness is Washington's intransigence. The upshot is a tragic minuet in which nobody moves toward the others because the others won't move first.

Thus, in my view the PLO's terrorism only sharpens the poignancy of Carter's impasse. Palestine was foremost among the torments in the Pandora's box labeled "comprehensive peace negotiations" that he felt obliged to open. Now that it's out, he cannot avoid confronting it realistically. This is especially true since the settlement process has now spawned the miracle of Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. I do not know whether the Administration expected this dramatic event or not, but we bear considerable moral responsibility for it. We cannot fairly leave Sadat in the lurch. His recent brawl with the Palestinians arising from the murder in Cyprus of Yousef Sebai, while it complicates the picture, does nothing to alter this basic imperative.

To the Arabs, for whom such emotion-laden gestures mean much, it will be inadmissible if no response is forthcoming to Sadat. The Arab radicals are bound to say "we told you so" and make political hay out of the general Arab bitterness. Predictably, they will strive to undercut any response and thus self-fulfill their prophecy.

American interests will suffer along with the cause of moderation everywhere. We must act to prevent this. Like De Lawd in the play *Green Pastures*, the U.S. "gotta rear back and make a second miracle to take care of the first one," impasse or no impasse.

Coping with Palestinian Aspirations

A moderate Arab diplomat with whom I occasionally discuss the Arab-Israeli dispute compares the PLO's commitment to destroy Israel to a child threatening an adult. The Israeli reaction is as if the adult responded stuffily to the child: "Well, I certainly won't deal with you." Israel makes quite an issue of this, my colleague adds, although it used to say it would negotiate with the Arabs any time.

Admittedly this diplomat gives inadequate recognition to the concern among Israelis about the PLO. Israel rejects all advice that the PLO's professed intentions should not be taken seriously. One has only to consider the recent Israeli incursion into South Lebanon to sense the depth of Israeli opinion on this point. Equally illuminating in a different way is the intense feeling in Prime Minister Begin's toast to Secretary Vance last August 9 in Jerusalem: the Premier argued that the PLO may be weak, but it wants to destroy Israel and that's exactly what Hitler said he would do to the Jews in the early 1930's when he was weak. I can agree with this view up to a point, but the Palestinians and the Nazis are hardly comparable in most respects. An intellectually detached process of separating Palestinian rights from wrongs and capabilities from intentions is necessary, even if that's hard for Israelis and anti-terrorists everywhere to do. Above all, Israel should have more confidence in its own staying power. As my Arab colleague also notes, the Israelis should be the first to see that the Palestinians cannot overthrow them.

Furthermore, Israel should recognize that a vastly important change in Arab-Israeli relations has occurred: the Arabs as a whole now acknowledge that Israel is here to stay. Sadat's trip to Jerusalem was the capstone of this shift. To those of us who had witnessed the intransigence of rampant Arab nationalism fifteen or twenty years ago, when Israel was regarded as a "usurper of Arab soil," Sadat's pilgrimage was an astonishing event. It marked a major psychological break among the Arabs, who have traditionally been the more stubborn side in the whole controversy.

To be sure, accompanying this change has been a gradual decline in the cry of Arab unity, shown particularly by the Palestinians taking over their own cause after the 1967 war. So what the Egyptian President says about Israel's right to exist may commit the Palestinians far less than in the days of Nasser. Yet the complex relationship between "Palestinian" nationalism and "Arab" nationalism has yielded mixed results. The Palestinians have asserted the right to speak for themselves, but paradoxically have shown a marked inability to capitalize on their new position. They are really no stronger than before; the difference is that they are more militant and control the rhetoric and goals.

Their dependence on one or more Arab governments is still full. Therefore, Sadat's trip can properly be viewed as a gesture on behalf of the entire Arab side, and it should be seized upon as such to avoid giving the radical Arab minority an opening. The historic bargain of mutual Israeli-Arab recognition is ready to be struck if only we and the Israelis will ignore the form (Palestinian intransigence) for the substance (Arab flexibility).

Thus I hope we will see our way clear to doing whatever we must behind the scenes to coax Israel into a less up-tight position on the Palestinian threat. I know that similar advice has been offered before by various observers, but this time the momentum of the Administration's ambitious effort is at stake. Either the Israelis relax their policy or the peace moves will fail with disastrous consequences - it's about as simple as that. While as a practical matter some gesture from the Palestinians may be necessary to sweeten this pill for Begin, I believe the basic change of position must be his. We should concentrate on finding the combination of pill and sweetener that he will swallow.

As for ourselves, I urge that we not push too hard our insistence that the PLO surrender its commitment to destroy Israel before we will talk to them. In reality, Sadat has just surrendered the commitment for them. While I suppose it is pointless to argue against this oft-reiterated U.S. position and in fact agree with Mondale that the PLO can logically be asked for a "demonstrated willingness" to lay off Israel, I believe a formal abandonment of the PLO ideology is not in the cards except as part of the ultimate settlement. And having publicly linked Resolutions 242 and 338 to the change we seek from the PLO, we probably cannot expect an open PLO statement along these lines, for that would smack of caving under American pressure. I propose that henceforth we quietly let the PLO know what else we would accept as a "demonstration" and then wait for them to do it before going public about it. How about a PLO endorsement of Sadat's initiative? If the peace process is to continue, that will have to come in any case, probably in conjunction with a Syrian acquiescence of some sort. If and when the PLO does this, we could conclude that obviously the PLO recognizes Israel's permanence and start the long-delayed U.S.-Palestinian dialogue. In fact, that could also be part of the sweetener which Begin apparently needs.

The Palestinian Struggle for Independence

Talking to the Palestinians is, of course, just a marginal breakthrough. Success will lie in solving the substantive issues. The secret here will be to ascertain what the Palestinians really want, for despite their weakness they hold a veto power over the settlement and are the key party to be satisfied.

I submit that the Palestinians are struggling for just one thing: an independent state. If we really think they will be pacified by something less than independence, we are wrong.

Certainly there is considerable attraction in a Palestine that is less than independent. It is hard to envisage a moderate Palestinian government in the best of circumstances. An anti-Western bias and adherence to the radical wing of the Third World group are likely from any viable Palestinian leadership, with all that such a stance means in U.N. votes, etc. Jordan's King Hussein, on the other hand, would be a "safe" arbiter of Palestinian votes. Add to this the fact that the West Bank was once under Jordan's aegis and the evidence that sentiment for a tie with Jordan does exist among many Palestinians and we have a prima facie case for the idea.

But I believe that the historical process at work flaws this plan fatally. Just as the Zionist movement in the international context of the first half of the twentieth century led irresistibly to an independent Israeli state, the logic of the second half of the century dictates that there *will* be an independent Palestine. Consider the direction that anti-colonialism - in either its real or contrived form - has taken in recent years. The resultant plethora of independent states is the spirit of the age. The anti-Western tone of most of this is also part of the age, and so is the West's inability to stem the tide in terms of traditional outlooks. The Carter administration should know this better than others, for one of its guiding principles is an acknowledgement of this trend. My point is that the Palestinians, justifiably or otherwise, have become part of this wave just as much as the South African majorities who are fighting white domination or the Panamanians who have demanded a new canal treaty. They are going to get their "sovereignty" and the only question is whether they'll get it *with* our concurrence and therefore a degree of protection for our interests or *without* it and an accentuation of their congenital "anti-imperialism."

This will happen, I believe, despite the probable willingness of the West Bank majority to accept less than full independence in a tie with Jordan. Many Palestinians are fed up with the PLO for having accomplished little but trouble with a succession of Arab governments. But this cuts little ice in the political fray. An outspoken minority always calls the tune; among the Palestinians that means the PLO, if indeed it doesn't mean the rejection front. The only impact the apathetic majority can hope to have is that, by sheer numbers, they may induce a minor broadening of the PLO's base and a hedged but detectable shift in PLO policy away from intransigence against Israel. Such changes are devoutly to be wished, but they will not significantly loosen the grip of the vocal militants on the Palestinian people. In general, the majority will be as ineffective as the colonial Tories were in the American Revolution. Just as Sam Adams, Patrick Henry, and Tom Paine swept the American scene at crucial junctures 200 years ago, so will the hotheads of the PLO - and, if their voice isn't listened to, the rejectionists. It is too bad there is no Hamilton or

Jefferson visible in the PLO high command, but that's beside the point. Let's be thankful that Arafat is not George Habash.

The Magic of "Sovereignty"

One could argue that "sovereignty" is such an illusory notion that it can't really be what bugs the Palestinians. It is indeed an odd concept. A sovereign state has been defined as one exercising "individual authority over all persons and property within its borders...independent of direct control by any other power." But restrictions of various sorts have been put on states universally viewed as sovereign, including notably guarantees of neutrality and limitations on military forces (Austria and Japan being the chief contemporary examples). Moreover, there is the general restriction levied on all states that bind themselves to the U.N. Charter, not to mention the practical and probably more telling constraints imposed by the interrelated nature of the modern world.

The most one can say about sovereignty in international law is that certain "marks" of its existence are always acknowledged: a flag, the right to send and receive diplomats, the power to conclude treaties in one's own name, the ability to send delegations to international conferences on a basis of formal equality with other participants, etc. Beyond that, the concept is mainly psychological: you know when you have it but you can't tell what it is.

Not very substantial stuff. But bitter conflicts have arisen over this abstraction for centuries and will do so again. Once a community decides it is a "people", it fights tooth and nail for this invitation to the table of nations. The Palestinians are doing so now. They may talk of a secular state of Moslems, Christians, and Jews and other alleged ideological visions, but what they truly want is land in Palestine on which to plant their flag. With the U.S. having called them a "people" deserving a "homeland", they are more than ever frustrated at being denied a place in the sun.

Nothing shows the effect this denial has on the Palestinian psyche more than the continuing Lebanese crisis. The numerous Palestinians in Lebanon are a rootless group. Denied status where they live, they are likewise alien where they or their parents were born. The result is they throw themselves on the delicate balance of Lebanese politics as a disruptive force. No solution to this predicament is discernible in the absence of a Palestinian government that can issue them passports. They would then have identity in the world and a home base to return to. Lebanon could (hopefully) solve its problem more easily even if thousands of Palestinians continue to live there. Some might be given Lebanese citizenship, but most would be resident "expatriates" - a label now impossible without a "patria" to be a reference point.

We and the Israelis should not be dismayed at this almost mystical quality of Palestinian sovereignty, I believe, for there is an opportunity to be seized in it. Once won, a state's independence can be hedged through schemes made with varying degrees of political compulsion as long as the illusion of sovereignty is preserved. The presence of peace-keeping troops is one such arrangement, as is a treaty of economic union. If Israel plays its cards right, I am convinced it can obtain all the guarantees it needs in pragmatic terms to compensate for the largely abstract concession of sovereignty. So can Jordan, if it concentrates solely on achieving a purely practical connection with the West Bank.

Furthermore, I think the concession of sovereignty might lead to some surprising results in other aspects

of the settlement process, specifically:

-- Once they have their sovereign turf, the Palestinians may be amenable to adjustment of the 1967 border in Israel's favor. It is even possible they will insist only on the West Bank and agree to abandon Gaza, for the viability of the Palestinian state would be firmer if it avoided "pakistanization" in non-contiguous territories. This is a highly debatable point, however, and I state it only as a possibility.

-- The knotty question of Jerusalem can more easily be discussed, if not settled. There are pitfalls in this emotion-laden issue that lie beyond the argument of this paper, but at least with a guarantee of sovereignty in the West Bank, the Palestinians can approach Jerusalem with a notch less heat.

-- The thorny questions of Arabs living in Israel and of Israeli settlements in the West Bank might be more solvable through mutual regimes of "Palestinian Jews" and "Israeli Arabs", i.e., expatriate communities enjoying special status through treaties. This thought also treads on debatable ground and might run afoul of Israeli sovereign sentiments, but I believe only an arrangement of this type will ever resolve it.

I don't for a minute argue that everything will fall into place if the Palestinians are promised their state, or that a sovereign Palestine will act reasonably once a settlement is achieved. Obviously, sovereignty, even if carefully hedged, carries with it a degree of political independence that allows its holder to be a troublemaker if he so wishes. I argue only that a non-sovereign Palestine next to Israel would be an even greater troublemaker and indeed impossible to bring safely into the world community.

It Takes Two to Shake Hands

If sovereignty is what the Palestinians truly want, all the recent formulas pointedly falling short of this are hollow. Thus, it does no good for Israel to issue soothing words about how it will take good care of the holy places under its control. That may be a necessary point to make at some stage in the bargaining, but it is not the real issue. The issue is: whose flag flies over the holy places, and over the rest of the disputed land.

In reaching a decision on whether a Palestinian flag should be allowed to fly, I believe we must look very closely at the relative dangers of an independent Palestine versus those of a non-sovereign entity bound to Jordan or to Israel. A tight Israeli connection will simply not conciliate Palestinian passions; and the volatility of interstate relations within the Arab world makes any firm tie to Jordan subject to change without notice, even in the unlikely event that the Palestinian leaders accept it. To be blunt, the long-term fate of the Hashemite Kingdom is not necessarily all that safe for Israel, and it will be less safe the more it tries to assume the role of sovereign over the prickly Palestinians. At any rate, the prospects are sufficiently cloudy that there is no reason to prefer a confederation under Amman strongly over an independent West Bank state for some presumed reason of security for Israel.

The truth is that Israel's security against the Palestinians cannot be considered in a vacuum, as though the only question were how best to hem them in. The penchant for mischief among the larger Arab states who can exploit Palestinian attitudes must also be factored in. This indeed is one reason why the need to buttress the Arab moderates is so important. There is a general consensus among Arabs for giving Palestine its "sovereignty", and if

the moderates cannot win this the radicals will take over.

Thus everything points to a Palestinian state, or at least early acknowledgement by us and the Israelis that such a state must be an eventual part of the settlement. Prime Minister Begin must be induced to offer this prospect as his response to Sadat's initiative. The Egyptian leader has held out the Arab hand in the three-decade quest for reciprocal Arab-Israeli recognition, and the Arabs await the extending of the Israeli hand. They will wait only so long. If President Carter is serious in saying, as he has, that no obstacle should be allowed to block a just and lasting settlement, then he must see to it that the hand is extended and the two sides at last clasp in mutual acknowledgement.

Classified by Douglas S. Kinney
Subject to General Declassification Schedule
of Executive Order 11652. Automatically
downgraded at two-year intervals and
declassified on December 31, 1982

PALESTINIAN ACTIVITY IN IRAN

I. Efforts by the Palestinian Fedayeen to gain influence in Iran reflect the rivalry between the more moderate elemen led by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and the radical groups, particularly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

A. Arafat seems to have largely succeeded in having his own organization, Fatah, dominate Palestinian activities in Iran, and he has helped prevent the radical groups from gaining an important role.

B. The contacts, however that have existed for several years between the radical Palestinian organizations and Iranian leftists are continuing.

C. The PFLP for more than five years has had ties to the Chariks and has trained them at bases in Lebanon. Representatives of the two groups have apparently met during the past few months to discuss further cooperation.

1. The PFLP also has contacts with other Iranian leftists, particularly dissidents in Khuzestan, and probably with anti-Khomeini elements of the Mujahedin.

2. There are unconfirmed reports that PFLP leader George Habbash met secretly with leftists in Abadan earlier this summer.

3. The PFLP reportedly has infiltrated some men and weapons into Iran; these activities seem to be centered in Khuzestan. The maximum number of PFLP members infiltrated is unlikely to exceed 275, and the actual number may well be lower. Their mission apparently is to agitate and organize among oil workers and to train the workers in weapons and explosives.

D. Habbash's intentions regarding the use of his allies and assets in Iran are not entirely clear.

1. We believe he already has some regrets about establishing good relations with the Chariks instead of with Khomeini.

2. Habbash had hoped the groups he supported would be able to seize power or at least wield a great deal of influence in the post-Shah era. Since those aims have not been fully realized, he seems mostly to be attempting to broaden his influence with dissidents in order to be able to reap the benefits in the event his leftist allies enhance their position.

3. Habbash would like to disrupt Iranian oil supplies to the West, but he is unlikely for now to use his assets in Khuzestan to attack oil facilities. He would prefer getting the Iranian Government to cut off supplies.